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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
THE UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM IN SERBIA 
 
High unemployment is certainly one of the gravest, if not the gravest economic and 
social problem in Serbia. As much as one quarter of the working population is out of work, 
hence they are not able to provide for themselves or their families. This puts Serbia at the 
European top with regard to unemployment.  
A particularly unfavorable feature of unemployment in Serbia is its long-term 
character: as many as two fifths of the unemployed have been out of work for more than five 
years, and only one quarter has been unemployed for less than a year. This means that 
unemployment in Serbia is not cyclical, but rather structural unemployment, which makes 
the chances for re-employment increasingly slimmer. The youth are particularly adversely 
affected, as a good portion of them cannot enter the labor market for years, thus becoming a 
“lost generation”. 
The reverse side of the tragically high unemployment is the fact that a small segment 
of the working age population works, either as formally employed or as self-employed. In 
2011, there was a mere 2.17 million of them in Serbia (including the gray economy), so the 
employment rate of the working age population (in the 15 to 64 age bracket) stands at just 
45.4. This means that less than half of the working age population in Serbia actually works! 
Others are either unemployed or not working (there is as much as 40.6% of them). 
Even a longer-term perspective of developments in the field of employment is very 
bleak: in some years, employment is decreasing, in others it is stagnating, so the underlying 
trend is a long-term decline in employment. 
The adverse consequences of high unemployment and low employment in Serbia are 
numerous and serious: 
• lower gross domestic product of the country in comparison with the potential one, 
• loss of human capital, because the capacities and skills of the unemployed deteriorate 
with the lapse of time, 
• increasing poverty, because the unemployed generate no income, 
• spreading of social and psychological problems, 
• threat to political stability. 
There are several factors which produce such unfavorable results. There is no doubt 
that the world economic crisis exerts a strong impact on the slackening of demand for labor 
and that it continues to bring about effects, despite the fact that the world has partially 
emerged from the crisis. Local circumstances are very important, too, among them also being 
macroeconomic policies, weaknesses of the public administration and regulatory problems, 
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i.e., a non-enabling business environment. Finally, an important role is played by policies and 
institutions related to the labor market – from labor legislation, to labor taxation, to 
unsatisfactory functioning of some competent public institutions.  
Labor legislation certainly affects the functioning of companies: the relations between 
employers and employees (recruitment, layoffs, strikes, collective bargaining, etc.), wages and 
other earnings of employees, the number of effective hours of work, internal organization of 
operations, the volume of administrative tasks in a company and generally, the operating 
costs of a company. More importantly, the regulation of labor relations impacts also upon the 
motivation systems of individuals, both employers and employees. 
 
 
PROPOSED REFORMS AIMED AT BOOSTING  
EMPLOYMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS  
 
Higher employment can only be achieved through a mix of various economic and 
social policies, definitely not by just one policy. Therefore, for the purpose of lowering the 
level of unemployment, different reforms are needed, in the fields of: 
1. demand for labor: by creating a business environment conducive to investment and 
economic activity growth;  
2. supply of labor: through reform of the education and training system, promotion of 
occupational health and resolution of the status of persons with disabilities in a more 
adequate manner; 
3. the labor market: which should be made more flexible, by eliminating the weaknesses 
of the labor legislation and by broadening the scope of negotiations between the 
employee and the employer. 
 
Serbia should not wait for the economic crisis to end and for employment to possibly 
start going up solely on the basis of increased economic activity, but to opt for upgrading the 
legal framework and policies, in particular the labor legislation, in order to contribute to the 
attractiveness of doing business and investing in Serbia in such a manner, as well as to the 
overcoming of the economic crisis and to economic growth and higher employment. 
The reform of policies relevant to labor and employment should not be a current task 
that is performed on an ad hoc basis only by the line Ministry, but rather a strategic project 
which implies a long-term activity and proper planning of the necessary steps. In that respect, 
the main stakeholders of an action plan might include the following: (1) An Employment 
Board at the level of the Republic of Serbia which would take strategic decisions on reform 
policies and actions and which would supervise their implementation; (2) a Tripartite 
Committee of the Serbian Government, consisting of representatives of the government and 
relevant trade unions and employers’ associations, and (3) an inter-departmental body of the 
Serbian government, which would coordinate operational and technical work carried out in 
line ministries. 
The potential comparative advantage of Serbia is the relatively low cost of the labor 
force and it represents an important opportunity for the future. On that basis, Serbia can 
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attract both domestic and foreign investors and enable them to make productive investments 
to mutual benefit. The cost of labor in Serbia is increased by:  
• the exchange rate policy of the strong dinar, which increases the wages of employees 
denominated in euros and discourages the inflow of foreign investment into Serbia; 
Serbia, just as many other developing countries, should pursue an exchange rate 
policy of the undervalued dinar, for the purpose of boosting exports, 
• high total tax wedge on labor makes the labor force less competitive than it would have 
been otherwise in comparison with other developing countries; the solution should be 
sought in reducing the taxation of wages when budgetary and social circumstances 
allow for that. 
 
There is no doubt that improvements in the often very sluggish operation of the public 
administration should be the priority task of the new government in Serbia, including those 
related to the labor market. Thus, courts should speed up trials and eliminate partiality which 
exists now. Inspection bodies should intensify their activity, also without partiality. More 
recent institutions (mediation, the Solidarity Fund, etc.) must try to justify their existence. 
And the Ministry of Labor would have to abide by the Law and refrain from political abuse of 
labor relations, particularly collective bargaining. 
 
 
AMENDMENTS TO THE LABOR LAW 
 
The existing labor legislation is not stimulating for employment, but has taken over 
the regulation which was common in the European Union, and even beyond that. The central 
idea of such labor legislation is the protection of employees against risks which inevitably 
surround economic activity, i.e., the shifting of these risks to the employer.  
The most important features of the Serbian Labor Law and related regulations can be 
summed up in the following manner: 
• restrictions imposed in all important fields, which prevent agreements between the 
employer and the employee even where they would be mutually beneficial; 
• a chaotic system of collective bargaining at national and sectoral levels that also 
includes participants with disputable representativeness and in which the so-called 
extended effect is extensively used, 
• a large number of legal and technical errors and meaningless arrangements, made 
because of the hasty adoption of the Labor Law. 
 
Such system of labor relations:  
• gives rise to a rise in unemployment and weakens the performance of the 
economy, 
• increases labor costs, which also results in declining employment, 
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• distorts the equality principle, since it favors the currently employed at the 
expense of the unemployed, i.e. mostly older at the expense of younger 
generations, 
• encourages non-compliance with the law, as life inevitably tries to circumvent 
unnecessary barriers, 
• encourages movements to the shadow economy, without any employment 
contract, 
• often leads to unnecessary conflicts within the company and the like. 
 
Serbia needs action of the new government in order to create an appropriate legal 
framework for labor, which will encourage, rather than undermine employment in Serbia. 
Proposals for amendments to the labor legislation presented in the study proceed from the 
need to strike the right balance between the interests of employees and those of the employer.  
• employees' interests must be respected through their fundamental rights: to adequate 
remuneration for work, to statutory working hours, to paid annual leave and other 
necessary forms of leave of absence, to free bargaining with the employer concerning 
the working conditions, to protection against discrimination and exploitation, to 
support in the case of termination of employment; 
• the employer’s interest must also be observed and he must be allowed to manage the 
business in the best way he can, without unnecessary restrictions, proceeding from the 
fact that the point of the company’s existence is to create new value added, and not to 
conduct social policies (which should done by the government for the most part). 
 
In addition to the employee’s and the employer’s interests, there is one more party 
whose interest should be taken into account in this type of thinking: that party is the 
unemployed person. A competitive labor market, without undeserved privileges for the 
already employed, is in their best interest. 
Serbia’s proclaimed goal is accession to the European Union; hence, it is the time for 
Serbia to start following the EU model in these matters, too, and carry out the reforms toward 
liberalization of labor legislation that have been underway there for the last 15 years or so.  
The reform of labor legislation is necessary in order to achieve higher employment 
and lower unemployment, both directly – through creation of legal options for facilitated 
employment – and indirectly – through creation of an improved business climate that would 
attract investors and bring about economic progress and higher employment.  
The proposal for amendments to the Labor Law is based on the following principles:  
• the essence of the so-called European labor relations model has been preserved,  
• the respect for the rights of employees, and all the provisions of the conventions of the 
International Labor Organization and the Revised European Human Rights Charter, 
has been preserved, 
• the weaknesses of the existing law which are significant for employment and 
operation of the economy are eliminated,  
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• a bit more flexible, more liberal arrangement is proposed, which is in line with the 
present European trends toward liberalization of the labor legislation. 
 
The main proposed amendments to the Labor Law include the following: 
Work engagement: improvements of various options for work engagement and the 
introduction of new ones have been suggested, while eliminating or mitigating certain 
limitations:  
• Fixed-term employment: to provide for a longer duration of one contract, of 24 
months, while restricting the maximum number of contracts per employee to three; 
eliminate the obligation to state reasons for fixed-term employment; 
• Remote employment: to replace the term ‘homeworking’ by the term remote 
employment and leave more leeway for negotiation to the employee and the 
employer; 
• Employment of aliens: to adopt a new law that would be more modern than the 
current one (of 1978), and that would rest on the principle of equal status for local and 
foreign workers, with minimum derogations;  
• Job sharing contracts: to add a new section in the Labor Law (LL) which provides for 
working in a pair, that is, the performance of work by two employees sharing one job 
by splitting the working hours; 
• Temporary employment through agencies: to add a new section in the Labor Law (LL) 
which provides for legal and regulated operation by agencies which hire labor force 
that they then send to work in other companies, those which have a temporary need 
for workers; 
Working hours: changes have been proposed toward more flexible arrangements 
which provide for more negotiations between the employee and the employer and better 
utilization of the time spent at work: 
• Overtime work:  the ceiling of 4 hours per day would be kept, but the ceiling of 10 
hours per week would be replaced by 60 hours a month, as more flexible; 
• Redistribution of working hours: the redistribution cycle would be extended from 6 to 
12 months, as a more suitable cycle for seasonal jobs (construction, agriculture); 
• Secondment: to provide for secondment to another appropriate position (up to 30 
days) without amending the service contract; 
• Annual leave: to prescribe (1) that the first part of annual leave has to last at least 2, 
instead of 3 weeks, as a more flexible solution, and (2) that the second part of annual 
leave may be used in smaller bits. 
Personal income: suggested amendments are intended to enable modern forms of 
remuneration to employees: 
• to delink the principle of the same pay for the same job from positions in the job 
classification; 
• to eliminate the obligation to monthly calculate the parts of the wage based on the 
performance and the contribution to the employer’s business success, as unnecessary 
red tape, 
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• to eliminate the inclusion of personal earnings in wages (Article 105, paragraph 3) and 
thus leave their potential taxation to tax laws;  
• to set the basic wage and not the average wage (including bonuses) as the basis for 
determining compensation during absence from work; 
• to remove the setting of the minimum wage from the purview of the Socio-Economic 
Council and prescribe it in the law, similar to the indexation of pensions. 
Disciplinary liability: to reintroduce into the LL the notion of disciplinary liability 
(basic provisions), having in mind that this issue is currently completely unregulated, that is, 
there is practically only dismissal as a disciplinary punishment. 
Dismissal: while keeping the basic arrangement according to which the employer has 
to state a valid reason for the dismissal of an employee, the following changes have been 
proposed: 
• Changes in some procedures: dismissal stops being automatically unlawful if it has not 
been proven by virtue of a final and binding decision that (1) an employee has abused 
sick leave or (2) he/she committed a criminal offence; the employer is allowed to fire 
an employee and then prove in a court of law the grounds for it; 
• Illegal dismissal: the proposal is to enable the employee whose employment was 
unlawfully terminated to choose whether to be reinstated to his/her post (with modest 
compensation) or to receive full compensation for lost wages (with a possible top-up); 
• Severance pay/retirement bonus: (1) to abolish the retirement bonus, (2) to prescribe 
that the right to severance pay pertains only the those years of service spent with the 
employer that is paying the severance pay (instead for the full years of service) and (3) 
that severance pay may be paid in installments, but not more than six installments. 
Collective bargaining suffers from serious deficiencies. The main problems do not 
arise so much from the provisions of the Labor Law as they do from their inappropriate 
implementation. The most important objections are related to: the inappropriately frequent 
use of the extended effect of concluded agreements, the problem of representativeness, 
weaknesses of the so-called social dialogue and non-compliance with the provisions of 
(extended) collective agreements. 
Extended effect: in the recent years, the practice has gathered momentum according to 
which three representative associations sign collective agreements at the national or branch 
level, without broader consultations and transparency, and then these agreements are 
immediately given extended effect by virtue of the Minister’s decision, meaning that the 
validity of one collective agreement is rolled out to include all employers in a branch or 
territory, i.e., also all those who are not members of the association which has signed the 
collective agreement. The result of such practice of collective bargaining is permanent 
imposition of the will of the minority on the majority.  
Proposal: that the effect can be extended only of those collective agreements which 
have already covered at least a half of employees. That would prevent the minority from 
imposing their will on the majority.  
Representativeness: The Labor Law has established an inadequate mechanism for 
determining representativeness: it is determined by unanimous vote of a tripartite committee 
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consisting of representatives of the government and representative associations of employers 
and trade unions. The weakness of the mechanism is reflected in the following: it is not 
realistic to expect the interested parties (existing associations) to be impartial when they 
decide on the representativeness of future competitive organizations, which has been 
confirmed in practice: in the past eight years of its operation (since its formation), there is a 
permanent blockage, so no other association has become representative for the territory of 
the Republic of Serbia. Dubious or non-existent representativeness of formally representative 
associations calls into question or denies the legitimacy of collective bargaining and social 
dialogue at the level of Serbia, i.e., very few people take them seriously or have any respect for 
them. 
Proposal: to reassign the task of determining and reexamining representativeness 
from the tripartite committee to a professional body – the Business Registers Agency – which 
currently maintains the registers of associations of individuals, sports and similar 
organizations. 
Once the mentioned issues of representativeness and extended effect are resolved, i.e., 
once collective bargaining becomes far more legitimate than it is today, social dialogue and 
compliance with collective agreements at higher levels will probably be promoted as well. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
High unemployment is definitely one of if not the greatest economic and social 
problem in Serbia. As much as one quarter of the economically active population is not 
employed, and cannot support themselves and their families. This places Serbia among the 
top European countries with regard to unemployment, together with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Spain. A particularly unfavorable characteristic of 
unemployment in Serbia is its long term: as many as two fifths of the unemployed have been 
jobless for over 5 years, and only one quarter for less than a year. This means that in Serbia 
unemployment is not cyclical but structural, meaning that the chances of re-employment are 
lessening. The young generation is particularly affected, as they do not even manage to enter 
the labor market for years, thus becoming “a lost generation”. 
The other side of the tragically high unemployment is a very low rate of employment, 
i.e. the fact that a small portion of working age population works, either in formal 
employment or is self-employed. In Serbia, there are only 2.17 million of them (including the 
shadow economy) in 2011 so the employment rate of the working age population (15-64) is 
only 45.4. This means that less than a half of working age population of Serbia actually works! 
The others are unemployed or non-active (making up as much as 40.6%)  
There are numerous adverse effects of high unemployment and low employment in 
Serbia: 
• lower gross domestic product of the country than the potential, since a large part of the 
labor force is not working and contributing, 
• loss of human capital, since the knowledge and working skills of the unemployed 
diminish over time, 
• increased poverty, as the unemployed do not earn any income, so many, particularly 
those who do not have family support, become poor, with all the associated 
consequences (low standard of living, homelessness, spread of diseases, etc.)  
• widening social problems, since unemployment leads to psychological crises in an 
individual’s life: from family relations (divorce, and similar), through gambling, abuse 
of alcohol to petty crime, 
• threat to political stability, as the unemployed lose faith in democratic values and 
deem the government worthless for failing to provide them with jobs, they may easily 
fall prey to various demagogues and political extremists.  
 
The are many factors that cause adverse circumstances, including macroeconomic 
policy and regulatory issues, that is, a non-conducive business environment, but an important 
role is also played by labor market related policies and institutions – from labor legislation, 
wage taxation to unsatisfactory operation of some responsible government institutions. Such 
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policies make the Serbian labor force expensive, much more expensive than is reflected in 
employee wages alone, since the total cost of labor includes taxes and contributions, the 
employer’s administrative effort and costs associated with hiring, possible severance pays and 
all other employee compensations and benefits borne by the company. 
The current labor policies adversely affect the competitiveness of Serbian businesses, 
reducing both worker and company productivity through various obstacles to doing good 
business: from inflexible working arrangements, through high levies to limiting modern 
remuneration systems. Thus the labor force is quite uncompetitive when the productivity 
(added value) is compared to wages, which shows that the labor costs per unit of product are 
exceptionally high in regional terms.    
 
 
CHANGES AND ADAPTATION 
 
The world in which the citizens of Serbia are living and working is changing ever 
faster. The old times, when a father’s job would be handed down to his son or when a worker 
would do the same job his whole life, are long gone: they have been replaced by the era in 
which all economic and social processes are developing faster, which brings great new 
opportunities, but inevitably increases some risks.  
The first factor that brings about change is technological progress, creating new 
products and services at amazing speed, changing the manner of production and 
consumption, demanding new skills from people and changes in production structure, and 
making the old know-how, techniques, firms and sectors obsolete overnight. The second 
factor is an ever increasing competition on the market that comes from both domestic and 
foreign sources. Integration of the global economy brings great business opportunities, 
accelerates economic development and, in the long term, increases employment, as 
demonstrated by the experience worldwide in recent decades. Stronger competition 
encourages economic actors to exert maximum efforts to increase efficiency in order to keep 
up, and lagging behind in the competitiveness game brings lagging behind in business results 
and threatens company survival. 
Such fast changes require faster adjustments than before both on the part of 
businesses and their employees, including the reallocation of workers from declining firms, 
industries and sectors to the prosperous ones that have a future. The approach, common in 
Serbia, to delay dealing with problems in order to reduce social tensions and political 
problems is no longer sensible. Such a delay strategy produces negative results in the long 
term, which is clearly demonstrated by Serbia’s experience in the past years. Delaying 
adaptation causes significant economic difficulties for all: unemployed individuals have little 
chance of getting a job and earning a living and employed individuals have little chance to get 
ahead; firms lag behind their competitors and risk insolvency, while the state finds itself in 
fiscal and social difficulties.   
 
On the other hand, a country quick to accept technological innovation, improve the 
quality of labor force and develop good human resource management, improves 
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competitiveness of its businesses, is rewarded in the market with higher value added and 
better financial results, and is capable of significantly accelerating economic growth and even 
catch up with wealthier countries. The examples include Ireland, Korea, and Taiwan, as well 
as China and India  
Weak competitiveness of companies from a country, including Serbia, may occur for 
many reasons, but most are associated with weaknesses in the government economic policy 
and regulation of economic activity and its individual segments. The overall cause may be 
wrong macroeconomic policy measures, such as overvalued local currency, which raises 
prices of domestic products on the international market and makes them too expensive. 
Another is excessive labor costs relative to the value of output (added value), which are a 
result not only of wages that are (too) high relative to productivity (a consequence of 
government regulation and/or collective bargaining), but also high taxes and contributions 
on wages that bring up their gross amount paid by the employer, as well as other high costs of 
the engaged labor force – for instance, numerous leaves and long holidays, through various 
benefits and salary top-ups to high severance and retirement pay or expensive administration 
of complex employment related procedures. The third cause lies in the weaknesses of labor 
legislation that may, for social or other reasons create significant difficulties for the company 
adaptation to changed business circumstances, primarily of labor force – in terms of volume, 
structure and wages.  
Labor legislation and other employment regulation have a definite impact on the 
functioning of a company: on relations between employers and employees (hiring, firing, 
strikes, collective bargaining, etc.), on wages and other employee emoluments, on the number 
of effective working hours, on internal work organization, on the scope of administrative 
activities in the company and, generally, on the operating costs of a company. Even more 
importantly, labor regulation also affects the system of motivation of individuals, both 
employers and employees. Therefore, depending on the regulation a behavior system is 
created that may deviate from the standard or expected: for example, if dismissal of 
employees is forbidden, the employer will reduce hiring to the minimum; or if long-term 
receiving of decent unemployment benefits is provided for, the unemployed will not see an 
interest in seeking employment, etc.  
In terms of required fast adjustments in a fast changing environment, the 
economically most efficient employment relations system is based on as free as possible 
contractual relations between employees and employers, since the employer then has a 
possibility, starting from purely economic criteria and company interests, to make all the 
necessary adjustments in a short time. Such free, flexible employment relations in a dynamic 
business environment carry a risk of relatively frequent job loss by a considerable number of 
workers, which in a growing economy with rising employment rates, is not necessarily a big 
problem: most workers will soon find a new job and thus be unemployed for only a short 
time. During that time they will receive unemployment benefits, perhaps participate in an 
active employment policy program and will ride out the jobless period without difficulty. 
Wishing to reduce economic risks associated with the market economy most 
countries that make up the European Union today created the so-called welfare state. They 
built a model that emphasize social functions for the purpose of correcting market outcomes 
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and provision of as much security and income equality as possible. An important component 
of this project was legislation that, under the slogan of balancing the rights of employers and 
workers, very much restricted contractual relations between employees and employers and 
attempted to protect the employee from the employer and his actions as much as possible. A 
system of employment relations was created that made it more difficult and slow and 
sometimes impossible for companies to adapt to changed circumstances, which resulted in 
inferior economic results over a long period of time and, to the politicians’ amazement, high 
unemployment.  
Rigid labor legislation, therefore, makes it difficult for a company to adapt its 
operations to a changed business environment, so it is shown that the legislation that could be 
acceptable at the time of economic boom is not at the time of crisis, when the manner of 
operation needs to be changed, costs cut, perhaps the volume of production reduced, and 
sometimes labor force downsized, and when labor legislation ties companies’ hands or is 
associated with costs of adaptation that are too high. Companies that operate within the 
framework of rigid labor legislation usually lag behind in economic competition in a very 
dynamic environment of open economies, resulting in losses of competitiveness for domestic 
companies compared to foreign competitors. Rigid labor legislation also limits opportunities 
in the labor market, particularly for new entrants. 
Flexibility here means the ease of adaptation to changed circumstances by both 
employers and employees. It is a complex phenomenon comprising several components: (1) 
the ease of change of a firm’s labor force, both in terms of numbers of employed workers and 
number of working hours; (2) wage flexibility, which refers to the ability of real wages to 
change so that the imbalances of supply and demand on the labor market would be 
eliminated; (3) contractual flexibility, where the employer and the worker can select a type of 
employment contract that suits them; (4) flexibility of profession, referring to the ability of the 
worker to perform different tasks and to acquire and apply universal skills, which can be 
applied in different jobs; (5) geographic mobility, which includes the possibility for and 
willingness of an individual to change their place of residence to make use of better 
conditions at another location, within the same firm or to find employment in another firm. 
All the above mentioned types of flexibility are needed for good functioning of a labor 
market, but the studies of this type are primarily concerned with the ones at the top of the list 
rather than those at the bottom. 
 
 
THIS STUDY  
 
The main objective of this project is to contribute to the improvement of labor market 
policies aimed at increasing employment and competitiveness of the economy for the 
purposes of accelerating economic growth. This objective may be attained if: 
  
• labor regulation is improved to increase market flexibility and employability of 
workers, 
• wage taxation, including social security contributions, is improved, 
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• regulatory burden of procedures companies face in relation to labor  
• legal protection in courts and other government institutions is strengthened  
 
Therefore, this study: 
• presents the analysis of the Serbian labor market, including the dynamics by various 
indicators (employment, unemployment, productivity, labor costs, various structures, 
etc.)  
• compares labor market indicators with the countries from the region and the 
European Union,  
• provides a review of labor legislation, primarily the Labor Law and other related 
legislation (taxation, occupational health and safety, employment policy, etc.,  
• compares legal arrangements in Serbia with global legislative practice, particularly the 
EU countries, 
• examines the functioning of the main institutions dealing with labor relations in 
Serbia (courts, mediation, inspectorate) , and 
• provides numerous recommendations for the improvement of labor market directed 
policies and institutions, particularly the Labor Law, and a developed framework for 
their implementation 
 
In the course of work on this project, a number of consultative meetings were 
organized with the representatives of interested associations, the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Policy, as well as an expert round table on labor legislation issues. We would once again like 
to thank all of them for their cooperation and very useful information and suggestions most 
of which that are incorporated in this study.  
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Chapter 1 
LABOR MARKET TRENDS  
 
EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT  
AND ACTIVITY RATES 
 
Employment and Activity 
 
Labor market trends in Serbia have been extremely unfavorable in the past years, as is 
clearly seen from the figure below. 
 
Figure 1.  
Employment, activity and unemployment rates in Serbia, 
population aged 15 - 64, percent 
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey, multiple years1 
 
Between 2004 and 2011, the activity rate dropped from about 66.5% to below 60%, 
while employment rate dropped from about 53.5% to only 45.5%. At the same time, the 
unemployment rate mostly remained about 20%, but after the onset of the 2008 crisis until 
2011 it rose from 14.4% to 23.6% in 2011 and to 25.5% in April 20122. 
                                                      
1 In 2008, major change in methodology of the Labor Force Survey has been implemented, which resulted in 
increased employment rate and reduced unemployment rate, so data is not fully comparable over this period. 
2 As of October 2012. the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia has released only limited data set related to 
the April 2012 Labor Force Survey. 
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However, the most convincing proof of the unfavorable labor market trend is the total 
number of employees, which was down from about 2.75 million in 2004 to only 2.15 million 
in 2011, i.e. the total number of employees dropped by over 20%. 
Figure 2. 
Total employment in Serbia, percent 
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey, multiple years 
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The initial employment decrease can probably be explained to a great extent by 
privatization, which was associated with elimination of fictitious jobs, and the decline since 
2008 to date is primarily a direct or indirect consequence of the global economic crisis. 
At the beginning of transition, it was expected that the disappearance of jobs in the 
public sector and bad companies will be followed by creating new jobs in new domestic or 
foreign firms. Although that happened to an extent, it was not sufficient to make up for the 
fall in employment. There were some indications that the situation with unemployment could 
start improving from 2008 onwards, but the global crisis ensued and led to a new fall in 
employment. 
The following figure shows employment and activity rate trends by gender:  
 
Figure 3. 
Activity and employment rates in Serbia by gender, percent 
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey, multiple years 
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It can be seen that the trends are somewhat similar – while the activity rate for both 
genders was actually declining all the time, the employment rate had a certain „U shape“ in 
the period between 2004 and 2008, while it exhibited a significant decline (somewhat more 
pronounced in men) in the period between 2008 and 2011. 
In addition to markedly negative trends, the current situation in the labor force 
market is exceptionally unfavorable also in comparison with the EU and neighboring 
countries.  
The figure below shows the employment rates in EU member countries, candidate 
countries and Serbia in 2004, 2008, and 2011. As can be seen, Serbia is far behind the EU 
average in each year (53.4% vs. 67.4% in 2004, 537% vs. 70.3% in 2008, and 45.4% vs. 68.6% in 
2011). In addition, in 2011, Serbia had the lowest employment rate of all the above countries. 
 
Figure 4.  
Employment rate in Serbia, EU, and candidate countries, working age population  
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey and Eurostat 
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Consequently, Serbia is now also behind countries from the region, such as Bulgaria, 
Turkey, Romania, Macedonia, and Croatia for this indicator, and lags behind some European 
countries by as much as 30 percentage points. Regarding the women employment rates, 
Turkey is the only country of all of the above where this rate was lower than in Serbia in 2011, 
which is extremely unfavorable. 
If we look at the population activity, the overall activity rate of 59% in Serbia is much 
lower than the European Union average, which was about 71.2% in 2011. However, if we look 
at age groups, we can see that the activity rates in Serbia are significantly lower for persons 
below the age of 25 and in the 55 to 59 age group.  
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Figure 5.  
Activity rates by age group in Serbia and EU average, 2011, percent  
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey and Eurostat 
 
There is a particular problem, like in the case of employment rate, in the youngest 
population groups (aged 15-29), as well as the 54-59 group.  
But there also an important problem among older people, particularly in the 55 to 59 
age group, where the activity rate of the Serbian population is below the EU average by as 
much as 10 percentage points. Of course, it is primarily a consequence of the local pension 
system that allows very early retirement, particularly for women. 
One of the most striking differences between Serbia and the EU average in the 
employment structure is the age structure, which can be seen from the figure below. 
 
Figure 6.  
Employee age structure, Serbia and EU average, 2011, percent 
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey and Eurostat 
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In Serbia, the share of young people in total employment is much lower than in the 
European Union, and the share of older people is much higher. It is obvious that the age 
structure of employees in Serbia is far more unfavorable than the age structure of EU 
employees. While the share of the middle-aged (35-50 years) is about 42% in both cases, the 
difference in share of younger and older employees is whole 7 percentage points. This is 
particularly pronounced among men, and to a lesser extent among women.  
In all, the average employee in Serbia is significantly older than the average employee 
in the EU. If this finding is correlated with the extremely high unemployment of the younger 
population, we have indications that there is a problem with attrition. In all probability, older 
workers do not lose their jobs fast enough in favor of the young. This is a serious problem and 
points to a marked inflexibility of the local labor force market. 
 
Figure 7. 
Number of employees by level of education, 2004 and 2011 
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey, 2004 and 2011 
 
If we look at the employee educational structure, we can see that virtually the entire 
employment reduction in the period 2004-2011 affected those with less than a college degree, 
and the share of those with secondary school degree slightly rose, while the share of persons 
with a college degree or higher rose significantly, which implies that there was a significant 
rise in the level of education of an average employee. 
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Figure 8.  
Educational structure of employees in Serbia, percent 
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey for 2004 and 2011 
 
The next figure shows a comparison between Serbia, EU countries and other 
candidate countries in the share of employees with some kind of tertiary qualification. The 
impression is that the situation is not that bad: 
 
Figure 9.  
Percentage of employees with a tertiary qualification in total employee number, 
Serbia, EU and candidate countries, 2011, percent 
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey and Eurostat 
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In Serbia, the share of the employee group with the highest level of qualifications 
exceeds one fifth, which is a favorable result that places it above some of the most developed 
countries. However, bearing in mind the exceptionally low level of youth employment in 
Serbia (who, by definition, cannot have an academic degree), perhaps such a favorable results 
is not so surprising. 
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Unemployment 
 
In 2011, Serbia had the highest unemployment rate of all the countries for which 
Eurostat keeps records: 
 
Figure 10.  
Unemployment rate in Serbia (April 2012), EU and candidate countries 2011, percent 
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey and Eurostat 
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In addition, Serbia exhibited the highest unemployment rate growth in the period 
between 2008 and 2011: 
 
Figure 11. 
Unemployment rate growth 2008 - 2011, percent 
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey, Eurostat 
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As for the unemployed educational structure, persons with secondary school degrees 
dominate, with about 67%, followed by elementary school (16%) and university degree (9%) 
In addition, Serbia is among the countries with the highest share of persons waiting 
for a job for over four years in total unemployment, with only Macedonia with a higher share. 
Figure 12.  
Share of persons waiting for a job for over 4 years in total unemployment, 2011, percent  
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey 2011 and Eurostat 
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As can be fully expected, the share of persons waiting for a job for less than a year is 
one of the lowest with only 26.2%. 
The figure below compares the unemployment rate by age group in Serbia and the 
EU. The bars have a similar shape: much higher unemployment for young population, and 
unexpectedly low unemployment rate in the 30-34 age group. 
 
Figure 13. 
Unemployment rate by age group, Serbia and EU average, 2011 
 
SOURCE: Labor Force Survey 2011 and Eurostat 
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The final conclusion cannot be positive by any means. If the current outcomes on the 
labor market are compared with other countries, or even with the situation several years ago, 
the situations is very bad. According to the latest data from the Labor Force Survey (April 
2012) the unemployment rate exceeded 25%, while only four years ago it was below 15%, 
which was considered very bad at the time. Moreover, with the exception of Macedonia, there 
is virtually no country in Europe where unemployment is so high.  
Aside from the very high unemployment level, low level of activity has become a very 
severe problem – about 40.6% of the working age population is not active. This leads to very 
low employment levels of the working age population (only 45.4%) which need to support 
not just children and elderly, but also non active and unemployed working age population. 
That is a very serious problem for overall economic, social and political environment. 
On one side, total social productivity is lower, collected taxes and contributions are lower, 
while demands for social transfers are growing, leading to severe fiscal problems. On the 
other side, idle social capital is losing its value, and when we see it in the context of very high 
long term unemployment rates, where more than 40% of the unemployed are being 
unemployed for more than four years, we can also raise the question of employability of those 
people – what is left of their knowledge and work skills. Also, unemployed and their families 
are facing much higher poverty risk  
These trends are partly the result of objective difficulties (transition with restructuring 
in the period up to 2008 and the global economic crisis since) but a significant factor are 
regulatory weaknesses and labor market policies, especially significant inflexibility of the 
labor market. 
All this points to the necessity of a comprehensive reform in the country and to the 
problems existing on all three sides: on the labor force supply side, on the labor force demand 
side, and on the labor force market itself. To bring unemployment down to any decent level 
the following needs to be reformed: 
4. Labor force demand through creating a business environment conducive to private 
business start-up and growth. The current business environment suffers from 
numerous weaknesses (authorities’ arbitrariness, and making ad hoc decisions, 
incompetent and often corrupt public administration, inefficient judiciary, bad laws 
are implemented at certain times and not at others...), 
5. Labor force supply, through the educational and training system reform. The current 
educational system, particularly at the secondary school level produces educational 
profiles that nobody needs any more, and does not produce the sought after profiles, 
such as persons trained to provide personal services, financial services, use of 
information technologies etc. In addition, there are very limited possibilities for 
additional education and training, and a system of certification is virtually non-
existent. 
6. Labor market is very inflexible (see later), so that even if significant reforms were to be 
implemented on the supply and demand sides, it is a big question whether positive 
results would be noticeable in such rigid market, where only a fraction of mutual 
relations can be resolved through the agreement between the employee and the 
employer. 
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LABOR COST AND PRODUCTIVITY  
TRENDS IN SERBIA 
 
Labor costs in Serbia are monitored through trends in average wage in the formal 
sector. According to official statistical data, the average wage in the first half of 2012 is close 
to RSD 56 thousand, while the net wage is slightly over RSD 40 thousand (Table 1). 
 
Table 1  
Gross Wages, in RSD (official statistics) 
 Average total labor cost  
(‘gross II’)  
 Gross average wage  
 
  
old 
methodology 
new   
methodology  old methodology 
new 
methodology 
2002 15,421 .. 13,260 .. 
2003 19,370 .. 16,612 .. 
2004 24,132 .. 20,555 .. 
2005 30,081 .. 25,514 .. 
2006 37,427 .. 31,745 .. 
2007 45,715 .. 38,774 .. 
2008 53,850 47,882 45,674 40,612
2009 .. 52,049 .. 44,147
2010 .. 55,944 .. 47,450
2011 .. 62,172 .. 52,733
2012 (I-VI) .. 65,973 .. 55,957
SOURCE: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, RAD-1 survey; estimate of wages in small enterprises 
(up to 50 employees); Tax revenues data for employed by entrepreneurs  
NOTE: 1. Change in methodology in 2009. so that wages of employed by entrepreneurs have been included 
2. Total labor cost is calculated as social security contributions paid by employee are added to gross 
wage(17.9% of gross wage since 2005) 
 
Statistics recorded exceptionally high rates of real wage growth that were above 10% 
annually in real terms almost all the time through to 2007. The highest growth was recorded 
in 2002, which can be explained by the fiscalisation of the economy as a result of the tax 
reform, but in the subsequent years, the growth rates reached as much as 14-15% in real 
terms. Average wages did not fall even during the crisis, and the only year for which the 
statistics does not record any real growth whatsoever is 2011. This can be explained by the 
loss of the lowest paid jobs, which led to the drop in employment, but not to the drop in the 
average wage.3  
 
  
                                                      
3 Specifically, the number of employees in sole proprietorships, where the (formal) wages are traditionally the 
lowest, has decreased since 2007/2008 by 130 thousand workers. 
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Figure 14.  
Nominal and real growth rates of average wage (2002-2012) 
 
SOURCE: RSO 
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In all probability, official statistics, due to methodological problems, used to 
overestimate real wage growth, which is why SORS improved its methodology of statistical 
covering of wages by including data on the wages of persons employed with sole proprietors 
that are “taken over from the Tax Administration records and joined with the data obtained 
from the monthly survey“.4  
However, when the fiscal data relating to wage payment – wage tax and pension and 
disability insurance contributions for employees are used for the approximation of the total 
formal wage bill and average wage, the fact that more taxes and contributions are collected 
than would be expected on the basis of the official statistics data is still surprising (Table 2). 
These findings indicate that one should still be very cautious when analyzing official data on 
average wage and employee number.  
 
  
                                                      
4 The basic (and the only) source of data on wage trends in the formal sector was, between 1960 and 2009, the 
monthly RAD-1 survey. As RAD form is not completed and sent by all the enterprises, a large part of the 
economy – the private sector and particularly those employed with sole proprietors, was left outside the reach of 
the statistics, which resulted in overestimating the growth and amount of average wage in Serbia.  
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Table 2.  
Average wage series according to SORS and alternative series  
 (estimate based on taxes and contributions) 
 RSO 
Based on wage 
tax 
Based on employees’ 
PDI contributions 
Average wage of 
employees at 
entrepreneurs 
2009 44,147 50,095 45,669 13,074 
2010 47,450 53,657 53,982 14,598 
2011 50,755 61,029 57,574 18,676 
SOURCE: Author`s calculation based on MFIN, PDI and SORS data 
 
When official data on the average monthly wage in Serbia expressed in euro is 
compared with other EU-candidate countries, we can see that Serbia is approximately on a 
par with BIH, Montenegro, even Turkey, while the wages are lower in Macedonia and 
Albania. Croatia, which is to become an EU member in July 2013, of course, stands out when 
it comes to the amount of the average wage.  
 
Table 3.  
Average monthly (gross) wage, EU-candidate countries (and Croatia) 
 In EUR  in PPS 
  2000 2005 2010a)   2000 2005 2010a) 
Albania 113 219 309  .. 514 738 
BIH 190 275 408  .. 627 819 
Montenegro 181 213 479  .. 508 965 
Croatia 642 848 1067  1149 1336 1528 
Macedonia 168 207 335  .. 573 862 
Serbia 65 317 458  .. 804 1011 
Turkey 246 419 504   .. 672 891 
SOURCE: EUROSTAT database and 'Pocketbook on enlargement countries 2011'; RSO, NBS and EUROSTAT for 
Serbia; a) 2009. for Albania and Turkey 
      
It is interesting to also look at comparisons of wages expressed in PPS.5 If we exclude 
Croatia again, we can say that in this indicator, Serbia (with Montenegro) stands out among 
other countries by somewhat higher average wage, in terms of a slightly higher standard of 
living that it can provide compared to other candidate countries.  
Labor productivity, expressed as the ratio of GDP in constant prices to the number of 
employees, has been constantly on the rise since 2002, although slightly slowing in the last 
two years. At the same time, total employment has constantly been declining, which indicates 
significant contingents of surplus employees. When agriculture is taken out from the 
equation, productivity growth is even faster.  
                                                      
5 Purchasing Power Standard is an artificial EU-27 currency, which was constructed with the aim of eliminating 
price differences between EU countries. Theoretically, one PPS can purchase the same value of goods/services in 
every member country.  
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  Figure 15.  
GDP per employee, constant 2002 prices   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Author’s calculation based on SORS data  
 
As for a comparison of labor productivity, one must say that it is made difficult 
primarily by the fact that EUROSTAT measures labor productivity primarily on the basis of 
worker hours through indices (not levels) – or in relation to the EU-27 average that is 100, or 
by growth indices. Productivity levels expressed in national currencies may be derived on the 
basis of data on GDP and number of employees.   
 
Table 4.  
Labor productivity (GDP/total employment), 2011 
 In EUR  In PPS 
EU-27  58,194   58,194 
EU-15  67,119   63,507 
Bulgaria  13,047   28,401 
Czech 
Republic  31,589   42,979 
Estonia  26,224   37,039 
Latvia  20,050   23,503 
Lithuania  30,705   27,505 
Hungary  26,368   43,261 
Poland  22,939   38,740 
Romania  14,765   28,748 
Slovakia  29,369   42,375 
Slovenia  36,340   44,011 
Croatia  30,079   44,420 
Macedonia  11,337   28,639 
Serbia  14,458   29,634 
Turkey  22,984    41,030 
SOURCE: EUROSTAT database and 'Pocketbook on enlargement countries 2011'; SORS, NBS and EUROSTAT for Serbia; 
2006 data for Turkey and Macedonia 
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When we compare labor productivity in Serbia expressed in euro with European 
Union country average, Serbia is far behind as can be expected, but also considerably behind 
the countries that joined the EU later, except Romania and Latvia, while Bulgaria and 
Macedonia are at a lower level than Serbia. When we compare labor productivity expressed in 
PPS, these findings are even more convincing, while Lithuania joins the group of countries 
with lower labor productivity.  
The indicator of price competitiveness that is very often used is a unit labor cost. It 
shows the link between the amount of employee income and labor productivity. The unit 
labor cost may be calculated in different ways, as there is no single definition of unit labor 
cost. Figure 3 shows unit labor costs calculated as the ratio of total labor cost (average gross 
wage plus contributions paid by employer), excluding agriculture, to productivity expressed 
as GDP per employee, where employees also include sole proprietors.  
 
Figure 16.  
Unit labor costs, rate 
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*break in the series (change of wage monitoring methodology) 
SOURCE: Author’s calculation based on SORS data  
 
The problem in this series is a well-known “break” that occurred due to the change of 
methodology of covering wages in 2009. Nevertheless, we can observe a slight drop in unit 
labor costs in the last few years. Due to the break, unit labor cost was calculated by 
approximating the total cost of employees on the basis of wage tax. The average cost per 
employee calculated in this manner may be related to the GDP per employed worker, which 
represents aggregate compensation for employees relative to GDP. We must point out that 
until 2005, wages did not grow faster than productivity, which official data indicated, but they 
did so between 2005 and 2007, after which they started declining. Therefore, we can say that 
price competitiveness of Serbia has been slightly improving in the last few years.  
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Figure 17.  
Unit labor cost (aggregate total employee costs /GDP), percent 
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NOTE: Aggregate total employee costs are derived from wage tax  
 
As can be seen, at the aggregate level, unit labor cost is conceptually reduced to the 
“labor share” indicator – the total part of GDP that goes to labor.6 Therefore it should be 
interpreted with caution. Unit labor cost at the level of a firm and the entire economy does 
not mean the same. At the firm level, reduction of labor costs is always welcome, whereas at 
the aggregate level it means a decline in capital productivity.  
Concerning international comparisons of unit labor costs, what is usually monitored 
is their trend – indices in nominal and real terms – while the levels cannot be found in 
“ready-made” data series. For the purposes of price competitiveness comparisons, we need 
unit labor cost levels, so we will therefore look at the “labor share” indicator that is commonly 
calculated as the share of total employee compensation to GDP, from the national accounts.7 
The data for Serbia are derived from the wage tax, as SORS ceased publishing GDP according 
to income approach.  
 
  
                                                      
6 As a rule, it should include the income of the self-employed, but is mostly calculated only for employee labor 
costs.  
7 This version is most commonly used for international comparisons, although it underestimates the labor share 
in GDP since it does not include the income of the self-employed, which is recorded in national accounts within 
the item “mixed income”. For details see Lubker, M. (2007); „Labor shares“, Technical Brief No. 1, ILO. 
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Figure 18. 
Labor share in GDP, 2011 
 
SOURCE: EUROSTAT, for Serbia, author’s calculation on the basis of MoF data  
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Serbia has a much lower labor share than most EU countries, particularly the most 
developed ones, which is only to be expected as the labor share is generally higher in 
developed countries (Lubker, 2007), but it is slightly higher than in Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Thus, it is demonstrated that Serbia has 
price competitiveness compared to the European Union average and most member countries, 
and that, in this indicator, its competitors are Easter European countries that joined the EU in 
2004 and 2007.  
Overall, labor productivity in Serbia is very low, and in this respect, Serbia is trailing 
behind the European countries, together with come other Balkan countries. ON the other 
hand, in terms of labor costs, Serbia ranks higher, overtaking not only some Balkan but also 
some East European countries with a much higher labor productivity than Serbia. Therefore 
there is a mismatch in Serbia between productivity and gross wages, at the expense of 
productivity, thus harming the productivity of the Serbian economy in the foreign markets  
 
 
PRIVATIZATION, RESTRUCTURING AND EMPLOYMENT  
 
After the second wave of Serbian transition, the 2001 one, started, one of the 
unavoidable difficult questions had to do with employment dynamics in the coming years 
considering that, at the times of transition, it is common for employment to be among the 
first victims of structural changes. A drop in total employment, caused by the falling socially-
owned and state-owned sector, is probably inevitable in at the initial stages considering that 
the process of destruction of the old, untenable job positions is usually faster than the process 
of creating new ones, particularly if the starting situation was farther away from what is an 
economically rational (balanced market) situation. Thus, in 2000 Serbia there was a 
considerable surplus in people employed in enterprises, which was created in the previous 
decades of self-management socialism and then increased in the 1990s that ruined the Serbian 
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economy. Later individual restructuring processes in individual companies showed that, most 
commonly, this surplus amounted to one third and one half of the inherited labor force.  
The Government of Serbia initially focused on the following labor market strategy:  
• A relatively liberal labor law, with the intention to increase labor market flexibility and 
so improve the investment climate in Serbia, 
• Lowering wage taxes and contributions, so as to reduce labor costs and encourage new 
hiring, particularly through moving from then widely-spread shadow economy to the 
formal sector, 
• Active employment policy measures, intended to facilitate new hiring, and 
• Quite generous social programs for those who lost their jobs or who accepted to 
voluntarily leave the privatized companies, which was supposed to mitigate the 
consequences of job loss during the transition. 
 
The idea behind the first item on the list was to facilitate the restructuring of 
companies, the second and the third were meant to encourage long-lasting employment 
growth, and the fourth was intended to help those who are left jobless. 
In the years that followed – before the 2008 crisis – the plan was only partly 
implemented. The restructuring gradually decreased the number of employees in the 
privatized sector, but less radically than expected. The reason was somewhat slow 
privatization that was not based on any of the mass privatization concepts but rather on the 
sale of individual companies, which implies a more complex and more protracted procedure. 
On the other hand, the growth of autochthonous private sector, which was supposed to be the 
source of new employment, was very slow and therefore insufficient to make up for the losses 
caused by the restructuring of state-owned and socially-owned sectors; the result was only a 
moderate reduction of total employment.  
Since the end of 2008 to date, the above mentioned process of restructuring-related 
reductions in employment was joined by the consequences of economic crisis and its impact 
on ever deeper drop in employment and rise in unemployment.  
The fall of employment in the business sector involved in the privatization process 
was massive: in 2002, at the beginning of the privatization process, the number of people 
employed in this group of companies was about 680 thousand, and in 2010, these companies 
employed only 286 thousand people, or less by 58%.8  
The process of corporate restructuring is not yet finished in all companies which have 
gone through the privatization process; and a large number of companies are yet to be 
privatized. Namely, there is  a large group of companies without any business prospects, and 
many of them are still in the so-called restructuring program; namely, they are still receiving 
subsidies to be able to pay wages and formally stay away from the bankruptcy procedure. This 
group comprises almost two hundred companies, with about 100 thousand employees, and 
their proper restructuring (or bankruptcy) will definitely be accompanied by new 
unemployment. 
 
                                                      
8 Impact Assessment of Privatization in  Serbia, Privatization Agency, Belgrade, 2012 
30 
 
LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION  
 
An important characteristic of the Serbian labor market is that it is segmented. While 
developed economies will normally view their labor market as a more or less single unit, with 
practically identical or very similar institutional arrangements, identical or very similar 
manner of wage setting, and easy mobility of workers from one to the other part of the 
market, the analyses for developing economies are often based on the idea of a dual, or 
segmented labor market.9 Labor market in this model is not integrated but rather consists of 
two or more ‘submarkets’, or autonomous markets with characteristics of their own, which 
are interconnected to an extent but which also feature their own specificities and dynamics. 
The usual division is the one into two segments, whether to make a distinction between a 
modern and backward sector or between a formal and informal sector. Divisions in more 
than two sectors are quite frequent too, depending on theoretical preferences and the current 
situation in the country concerned. The causes of labor market segmentation are often to be 
found in the combined effect of (1) institutional, i.e. regulatory differences, when individual 
parts of the market are differently regulated and directed by the government policy and 
legislation, and (2) internal characteristics of individual parts of labor market, such as the role 
of trade unions and employer associations, regional imbalance, etc.  
In Serbia, four autonomous labor market segments can be clearly distinguished, 
namely: 
• State sector, 
• Formal sector in the private economic sector, 
• Informal sector in the private economic sector, and  
• Individual farming. 
 
The distribution of employees between segments in 2011 was as follows: 
 
Employment in 2011 (in 000) 
State sector 678.1
Other formal sector, without farmers 1,051.3
Informal sector, without farmers 112.3
Farmers (and helping members of the household) 411.5
Total 2,253.2
SOURCE: ARS 2011, SORS 
 
As can be seen, the state sector includes as much as 30.1% of all employees, which is 
comparatively a very high share, particularly in view of the fact that the other, i.e. private part 
of the formal sector is not much larger that the public part (only by a half) and accounts for 
46.7% of total employment. Farmers account for 18.3% of total employment, and shadow 
economy for only 5.0%. An explanation for such a small share of shadow economy may be 
                                                      
9 The roots of this idea may be found in Arthur Lewis' 1954 model of dual labor market  
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that, according to the Labor Force Survey, it does not include those who are employed in 
formal sector even when they take an active part in the shadow economy.  
From the legislative point of view, formal private sector is governed by the Labor Law 
with accompanying institutional structure; governmental sector is governed by the Labor 
Law, but also by the Law on Civil Servants and Auxiliary Staff which partly changes a large 
number of the Labor Law arrangements (disciplinary responsibility, termination of 
employment, collective bargaining, and the like). In the remaining two sectors employment 
relations are virtually unregulated; namely, none of the laws governing labor, employment 
relations or hiring apply to these areas of economic activity. 
Different regulation, even absence thereof, results in different functioning of these 
segments of the labor market, beginning with the manner of wage formation, hiring and 
firing, collective bargaining, and similar. Accordingly, individual segments have different 
basic characteristics: 
• State sector: comprises public administration, greater part of education, health care, 
and similar activities, as well as public enterprises; provides for a higher level of job 
security, which is partly a consequence of the legislative protection of employees and 
partly of a higher financial stability; political parties have a strong impact on hiring, 
particularly for senior positions; there is a greater evenness of wages so that the lower 
rank employees often have higher wages and experts often have lower wages than in 
the private sector;  
• Formal part of the private sector: comprises a larger part of the economy – from 
industry and trade through to different services; the Labor Law regulates employment 
relations in this segment, although it is not always fully applied, particularly in small 
firms; job security is lesser than in the public sector, primarily due to business risks; 
wage differentials are high; the role of trade union differs from firm to firm and 
collective bargaining is uneven; 
• Informal sector excluding farmers: comprises shadow economy in different business 
activities: from street vendors, through craftsmen, to doctors who are employed in 
public institutions but work in private ones after hours; main reasons for its existence 
include the avoidance of government regulation of both rigid employment relations 
and tax liabilities; most are self-employed as small sole proprietors, while the number 
of ‘employees’ working for employers is modest; social security entitlements are 
mostly non-existent: contributions for social insurance are not paid and, 
consequently, they do not have health or pension insurance; the latest economic crisis 
has affected this sector and the number of employees dropped by more than in the 
case of formal sector because this market is more flexible and it more fully adapts to 
economic circumstances;10  
• farmers (with helping members): this segment is a source of (potential) labor force for 
other sectors; their number is decreasing in the long term, with demographic changes 
and the advancement of agricultural technology, but this decrease is slowed down at 
                                                      
10 G. Matković, B. Mijatović and M. Petrović: Uticaj krize na tržište radne snage i životni standard u Srbiji 
(Impact on the Crisis on the Labor Market and Living Standards in Serbia), CLDS, 2010, p. 24 
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the times of crisis; because of the existence of agricultural holdings, farmers are self-
employed sole proprietors who occasionally, at the time of seasonal works, may 
employ people off the books; some of them pay social insurance and thus have 
pension11 and health care entitlements, while others do not; since they are attached to 
their holdings, the inertia is the main characteristic of this labor market segment. 
 
These labor market segments are interconnected, which is manifested by the transfer 
of people from one to the other segment, but also influences and modeling after the other, 
e.g., partly in wage setting. There is definitely a considerable dynamics in the overall labor 
market, particularly between the formal private sector and informal private sector and the 
unemployed and inactive populations. Considering the a declining employment trend in 
Serbia has already become long-term, a part of employees move to the unemployed group 
and a part to the group of inactive people who are not looking for a job because they do not 
believe they can find one.12 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES 
 IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS 
 
According to the data of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (which, in 
addition the data for public administration, include public services and public enterprises, but 
do not include the police and the military) the Serbian public sector employs almost one in 
four formally employed persons, which is very much. When about 90 thousand persons 
employed in the police and the military13 are added to this figure, we can see that for each 2.2 
persons employed in the private sector, one person in employed in the public sector. In its 
report entitled “Proposed Fiscal Consolidation Measures 2012 – 2016”, the Fiscal Council 
stated that the employment in the Serbian public sector is not excessive relative to the 
population, but that it is excessive relative to the number of employed persons.  
A large number of persons employed in the public sector predominantly results from 
the incapability of earlier governments to reform the public sector and reduce it to a 
reasonable scale. This is probably best illustrated by the movements of employment in 
education where, within the past ten years, the ratio between students and employees fell 
from 9.2 to below 7 – although the number of students dropped from about 1.035 mil to 
about 0.86 mil, the number of employees increased from about 112 thousand to more than 
122 thousand . 
Simply put, hiring in the public sector is still a source of clientelism in Serbia – a 
government job is a common motive for joining a political party and political parties often 
use employment opportunities to reward their loyal and deserving members and their 
families. A certain measure of public administration professionalization implemented in the 
                                                      
11 Cf. B. Mijatović – Farmers’ Pension Insurance, CLDS, 2010 
12 G. Matković, B. Mijatović and M. Petrović, ibid, pp. 15-17 
13 The World Bank, Serbia: Right-Sizing the Government Wage Bill, 2010 
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previous period mostly related only to the highest government positions and bodies, while 
hiring at lower levels of government, and particularly in public enterprises, utility companies 
and public services, is mostly carried out on the basis of advertising vacancies where 
everything has already been agreed. 
On the other hand, the past ten years saw a considerable drop in the number of 
private sector employees (does who receive wages, which means that the persons employed in 
shadow economy or agriculture are not taken into account). The total number of persons 
employed in the public sector slightly fell; we will see below, however, that this is mostly a 
result of lesser employment in public enterprises. 
 
Figure 19.  
Employment trends in formal private and public sector 
 
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, Public Finance Bulletin 
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Specifically noticeable is that, since the onset of crisis in 2008, some 250 thousand 
(16%) jobs have been lost in the private sector, while only about 12 thousand (2.5%) jobs were 
lost in the public sector. 
With regard to the public sector structure, there has been a considerable decrease in 
employment in the state-owned public enterprises (which was primarily due to divesting 
non-core activities and, in some cases, limited restructuring and privatization); some increase 
was seen in education and culture, while the number of employees largely stagnated in other 
areas (administration, health care, local utility companies). 
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Figure 20. 
Employment trends by public sector components 
 
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, Public Finance Bulletin 
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Therefore, some reduction of the public sector has been observed, although one may 
say that, compared with private sector employees, public sector employees have relatively 
painlessly weathered the crisis– there were practically no dismissals at all. 
The employment and wage trends in the public sector have a large impact on the 
‘private’ labor market since public and private sector compete for the same employees. 
Accordingly, the wage policy of the public sector sets a kind of benchmark for other 
employers. The figure below shows the average net wage trends in public and private sectors 
in Serbia. Any direct comparison would of course be questionable, considering that these 
groups are completely different. On the one hand, public sector employees are probably 
better educated and more experienced, and they often perform very dangerous and 
responsible tasks. On the other hand, job security is at a much higher level, and working 
conditions are better by far.  
 
Figure 21.  
Average net wage trends in private and public sectors 
 
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, Public Finance Bulletin 
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There is a particular problem in that the lowest to highest wage ratio in the public 
sector is much below the corresponding ration in the private sector. This means that, if 
compared to the private sector, public sector is a relatively good option for persons with a 
lower level of education and skills. This means that private sector must pay them more if it 
wants to employ them. It is questionable whether this is a serious problem at this point in 
time, when unemployment rate is extremely high, but it can become a serious problem if 
unemployment drops. 
Serious fiscal problems faced by Serbia open up the question of sustainability of the 
existing model in which public sector hiring is often seen as a manner to prevent social 
problems. The reforms whose goal is to reduce the public sector costs and introduce 
incentives for better performance have been postponed for years, particularly in the sectors 
that employ the largest number of people – education and health care.  
All things considered, the following governments will be under a great employee 
pressure to increase wages and there will be no room for it – the deficit needs to be reduced, 
and room needs to be made in the budget for the increasing cost of interest.  
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Chapter 2 
GENERAL LABOR REGULATION  
 
LABOR LEGISLATION  
 
Early in the past decade, in the first phase of transition, Serbia reformed its 
employment relations and to some extent liberalized its labor legislation, i.e. the pre-reform 
model from the 1990s that was adopted in quite different circumstances. Already in 2005, a 
step backward was made and the Labor Law was made much more restrictive. That is why 
employment relations reform has not thus far been based on balanced relations between 
employees and employers, as it was proclaimed; rather, it has essentially transposed the 
regulations common in the European Union, and even more than that – it wrote into law 
many arrangements that caused the interest of employees to prevail over the interests of 
employers and the overall business interest and, consequently, inflexibility of employment 
relations and labor market. The central idea behind such labor legislation is to protect 
employees against the risks inherent to economic activity as such, that is, the transfer of these 
risks to the employer, with all financial and other consequences. Its main characteristics 
include considerable protection of employees, highly formalized and complex procedures in 
employment relations, important role of trade unions imposed by the law, extension of the 
term of the old General Collective Bargaining Agreement concluded in the pre-reform period 
which markedly expanded the rights and protection of employees, and the like.  
Good illustration of the character of the Labor Law, namely its bias against employers, 
is Art. 12 – 17 which list the rights and obligations of main actors who determine their 
mutual relations. This catalogue contains provisions about the rights and obligations of 
employees and the obligations of employers. The rights of employers are not mentioned at all, 
as if there were not any. Even though they can be implicitly identified, the fact that their 
explicit mentioning is avoided suggests what is the ideological orientation of the lawmaker 
and that the imbalance is created at the very beginning of the legal text and is subsequently 
consistently maintained, namely that their rights are minimized and given only secondary 
importance, which is definitely not good for the attractiveness of doing business in Serbia. 
The main features of the Labor Law and related legislation may be summed up as 
follows: 
• Restrictiveness in all important matters: from the restrictions related to the types of 
work engagement and the provisions of working hours annual leaves, through the 
conservative approach to the regulation of remuneration, to rigid arrangements for 
the termination of employment and pro-union approach to the role of  trade unions 
and collective bargaining; 
• Extreme patronizing character of the Labor Law which, through extensive regulation 
of every single matter, prevents any agreement between the employer and the 
employee, even where it is in the best interest of both of them, 
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• Chaotic system of collective bargaining at national and sectoral levels that also 
includes non-representative participants and where the so-called extended effect is 
extensively used, thus distorting the idea of free collective bargaining and turning the 
collective bargaining itself into something quite opposite. 
 
This system of employment relations relations gives rise to a drop in employment and 
competitiveness of the Serbian economy, because it:14  
• disrupts businesses in their economic and financial adaptation to the dynamic 
change of environment and inhibits the transfer of employees from companies 
and activities with no prospects to ones with good prospects, thus causing a direct 
economic damage to the Serbian economy,  
• is associated with increasing labor costs, which results in less hiring as it 
discourages employers to employ new people; together with slowed-down 
transition and the government’s inappropriate response to economic crisis, this 
led to very negative trends in employment and unemployment, 
• distorts the equality principle, since it favors the currently employed at the 
expense of the unemployed, i.e. mostly older at the expense of younger 
generations, through few people fired or hired, which results in a stable labor force 
in the company that hardly ever changes, 
• encourages non-compliance with the law, as life inevitably tries to circumvent 
unnecessary barriers, so breaking the law is very common either for the purposes 
of resolving real problems (for instance, employees sign blank and dateless letters 
of resignation which are held by the employer), or due to the lack of required 
expertise on labor legislation in smaller firms; this in turn results in numerous 
litigations relating to the violation of statutory procedures which, due to the 
apparent bias of the courts in favor of employees,15 leads to the distortion of the 
rule of law and losses in the economy, 
• leads to non-standard forms of employment (fixed-term, temporary, casual 
employment, service contracts, etc.) with the idea to have the regular labor force in 
the company regulated in an easier and less costly manner;  
• encourages movements to the shadow economy, without any employment 
contract, to avoid restrictive provisions of labor legislation and the increased costs 
relative to the market wage level, 
• encourages the use of advanced technologies that save on the labor and 
outsourcing work assignments, for the same reasons, 
  
                                                      
14 See Reform of the Labor Market and Labor Relations, in Four Years of Transition in Serbia, CLDS, 2005; 
Serbia, Labor Market Assessment, World Bank, September 2006; Employment Protection Regulation and Labor 
Market Performance, in OECD Employment Outlook, OECD, 2004; Serbia: A Labor Market in Transition, 
OECD, 2008; White Book, FIC, 2011 
15 Some believe that one of the reasons for this bias is the fact that the costs of court proceedings in Serbia are 
borne by the losing party and that it would be too much of a burden for many employees, and also that it is 
much easier to collect these costs from the employer.  
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• often leads to unnecessary conflicts within the company, since it introduces overly 
high standards in employment relations, and the like. 
A comparison between arrangements in Serbia with arrangements in other countries 
is shown in the section below, and the discussion of specific weaknesses of the most 
important arrangements of the Labor Law is presented in Chapter 4. 
Resistance to the changes in labor legislation on the part of the trade unions is large. 
Thus, the attempt at a very limited flexibilization of labor legislation towards the end of 2011, 
in the form of Serbian Government’s proposed amendments to the Labor Law, was rejected 
by the unions. This made the Government give up its own proposal. The EU member states 
have been making progress in the process of change in a more liberal direction for an entire 
decade now, while Serbia lags behind the EU, by adhering to the old concept which is being 
gradually abandoned by the EU member states themselves. 
 
 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
Industrial relations in Serbia are regulated by the Labor Law (2005) and the Law on 
Socio-Economic Council (2004). The main actors of collective bargaining at the branch of 
industry and national level are the Serbian Association of Employers (SAE), Confederation of 
Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia (CATUS), Nezavisnost Trade Union Confederation 
(UGS Nezavisnost) and, since recently, the Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTU), 
representing the unions, and the Government of Serbia, as a participant in the tripartite, so-
called ‘social dialogue’ and the employer for the public sector. The representativeness of the 
above mentioned organization of employers and the unions was recognized in accordance 
with the Labor Law. A number of associations have unsuccessfully been attempting to acquire 
a representative status in recent years (the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, Association of 
Free and Independent Trade Unions (AFITU), Association of Small and Medium Sized 
Enterprises (ASME), Poslodavac Association). 
Collective bargaining in Serbia varies depending on the sector in which it takes place. 
The public sector applies branch agreements, and private sector mostly applies collective 
agreements at the company level and sometimes collective agreements of higher levels 
(branch and national) are adopted. Almost all employees are covered by collective bargaining 
agreements in the public sector, while this coverage in private sector is relatively low because 
of the low level of employee membership in trade unions16 and the lack of understanding and 
knowledge of collective bargaining both on the side of some local trade unions and some 
employers. 
Due to a relatively small number of company collective agreements and relatively 
small coverage of employees, trade unions traditionally try to compensate for this deficiency 
by adopting higher-level collective bargaining agreements, particularly the highest-level ones 
– the general collective bargaining agreement for the whole of Serbia, with extended effect. 
With this, the entire private sector in Serbia is covered by a single agreement.  
                                                      
16 M. Arandarenko - Serbia: Industrial Relations Profile, Eurofound, 2012, pp.  5-6 
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After long years in which archaic General Collective Bargaining Agreement from 1997 
was in force, a new agreement was adopted in May 2008 and lasted until May 2011. It was 
harshly criticized by employers but was of little practical value. At the time of crisis hardly 
anybody took any notice of its provisions. In the course of last year and this year, several 
branch collective agreements have been adopted, with extended effect. 
The main problems with collective bargaining at the national level do not arise that 
much from the provisions of the Labor Law as they do from their inappropriate 
implementation. The most important remark from the employers concerns the careless 
implementation of the extended effect of concluded agreements and a wide-spread perception 
among Serbian employers that they are not represented in the bargaining process, 
considering that the officially representative association of employers does not represent their 
interests properly, but makes too many concessions to trade unions and the Government of 
Serbia. An illustration of such concession can be found, for instance, in the surges of 
minimum wage (13% in April 2012), or in the General Collective Bargaining Agreement 
signed by the Association in 2008, which particularly favored employees and trade unions 
and which excessively restricted the rights of employers in employment relations. A highly 
illustrative event took place in 2008 when an Annex to the General Collective Bargaining 
Agreement was signed providing for wage increase for all employees (its extended effect was 
signed to immediately) by as much as 20%; this anti-business act was annulled by the 
Government of Serbia.  
The problem of participant representativeness is particularly acute as the process of 
determining the representatives at national level was very much non-transparent in the past. 
There are wide-spread rumors that the Serbian Association of Employers is not really 
representative, and some doubts have been raised with regard to UGS Nezavisnost. The 
competent Ministry of Labor is  not taking any steps to clarify the situation, and a good 
illustration of doubts could be the letter that CATUS sent to the Serbian Association of 
Employers at the moment when their cooperation was discontinued: “Dear Sirs and Madams 
from the Serbian Association of Employers, we are now resolute in our intention to officially 
establish whom you are representing, namely whether you are competent under the Labor 
Law to participate as an equal social partner in the dialogue at the level of the Republic”.17 
They failed in this intention and CATUS and SAE continued their collaboration.  
In the past year the old practices continued: the three representative associations 
signed several branch collective agreements, without any wider consultation and 
transparency, which were immediately afforded extended effect (except the one for metal 
industry which was signed last). 18 Some of these agreements broadened individual rights of 
employees compared to the Labor Law: for instance, it increased  the amounts of severance 
                                                      
17 Open Letter of CATUS Presidency dated 30 December 2008, in R. Kosanović & Sanja Paunović - Collective 
Bargaining, FES, Belgrade, 2010, Exhibit 15. 
18 Interestingly, the authors of these industry agreements are inclined to copy the provisions of the Labor Law ad 
extenso, as if they would not apply without being ‘endorsed’ in the collective agreement. It is similar with a large 
number of provisions which read that the employer or the employee “may...”, as if it were the branch specific 
collective agreement (BCA), rather than the Labor Law, that gives somebody a right to do things, or as if it were 
a matter of some natural right of the employer and the employee.  
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pay, more precisely specified criteria for identifying redundancies, increased compensation 
for working on non-working days and at night, as well as holiday allowance, meal allowance 
and field work allowance, imposed on employers a duty to provide its employees with 
insurance policies against death, occupational injury, impairment or loss of work capacity, etc. 
The orientation of national collective bargaining actors in Serbia to collective 
bargaining agreements of a higher level (general or industry) creates new difficulties both for 
employers and employees. Since the conditions of working and operating on the (often local) 
market, technical, financial and staff characteristics of a business, labor relations and 
remuneration policy, work organization and similar factors differ between businesses, a single 
collective bargaining agreement of a higher level cannot suit everyone equally, meaning that it 
usually does not suit anyone. A uniform arrangement cannot suit everyone. To respect such 
diversity it is far better to bargain at an individual business level, as it is then possible to 
respect the specificities of a business, which will definitely benefit both employers and 
employees. Thus, for instance, only at the company level there may be a rational link between 
productivity trends and employee wages, which is a precondition for an efficient 
remuneration system and encouragement of good work. 
This process has additional two serious shortcomings: 
• Branch agreements, by all accounts, were not concluded by representative 
associations; namely the Labor Law also recognizes representative associations of 
industries and economic activities and establishes a quantitative requirement for them 
(15% of workers for an association of employers, and 10% for a trade union, Art. 220 
& 222); it is not publicly known, however, that the three associations with ‘general’ 
representativeness for the territory of Serbia were also recognized as representative for 
branches and industries for which they have signed collective agreements; and if they 
are not – then branch collective agreements are not in conformity with the law and 
should not be valid, 
• The insistence on the extended effect goes so far that branch collective agreements 
come into effect only when the minister extends their effect; thus, the branch 
agreement for the construction and construction materials industries reads: “The 
Collective Bargaining Agreement is concluded for a period of 12 months, from the 
date when the competent minister issues a decision whereby this Collective 
Bargaining Agreement shall fully apply to all the employers who are not members of 
the Association of Employers – the participants of this Collective Bargaining 
Agreement”; this is an extremely unusual step: as if the BCA were not made for own 
members but rather for those who are not, i.e. as if its provisions were not good and 
the signatories consequently refrain from applying them in ‘their own’ organizations; 
this definitely raises serious suspicions about the CBAs adoption process as well as 
their content. 
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More details about the substantial and legal aspects of problems with both the 
representativeness and extended effect of collective agreements are given in Chapter 4. 
For quite some time now, Serbia has been promoting a so-called tripartite social 
dialogue (trade unions, employers, and the government) at the national level as an important 
institutional arrangement for mitigating the crisis and dealing with substantial socio-
economic issues in the country. The institutional framework for social dialogue is the Social 
and Economic Council that was established by the 2004 Law of the same name.  
The results of the Council are not great. The best is the adoption of the 2008 General 
Collective Bargaining Agreement. However, it was suspended to a large extent shortly 
afterwards. After it expired in May 2011, no new general collective agreement was adopted. 
One of its regular legal obligations is to establish the representatives of employees’ and 
employers’ associations, and the functioning of the Council, namely its Board, produces 
much criticism and dissatisfaction of interested parties because the work of the Council is 
frequently paralyzed. The second legal obligation of the Council is to determine the 
minimum wage, which is mostly reduced to a political haggle in which the Government holds 
the trump card: the legal provision stipulating that if the Council fails to reach agreement, it 
may autonomously determine the minimum wage. What is more, there were some periods 
when the Council did not meet at all because of bad relations between the participants. 
On a wider social and political plane, the Social and Economic Council has not 
produced any visible results either. A good example is the only visible activity in this respect 
in recent years – the adoption of the so-called Social and Economic Agreement in April 2011, 
which was a response of the Government and associations of employees and employers to the 
extended crisis. With this Agreement the Government undertook to encourage growth and 
employment and promote social security; all associations undertook to comply with collective 
agreements, the employers undertook to protect the existing jobs and regularly pay wages and 
social security contributions, and the unions undertook to refrain from strikes. By all 
accounts, this Agreement is not producing any effect at all, apart from the provision 
concerning the conclusion of branch collective agreements, which is slowly moving forward. 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL LABOR MARKET COMPARISON 
 
Two models of global employment relations 
 
Different employment relations created on the basis of different perceptions of the 
market strengths and weaknesses and its effects gave rise, globally speaking, to two models of 
employment relations in the modern world, of course with sub-types and varieties. The first 
model is pro-market, with employment relations mostly liberal and quite flexible; it covers 
the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the UK, and Ireland. The other model is 
interventional, protective, with quite rigid employment relations; it covers most European 
countries (except Anglo-Saxon), but with considerable differences between them. Such 
classification of models rests on different key institutions in the labor market: legal protection  
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of employees, collective bargaining, unemployment insurance and active employment policy  
measures. Moreover, this classification also corresponds to the classic distinction between 
legal traditions, namely between the Anglo-Saxon (common) law and the Continental (civil) law.  
Let us underline right away that the extremes are not taken into account here: the 
market model is not entirely deregulated as there is government regulation, just as the 
interventionist model is not a planning model as there is a labor market. The difference is in 
the extent. The main features and outcomes of the functioning of the above models can be 
presented as follows:19 
Market, flexible model: 
• hiring and firing is relatively simple since (for instance, in the USA) each contracting 
party, meaning both the employee and the employer, has the right to freely enter into 
an employment contract and to terminate it at will; in recent times this right has been 
partly restricted by the prohibition of discrimination; European countries belonging 
to this group share, together with other European countries, the principle of justified 
dismissal, but in a more flexible manner;20 
• the average duration of employment in on firm is shorter than in the case of 
interventionist model, which is an unavoidable consequence of simpler dismissal and 
creating a vacancy for somebody else; in other words, turnover (job changing 
frequency) is high; 
• unemployment benefit is moderate, as part of activation strategy as in this way the 
unemployed are encouraged to actively look for jobs. In other words, it is believed that 
high unemployment benefit would discourage the unemployed from seeking 
employment; 
• trade unions are not particularly influential actors on the labor market, because labor 
legislation does not vest them with any specific role or give them a privileged position 
or protection, and because the so-called social partnership is not considered a role 
model for a society; what is more, trade union membership in the USA has been 
declining for decades, and so is their role; 
• employment relations within companies are often conflict-ridden because collective 
bargaining is not based on social mediation but rather on the market principle and 
bargaining capacity and skills, 
• collective bargaining is mostly decentralized, that is, takes place at the company level, 
between the company trade union and the employer; industry branch bargaining is 
less common, and national bargaining is almost non-existent,  
• income imbalance is relatively large, as the influence of government and trade unions 
on distribution is modest since the labor market mostly freely decides on wages 
                                                      
19 See A. Kleinknecht: Does Europe need more flexible labor markets, TU Delft, 2008 
20 A British model of dismissal protection is considered “rudimentary”, see Dismissal protection in 
Europe, CES Info, 2004 
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according to labor supply and demand and the employee’s contribution to company 
business,21 
• all individuals are in the same position (e.g., old and young), that is, no group is 
systemically discriminated (see the interventionist model); 
• unemployment rate is usually lower than in the interventionist model, since the 
simplicity of hiring and firing (associated with low costs) encourages employers to 
recruit new workers during the economic upturn (they can easily dismiss them if they 
are no longer needed) while relatively low unemployment benefits encourage the 
unemployed to look for jobs. 
 
Interventionist, rigid model: 
• there is legal protection of employee against termination, as termination of 
employment is possible only if there is a valid reason (the International Labor 
Organization Convention No 158) and the person whose employment is terminated is 
entitled to a severance allowance to be paid by the employer;  
• because of the restrictions imposed on dismissal and low frequency  of dismissals, 
there is long-term attachment to the same firm, particularly compared with the 
market model; this attachment increases social security of individuals but may limit 
their careers and earnings;  
• the level of unemployment benefit is higher than in the market model, since in the 
concept of social welfare state, attempts are made to avoid any significant decline in 
the living standards of people who become unemployed, 
• trade unions are usually numerous and influential, which is both a result of the 
tradition of organizing in trade unions and of labor legislation that provides them 
with an important role in collective bargaining and generally accepted concept of 
social partnership, 
• employment relations are mostly cooperative since the prevailing idea is social 
dialogue in which the representatives of the government, associations of employers 
and trade unions try to avoid conflicts between employers and employees by agreeing 
on solutions; this corporatist approach replaces both the market and individual 
bargaining, as well as the parliament in some issues;  
• collective bargaining about wages and other vital topics is more centralized. In some 
countries it is implemented at the national and industry branch level and then applied 
to the companies that are covered and, sometimes, its effect is extended to include all 
employees; 
• employee incomes are more balanced, which is a consequence of centralized collective 
bargaining about balancing the wages and stifling of the influence of labor market 
supply and demand on wages, 
• older individuals – men (already employed) fare better than younger people, women 
and immigrants (prospective employees), since labor legislation protects the former 
                                                      
21 D. Checchi and C. García-Peñalosa: Labor market institutions and income inequality, Economic Policy Issue 
56,  October 2008 
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from termination and ensures decent wages, while the latter make up the contingent 
of unemployed and remain both without income and without work experience 
• unemployment rate is usually higher than in the market model since the regulation of 
dismissals is restrictive and, consequently, often costly. Demand for new labor force is 
therefore lower than it would normally be: employers delay recruiting new workers at 
the time of economic upturn since they know that it would be hard to dismiss them 
(or costly) if and when they are no longer needed. 22  
 
The main difference between the market and interventionist and continental model is 
in giving priority to different values. The market model gives priority to the economic aspect 
as it primarily attempts to facilitate good functioning of businesses at micro level and the 
functioning of the entire economy at macro level, and therefore allows companies, at the 
times of crisis or downturn, to make relatively simple and inexpensive adjustments in 
employment rates and/or wage levels. In a market system this is based on relatively free 
bargaining between employees and employers. The fundamental idea of this model is that 
healthy companies inevitably ensure the health of the economy which, in longer term results 
in high level of employment and high wages.  
The interventionist model, on the other hand, gives priority to the social aspect, i.e. to 
the security of the employees’ position and standard of living, particularly at the time of 
economic downturn when simple adjustment of companies through employment and wage 
level is not accepted, but instead, job security is ensured by making dismissal and reducing 
wages difficult. In this way, companies and economy are left to bear the burden of 
adjustment, irrespective of any adverse consequences. This model, therefore, generates a high 
level of employee security, but also companies with surplus employees and the economy with 
a higher number of unemployed people than in the Anglo-Saxon model, which is a result of 
the employers’ refraining from employing new workers at the time of economic upturn since 
they know it will not be easy for them to reduce the labor force once the boom is over. 
Let us now look at the ranking of OECD countries with regard to rigidity levels 
(including the components): 
 
  
                                                      
22 See section Flexibility, unemployment and growth 
45 
 
Figure 1. 
Protection of employment, 2008, scale 0 (lowest) - 6 (highest) 
 
 
SOURCE: Danielle Venn - Legislation, Collective Bargaining and Enforcement: Updating the OECD Employment 
Protection Indicators, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 89, 2009 
 
Obviously, the lowest level of rigidity is present among the English-speaking 
countries. The countries with the highest level of rigidity include two developing countries 
and Southern European countries. In the middle of the table are Central and Northern 
European countries and some non-European countries. 
 
 
Comparing Serbia with other countries 
 
This Section will present some comparisons between the rigidity level of labor 
regulations in Serbia and the rest of the world, some peer countries. This will show where 
Serbia really is at the moment, which will be a valuable element for the definition of labor 
legislation reform policy. 
We will first look at a synthetic rigidity indicator (from the Fraser Institute Index of 
Economic Freedom) and then at the comparison between specific labor legislation 
arrangements for eight countries, including Serbia (from the World Bank’s Doing Business 
report).  
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The Fraser Institute’s Index of Economic Freedom is based on the quantitative findings 
from the World Bank’s Doing Business Report and the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Index, and includes five components composed of a large number of 
indicators relating to the regulation of employment, dismissal, collective bargaining, and 
working hours. The Index covers 140 countries.  
Graph 1 shows the value of the index of freedom, namely rigidity of employment 
relations and labor legislation for 2009.  The value of index ranges between 0 (maximum 
rigidity) to 10 (no restriction). 
 
Figure 2. 
 
 SOURCE: www.freetheworld.com/2011/reports/world/EFWdataset2011.xls 
 
The range of indices for the countries worldwide is 3.1 – 9.7 and Serbian index is 5.7.  
Regarding its level of labor legislation rigidity, Serbia shares places 43 – 47 among 140 
countries, which means that it is positioned in a more rigid half of the world, or,  more 
precisely, at the turn from the first third of countries to the second third of countries. This 
position is not commendable and suggests that it is necessary to have the regulation of 
employment relations changed to make it more flexible.  
Here below we will look at eight countries for some comparative labor legislation 
arrangements which are of importance for company operations and shed some light on the 
character of their respective labor legislations. These eight countries include, besides Serbia, 
its neighboring social welfare countries - Hungary and Croatia; some more flexible European 
countries - Denmark and Ireland, and large countries - USA, Russia, and Germany. The data 
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were taken from the World Bank’s Doing Business report23 and are thematically grouped in 
three tables.  
 
Table 1. 
Difficulty of hiring 
  Croatia Denmark Germany Hungary Ireland Russia Serbia USA 
Fixed-term contracts 
prohibited for 
permanent tasks? 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes No 
Maximum duration 
of fixed-term 
contracts, including 
renewals, in months 
36 
 
No limit No limit*  
24 
60 No 
limit 
60 12 No limit 
Ratio of minimum 
wage to value added 0.32 
Not 
existing 0.21 0.25 0.31 0.12 0.26 0.21 
* In Germany there is no limit for the contracts with objective clause, but there is a 24-month limit for the 
contract without such clause. 
 
Employment flexibility also reflects in the legal treatment of fixed-term contracts, and 
primarily by the following: 
• Can these contracts be concluded only in extraordinary circumstances or it is possible 
to conclude them for regular, continual tasks, and 
• What is the allowed duration of these contracts?  
 
With regard to the first issue, Serbia is positioned in a smaller group of countries 
sharing a restrictive arrangement, considering that fixed-term contracts may be concluded 
only in extraordinary situations (Serbia, Russia, Croatia) while they can be concluded in 
regular circumstances in other five countries. 
With regard to the second issue, Serbia has in place the most restrictive arrangement 
by far, considering that it is the only one that restricts the duration of fixed-term contract to 
12 months. All other countries either allow longer duration of fixed-term contracts or do not 
have any restrictions in this regard whatsoever. 
As to the relative level of minimum wages, Serbia is positioned around the average 
level in the observed group of countries; as it is stated in the relevant section, however, 
minimum wages in 2012 amount to very high level of 46% of average wages. 
 
  
                                                      
23 Doing Business 2012, The World Bank Group, 2011, downloaded on 15 July 2012 from http://www.doing 
business.org/data/exploretopics/employing-workers 
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Table 2. 
Working hours and leaves 
  Croatia Denmark Germany Hungary Ireland Russia Serbia USA
Working day in 
manufacturing, 
hrs/day 
40 a week 7,4  8  8  8  8  8  8  
Minimum daily rest, 
in hours 
12 11 11 11a 11 Not existing 12b Not 
existing 
Maximum overtime 
limit in normal 
circumstances, in 
hours 
8 hrs/week The limit 
is a daily 
rest of 11 
hours 
2 hrs/day or 
20 a week c 
200 hours 
a year 
zero 4 a day;   up 
to 120 a year 
Zero N/A 
Maximum overtime 
limit in 
extraordinary 
circumstances, in 
hours 
8 hrs/week  As 
necessary 
Average of 
48 hrs/week 
in 6 months 
As 
necessary  
zero 4 a day;   up 
to 120 a year 
4 hrs/day, 
8 a week 
N/A 
Premium for 
overtime work, in % 
of hourly pay 
Collective 
Agreement 
Collective 
Agreement 
Collective 
Agreement 
50%-100% Not 
existing 
50% for the 
first two 
hours; other 
100%  
26% 50% 
Premium for night 
work, in % of hourly 
pay 
10% 0% 13% 40% 0% 20% 26% 0% 
Paid annual leave 
for a worker with 
one year of tenure, 
in days 
20 25 24 20 20 20 20 0 
a can be reduced to 8 upon the agreement between the employer and the employee. 
b can be reduced to 10 in specific circumstances. 
c provided the average of 8 hrs/week is not exceeded over a 6 month period. 
 
As it can be seen, an 8-hour workday (in manufacturing) features in most countries. 
The workday is somewhat shorter in Denmark (and in France, but this country is not 
discussed here), while Croatia has in place an interesting arrangement: maximum working 
hours are determined at 40 hrs/week, which leaves room for more flexible arrangements for 
the industries and companies which find them suitable.  
Most commonly, minimum daily rest is 11 to 12 hours, but some countries (Serbia, 
Hungary) allow this break to be shortened in specific circumstances. Russia and USA do not 
have a legal requirement for minimum daily rest.  
The treatment of overtime work is different and depends on whether the 
circumstances are regular or extraordinary. Regular situations are regulated more 
restrictively, beginning with prohibition (Serbia) through to lower allowed limits in working 
hours. In the case of extraordinary situations, legislators are usually more lenient: some 
countries allow as much overtime work as necessary (usually to prevent accidents, natural 
disasters, etc.) while others allow more overtime work hours. Admittedly, Croatia and Russia 
do not distinguish between these two types of situations. The most extreme, however, is 
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Ireland which does not allow any overtime work at all; rather, it suggests that existing 
working hours could be used more flexibly, i.e., should be redistributed. An increase of hourly 
rate for overtime work is provided in most countries – in some it is provided by law (Serbia, 
Hungary, Russia, USA), and in some by collective agreements (Croatia, Denmark, Germany). 
Most countries pay a premium for night work, and Serbia ranks second in this group 
of countries, immediately behind Hungary, with regard to the level of premium (26%). There 
is no obligation to pay premium for night work in Denmark, Ireland, and USA; there it is 
presumed that adverse work conditions at night are taken into account in setting the wages. 
Paid annual leaves are standard in Europe. Most countries share the same minimum 
of 20 days (Serbia is in this group of countries), while Denmark and Germany diverge. On the 
other hand, in the USA, employees are not legally entitled to an (paid) annual leave; rather, 
this matter is to be resolved between the employer and the employee, or through collective 
bargaining. 
 
Table 3. 
Termination of redundant workers 
  Croatia Denmark Germany Hungary Ireland Russia Serbia USA
Retraining or reassignment 
obligation before redundancy? 
Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No
Priority rules for 
redundancies? 
Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No
Priority rules for 
reemployment? 
Yes No No No No No Yes No
Notice period for terminating 
redundant worker with one 
year of tenure, in salary weeks 
4.3 0 4 4.3 2 8.7 0 0
Notice period terminating 
redundant worker with 20 
years of tenure, in salary weeks 
13 0 30.3 12.9 8 8.7 0 0
Severance pay for terminating 
redundant worker with one 
year of tenure, in salary weeks 
0 0 2.2 0 0.7 8.7 1.4 0
Severance pay for terminating 
redundant worker with 20 
years of tenure, in salary weeks 
26 0 43.3 21.7 9.8 8.7 25.3 0
 
In all observed countries the employer may terminate the employees no longer deems 
needed due to economic, organizational, or technological reasons. At the same time, the 
employer is not required to obtain any third party (government, union) approval to do this. 
First three questions in this Table (Is the employer obliged to provide retraining or 
reassignment before redundancy? Are there any priority rules to protect particular categories 
of employees when composing the redundancy lists? Are there any priority rules for 
reemployment of terminated employees?) examine whether a termination by the employer is 
liberal or subject to statutory restrictions. As we can see, only Serbia and Croatia answered 
‘Yes’ to all three questions, which means that they provide for maximum restriction. 
50 
 
Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, and USA answered ‘No’ to all three questions, meaning that the 
employer may freely chose an arrangement which he deems best. Germany and Russia fall 
somewhere between these two groups. 
The Serbian arrangement for the notice period for terminating redundant workers is 
liberal – the termination is effective immediately. The countries sharing this arrangement 
include only Denmark and USA. Other countries provide a (paid) notice period which should 
provide the employee with an opportunity to find a new job.  
And, finally, we will compare different arrangements for severance pay for terminated 
redundant workers. With regard to the employees with longer tenure (here with 20 years), 
Serbia ranks at the top of the list, immediately behind Germany and the same as Croatia: 
severance pay virtually amounts to 6 monthly salaries.  
A conclusion from this overview may be that, with regard to the observed indicators, 
Serbia is usually among the countries with a restrictive arrangement. Therefore, the overall 
assessment may be that it has restrictive labor legislation.  
 
 
FLEXIBILITY, UNEMPLOYMENT AND GROWTH 
 
The basic opposition to flexible labor legislation and labor market stems from the 
concern that simpler dismissal of employees leads to greater unemployment and greater wage 
inequality. At first glance, such concern relating to unemployment seems absolutely justified 
since, in the short term, and at the time of declining business prospects and the crisis, 
unemployment may indeed rise faster in the countries with a flexible institutional framework 
than in those with a rigid one, as in the latter there are legal hindrances to the rise of the 
number of the unemployed.  
However, this is not entirely true, as in the medium term it is easily possible, even 
likely, that the employment in a system with a market character will be higher than in the 
interventionist one. This argument is supported by at least three mechanisms: 
• employers’ readiness to hire workers more easily and in greater numbers since, as we 
have already said, they know that it will not be expensive for them (in terms of 
difficulties and costs of dismissals, including severance pays), 
• increased unemployment may exert pressure on wages, so hiring may also be 
encouraged in this way, and  
• at the moment of prospects recovery, companies in a market system (1) do not have 
excess employees like those in an interventionist system due to layoff restrictions and, 
therefore, cannot increase the volume of production with the existing labor force but 
have to recruit new workers, and (2) financially, such companies are usually stronger 
as they did not have non-productive labor force costs, and are readier for expansion 
and new hiring. 
 
A confirmation of the need to look at the effects of labor legislation in the long term 
may be found in a recent analysis of the effects of financial crises in the period 1980-2008 in 
97 countries of the world. It shows that the financial crises: 
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1. in the countries with flexible market institutions had a large negative impact on 
unemployment in the short term, but this effect rapidly disappeared in the medium 
term, when the recovery takes full swing, 
2. in the countries with more rigid labor market, the negative effect was less pronounced, 
but more persistent.24 
 
The assessment of total effects on the basis of immediate short-term effects would be 
wrong, as we can see. Therefore, compensating market mechanisms – those that arise from 
the depths of interdependences within the entire economic system and that act in the long 
term should be taken into consideration. 
More specifically, a crucial question is the impact of the type of labor legislation on 
employment or unemployment: does flexible or rigid labor legislation result in a higher rate of 
unemployment or the type of labor legislation does not affect unemployment at all? 
Disagreements in principle about this issue direct us to empirical research which is the only 
one that can provide the answer.  
For a long time results of numerous studies of this issue provided contradictory 
results: some studies found that rigid legislation led to unemployment increase, while others 
did not confirm such a position.25 Previous studies had an important methodological 
problem in that their databases were limited: (1) they usually referred only to OECD 
countries, and not even all of them, and (2) they usually covered a small number of years, 
which produced a small total number of observations and, therefore, unreliable answers. 
In recent times, much larger databases have been created, both in terms of the number 
of countries and time covered, so the results are more reliable and all confirm that flexible 
labor legislation produces better results in the area of unemployment than a rigid one. So 
Botero at al. conclude, from an example of 85 countries, that „more protective employment 
laws lead to higher unemployment, especially of the young “. Their other findings are also 
interesting: that there is not much support for the theory that labor regulations cure market 
failures, and increase labor market efficiency; that there is some support for the political 
theory on labor legislation as a product of leftist ideology and interest groups (trade unions); 
and that the basic determinant of labor legislation character is the legal tradition (common 
law, continental).26 Similarly, Feldmann concludes on the basis of a sample of 73 countries 
that “rigid regulation increases unemployment around the world. Tight firing and hiring 
rules... most clearly seem to have adverse effects”.27 The analyses for developing countries by 
Djankov and Ramalho, on 87 countries, shows that “the main finding is that developing 
                                                      
24 L. E. Bernal-Verdugo, D. Furceri, and D. Guillaume: Crises, Labor Market Policy, and Unemployment, IMF 
Working Paper, WP/12/65, March 2012 
25 For an overview see A. Bassanini and R. Duval - Employment Patterns in OECD Countries: Reassessing the Role 
of Policies and Institutions, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 486, 2006.  
26 J. Botero, S. Djankov, E. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Salines and A. Shleifer - The Regulation of Labor, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 2004, Vol. 4. 
27 H. Feldmann - The unemployment effects of labor regulation around the world, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, Vol. 1, 2009, str. 88 
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countries with rigid labor legislation tend to have larger informal sectors and higher 
unemployment, especially among young workers”.28  
Finally, the most extensive and most recent study of dynamic effects in 97 countries, 
in the period between 1980 and 2008: Bernal-Verdugo et al. conclude that “increases in the 
flexibility of labor market regulations and institutions have a statistically significant negative 
impact both on the level and the change of unemployment outcomes (i.e. total, youth and 
long-term unemployment)”.29 
After such results we may, with significant confidence, conclude that flexible 
regulation of employment relations has an impact on reducing employment and, vice versa, 
rigid regulation increases it. 
The argument frequently mentioned in favor of employment protection is that it 
encourages commitment to the job, due to loyalty and long-term attachment to the firm, and 
investments in human capital and employee education. However, there are also arguments to 
the contrary: that (1) the protection against job loss may actually discourage work efforts, i.e. 
that the risk of losing it is actually the incentive for harder work, and that (2) employee 
education may not always be in the firms’ interest, as it improves the negotiating position of 
the former and opens the door to requests for profit participation. 
Another important question is whether and how rigidity influences trends in factor 
productivity, and, consequently, economic growth. The central hypothesis is that labor 
market rigidity, through employment protection, raises the costs of adaptation to changed 
economic circumstances and thus suppresses the necessary reallocation of labor from the 
firms and sectors that lag behind towards the firms and sectors that have good prospects. In 
this manner, rigidity makes more difficult the allocation of labor towards the most productive 
uses and so inhibits productivity growth.   
Recent empirical analyses show that such negative link exists, that is, that job 
protection leads to the slowing down of productivity growth. OECD’s analysis states that the 
impact is small but statistically significant,30 while Bassaniani et al. present their results to the 
effect that “mandatory dismissal regulations have a depressing impact on TFP growth”, and 
also that it seems that this impact “ is transferred to labor productivity”. „We argue that from 
our results we can infer that layoff restrictions have a negative impact on aggregate total 
productivity growth”.31  
As can be seen, restrictions in the area of recruitment and dismissal adversely affect 
not only (un)employment, but also productivity growth, which is a basic and increasingly 
important source of economic growth worldwide.  
 
                                                      
28 S. Djankov, R. Ramalho - Employment Laws in Developing Countries, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 
1, 2009, str. 12 
29 L. Bernal-Verdugo, D. Furceri and D. Guillaume - Labor Market Flexibility and Unemployment: New 
Empirical Evidence of Static and Dynamic Effects, IMF Working Paper, March 2012 
30 OECD Employment Outlook, OECD Publishing, 2007, p. 70. 
31 A. Bassanini, L. Nunziata and D. Venn  - Job Protection Legislation and Productivity Growth in OECD 
Countries, Economic Policy, April 2009 
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EUROPEAN PROCESSES 
 
European experiences and current trends in the development of labor legislation are 
certainly important for Serbia, primarily because Serbia intends to join the EU and is only 
natural that it should become familiar with the rules that apply in this organization of states 
and see their results. Secondly, as Serbia has basically accepted a continental model of labor 
legislation, it is natural to have an interest in the processes of reform of this area of legislation 
that are ongoing in the EU, because a question arises whether Serbia will follow them  
A short history could be presented as follows. The fifteen countries that were to make 
up the European Union had, at the beginning of 1970s, a low unemployment rate –2% on 
average – as a result of fast economic progress during the first decades following the World 
War II. However, in the middle of that decade, after the oil crisis, unemployment started 
rising fast, to reach 9% in mid-1980s and exceed 10% at the beginning of 1990s.  
Already in the 1960s and 1970s, the European social model had been built, with 
generous arrangements in the field of social policy (the unemployed, poor, government 
transfers, services), including labor legislation with protective clauses for employees. 
Therefore the social consequences of unemployment rise were not big: neither the standard of 
living of the newly unemployed was threatened (transfer benefits were considerable), nor 
were there any social tensions that would jeopardize social peace. Nevertheless, the 
dissatisfaction with weak economic growth and high unemployment gradually increased, and 
the term Eurosclerosis was used more and more often, due to the slowness of adapting to fast 
and broad changes. Questions were asked as to the cause of such unfavorable state of affairs. 
In the previous decades macroeconomic policy was thought to have been responsible, but in 
the early 1990s the labor market institutions began to be indicated as a potential (co)culprit.  
The opinion turned on the OECD Job Study from 1994.32 The study concluded that 
the cause of the rising structural unemployment in Europe and the inability of product and 
labor markets to adapt to the changes brought about by technological changes, globalization 
and individual competition, and “poorly functioning labor markets”. It is obvious from the 
recommendations what was thought to be specific obstacles in the area of labor market 
institutions.  
The Job Study proposed a broad program of actions and policies directed at 
unemployment reduction, including sound macroeconomic policy, diffusion of know-how, 
nurturing an entrepreneurial climate and encouraging competition on the product market. In 
the area of labor market institutions, the following was recommended: 
 
• increase flexibility of working time (both short-term and lifetime) voluntarily sought 
by workers and employers (implicit criticism of rules on fixed working hours and 
mandatory retirement), 
• make wage and labor costs more flexible by removing restrictions that prevent their 
adaptation to local conditions and workers’ skill levels (implicit criticism of 
centralized collective bargaining), 
                                                      
32  The OECD jobs study: Facts, analysis, strategies, OECD, 1994 
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• reform employment security provisions that inhibit expansion of employment in the 
private sector (implicit criticism of dismissal restrictions), 
• enhance active labor market policies, 
• improve labor force skills and competences through comprehensive changes in 
education and training, 
• reform unemployment insurance and related systems so that the society’s aim of 
equality would be achieved with less danger to efficient functioning of the labor 
market (implicit criticism of the amount and duration of receiving unemployment 
benefits, which is a disincentive to seeking employment, and advocating their 
reduction). 
 
At the same time there appeared the White Paper of the European Commission, also 
known as Delors White Paper, in which the problem was understood in a similar way and 
solutions sought in the direction of greater flexibility. The findings and recommendations of 
these two studies, particularly The Job Study, were broadly accepted, even among politicians 
in West Europe. It became fashionable to advocate labor market reforms, in line with the 
spirit of the time and wider pro-market economic orientation. 
In 1994, the work started on the European Employment Strategy to be included in its 
final form into the Amsterdam Treaty from 1997. The four pillars of the strategy were: 
1. employability, particularly preventing long-term unemployment, facilitating 
transition from education to employment, priority given to active employment 
measures over the passive ones, 
2. entrepreneurship, reducing obstacles to establishing and managing businesses and 
taxes and social contributions, 
3. adaptability of businesses and employees, removing barriers to agencies for temporary 
employment, part-time work and other flexible forms of employment and promoting 
investments into human and physical capital, 
4. equal opportunities, providing women and men equal access to employment and 
equal status at work. 
 
The European Employment Strategy, like other similar acts, is not a legally binding 
document, but is based on coordination of member countries’ actions. Common objectives 
and priorities are defined at the EU level, while the necessary policies are developed and 
implemented at member country level. Consequently, around this strategy developed a large 
bureaucratic system of coordination, guidelines, European programs, national plans, 
reports.... which operated without any major results during the next decade. In 2003, the 
above four pillars were replaced by somewhat vaguer (except the first one) objectives: full 
employment, improving quality and productivity at work and strengthening social cohesion 
and inclusion. 
A particularly clear expression of these overly ambitious plans was the Lisbon Strategy 
from 2000, which set high goals: that the EU should overtake the USA by 2010 and become 
the leading global economy and achieve full employment, with additional objectives in the 
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field of employment. Already in 2005, the lack of success was admitted (Kok’s Report), and 
the strategy renewed. 
The above mentioned reorientation to more flexible employment from 1994 onwards 
did not at all mean abandoning the European Union’s social model. All the time, at least 
verbally, a balance has been sought between a more flexible labor market and social 
protection of workers.  Already in the late 1990s, Denmark coined the term flexicurity, 
derived from words flexibility and security. Over time it was used more frequently and gained 
popularity, so in 2007, the EU Council adopted the document Towards Common Principles on 
Flexicurity, which thus became a landmark document to guide member state policies. The 
four basic principles are as follows: 
• flexible and reliable contractual arrangement, 
• comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, 
• effective active labor market policies , and  
• modern social security systems. 
 
Generally speaking, it is not yet clear whether the notion of flexicurity is more of a 
political phrase that should (through the lack of clear content and the possibility for 
everybody to interpret it at will, which is happening) hide the contrast between the two hardly 
reconcilable ideas (market flexibility and social security), or there is, after all, a possibility of 
coexistence at least at a certain number of points. As the detailed analysis shows, “despite the 
attempts to come up with a more precise definition, this review shows that the notion of 
flexicurity remains unclear”.33 Flexicurity is, to put it simply, often seen as a balance of the 
following: flexibility for employer and security for employees. That would entail a change of 
labor legislation towards liberalizing employment relations on the one hand, and 
strengthening social security of workers who are laid off through unemployment benefits, on 
the other, together with increasing their employability through lifelong learning and active 
employment policy measures on the third. In other words, secure jobs (removal of dismissal 
protection) would be replaced with worker security (provision of income through the social 
welfare system in the case of dismissal). However, its advocates claim that flexicurity is more 
than the above balance, although a developed analytical definition is as yet to come.34  
Labor market institutions reform process in direction of more flexibility during the 
last fifteen years has not gone a long way. Some results have been achieved in a number of 
countries – Denmark, the Netherlands, and sometimes Sweden are given as positive examples 
– but in most other countries labor legislation has not significantly changed in substantive 
terms. Actually, the most visible, and important change is expanding the possibilities for 
entering into non-standard employment contracts: in addition to the usual ones for full time 
permanent employment, now it possible in many countries in the EU to relatively easily enter 
into temporary employment contracts, part-time employment contracts, through temporary 
                                                      
33 E. Viebrock and J. Clasen - Flexicurity and Welfare Reform: a Review, Socio-Economic Review, No. 2, 2009 
34 There is an interesting discussion on flexicurity in the second wave of the European crisis in F. Tros - 
Flexicurity in Europe: Can it Survive a Double Crisis?, Working paper to be presented in ILERA World Congress 
2012, Philadelphia, USA, July 2012 
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employment agencies, etc. Thus, in 2010, the share of part-time employment contracts at the 
European Union level was 19.2%, the largest being in the Netherlands 48.9%, followed by the 
UK, Denmark, Sweden Germany and Austria, all with over 25%. Temporary employment is 
somewhat less common: 13.9% at the EU level, mostly in Poland and Spain (one in four 
workers), followed by Portugal.35 36 These numbers do not demonstrate the current 
movements (trends), i.e. new employment contracts well. In Italy, for instance, over two 
thirds of new contracts in 2011 were for temporary employment, and less than on fifth for 
permanent.37  
Standard employment has witnessed modest changes, generally speaking. Only under 
the impact of the crisis there have been some changes recently, and they occurred in the 
countries that were hardest hit. Thus in Italy, in the first half of 2012, Monti’s government 
tried to change the inherited system, which practically secures lifelong employment for the 
employee, since in medium-sized and large companies it is unlikely that he will be laid off. 
This great attempt ended in a political compromise and small steps forward that satisfy 
nobody – neither the government, nor the trade unions nor the employers. 
A fast rise of the number of employees on flexible contracts indicates, first, a very 
negative attitude of employers towards standard permanent employment, with all the 
associated rigidity, and, second, a failure to make labor legislation more flexible to the extent 
needed. Therefore, it seems, political elite agreed, out of necessity, to allow more flexible 
forms of employment as an outlet for rising unemployment and the way to make at least one 
segment of labor legislation “more market like”. On the other hand, it is very favorable for the 
unemployed to work on flexible contracts, as it provides them not only with the badly needed 
income, but also with working experience, on the job training and a chance to enter the world 
of permanent employees.  
Such market segmentation has led, on the other hand, to a new socio-political 
problem - unequal treatment of employees on standard and flexible contracts, leading to a 
very unbalanced distribution of risk and security, that is, to a certain extent it is disrupting the 
European social model. As the title of a new analysis, somewhat derisively, says: Flexicurity in 
the European Union: Flexibility for Outsiders, Security for Insiders.38 Indeed, during the crisis 
of the past years, the employees on flexible contracts fared worse, while additional 
government protection measures were directed towards permanent employees.39 The way out 
                                                      
35 Eurostat, downloaded on  22 July 2012, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/ 
Employment_statistics 
36 In Italy, there is a labor market with three segments: of the 27 million workers, 15 million, usually over 40 
years of age, enjoy the privileges of standard stable employment; 8 million, mostly younger, are either freelancers 
or on rolled over temporary contracts, but with none of the benefits of standard employment; the remaining 4 
million are the workers in the underground economy that are completely uncovered either with labor law 
protection or social insurance; the data come from the Instituto Nazionale di Statistica, presented in Italy's Labor 
Pains, Bloomberg BusinessWeek Magazine, 16 November 2011 
37 INAIL, Instituto Nazionale Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro, presented in Italy Lawmakers Clear 
Labor-Law Revamp, Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2012 
38 O. Van Vliet and H. Nijboer – Flexicurity in the European Union: Flexibility for Outsiders, Security for Insiders, 
Leiden University, Department of Economics Research Memorandum 2012.2, February 2012 
39 F. Tros, ibid. 
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from this difficulty can be sought in making the positions of these two groups equal, but in 
two different ways: (1) by relaxing restrictions on standard employment (hiring, firing, 
working hours, etc.) or (2) by introducing additional restrictions on flexible forms of 
employment. The former would be better from the economic standpoint, while the latter 
would probably be closer to the old understanding of the European welfare state.  
Economic crisis is the right time to review the existing arrangements and think new 
answers through. For the moment, we cannot see the European Union response, unless by 
that we mean the reforms in the most troubled countries. And they have, in Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland, involved the following: 1) reductions in severance pay for regular contracts and 
some simplification of individual or collective dismissal procedures (Greece and Portugal), 
along with measures to boost temporary employment by increasing the maximum work time 
under temporary work agencies (Greece); 2) measures to boost flexibility in working-time 
arrangements by reducing overtime pay and earnings of part-time employees and making 
averaging of working time possible (Greece); 3) measures to enhance flexibility in wage 
determination such as easing the conditions for firms to opt out from higher-level collective 
bargaining agreements (Greece and Ireland) and reforming sectoral wage agreements 
(Ireland); 4) introducing a sub-minimum wage for young people (Greece).40 In addition, in 
Greece, all collective bargaining agreements became null and void as from 14 May 2012, and 
need to be approved again, with the adopted measures encouraging individual collective 
agreements. 
 
 
 
  
                                                      
40 Economic Policy Reforms 2012: Going for Growth, OECD, 2012, p. 29 
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Chapter 3 
OTHER FACTORS IMPACTING THE LABOUR MARKET 
 
MACROECONOMICS AND BUSINESS REGULATION 
 
Labor markets are, obviously, under strong influence of other parts of the economy. 
Business environment and macroeconomic stability determine the level of business 
operations and investments and significantly impact the demand for labor. Also, 
government’s fiscal position influences both the possibility of the reforms in the wage 
taxation (including social contributions) and the possibilities for more active labor market 
policies. 
In the last 10 years or so, Serbia has gone a long way from macroeconomically 
devastated country to the one in which some macroeconomic stability was achieved, only to 
see such stability very much threatened again with the advent of the global economic crisis. 
Several IMF programs that were completed in the meantime have considerably helped the 
country to restore its credibility among investors.  
However, despite some successes, significant macroeconomic weaknesses remain, and 
many structural reforms as well as business environment reforms are as yet to be 
implemented. Very high and rising unemployment is a particular problem. Some progress 
has been made with regard to other macroeconomic variables – inflation has been brought 
down, economic growth was very high for a while, public debt was brought under control, 
there was considerable inflow of foreign direct investment, but unemployment, throughout 
these 12 years, has been a serious problem, the number of employed persons has significantly 
dropped and there are no signs that the situation will improve in medium term. 
The figure below shows GDP growth rates in Serbia in the past dozen years. As can be 
seen, Serbia achieved relatively high growth rates before the crisis. GDP per capita 
considerably increased, from below EUR 1,000 in 2000 to about EUR 4,500 in 2010, partially 
due to Dinar appreciation.  
 
Figure 1. 
Real GDP growth rate, percent 
 
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance 
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Growth rates, until the onset of crisis in 2008, were for the most part quite good, even 
very high between 2004 and 2008. However, the crisis showed that such growth was to an 
extent unsustainable, and after the GDP drop in 2009, growth rates barely went over 0%. As 
already mentioned, growth was not accompanied by employment increase, but quite the 
opposite – its decrease. It makes some sense, since Serbia started 2001 with a large number of 
people employed only officially, and privatization, naturally, led to the elimination of such 
jobs positions.  
It was expected that a large number of unemployed people will find jobs in the newly 
established foreign and domestic companies, but such optimism proved to be unfounded. 
Simply put, the business environment in Serbia was not very stimulating either for local or 
foreign investors. 
In the past twelve years, Serbia has managed to put its public finances in order, to an 
extent, although public debt and deficit surged with the onset of the crisis. In addition, the 
cost of interest is rising fast, creditors believe that the risk is very high, and, most importantly, 
there is no political will for implementing structural and fiscal reforms. 
General government expenditures to GDP reached 50% in 2012, which is higher than 
in most countries of the region. The slow pace of reform in the field of public and socially 
owned enterprises, and the public sector that is too large and inefficient contribute to this.  
Serbia also has a very rigid public expenditure structure – non-discretional outlays 
make up over 70 percent of total outlays, dominated by expenditures in the social sectors 
(social welfare, pensions, health care and education), then employee salary related 
expenditures  and social transfers. Public investments have been crowded out for the most 
part and are at a relatively low level, of about 3% to 3.5% of GDP.  
Serbian public debt was significantly reduced in the period 2000-2008 both as a 
percentage of GDP and in nominal terms. There are three main reasons for this achievement: 
(1) High GDP growth in euro terms (which is to a large extent the consequence of 
considerable dinar appreciation), (2) Significant write-off of the former Yugoslav debt, and 
(3) significant privatization proceeds that were used for funding current deficits and 
repayment of some old debts. Therefore, debt came down from about 170% of GDP in 2000 
to about 30 percent in 2008. In nominal terms it fell from about 14.2 billion euro in 2000 to 
8.8 billion euro in 2008. 
The conclusion may be that the public finance situation is very bad and that fiscal 
responsibility provisions have not succeeded at all in preventing further deterioration. The 
new government is preparing a fiscal consolidation program which, judging by what is known 
in the public, is based on further tax increase. Furthermore, it may be concluded that the 
long-term prospects for Serbian public finance will crucially depend on two things: (1) 
political will of the new government to implement painful structural reforms to comply with 
fiscal responsibility provisions relating to wages and pensions, and (2) resolution of the EU 
debt crisis. 
Assuming the present EU crisis does not end in a full blown crash, Serbia will have to 
reduce its deficit to about 2-3% of GDP over the next several years, together with creating 
room for increasing capital and interest expenditures, as well as retaining a relatively 
competitive tax system. The only way to do this is through reducing the expenditures on 
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public sector wages and on pensions, either by complying with the fiscal rules on indexation, 
or by more difficult, but more needed measures of reducing the employment level in the 
public sector.  
In summary, the fiscal situation is very complex and the room for any major 
employment promotion programs and for major reduction of the wage tax burden can hardly 
be created. In the medium term, employment in the public sector will probably have to 
decrease under fiscal pressures, so the public sector may even aggravate the situation with 
unemployment rather than improve it. 
In the past eleven years, Serbia has implemented numerous economic, political and 
institutional reforms. However, in many international comparisons, Serbia is still lagging 
behind most of its neighbors. Probably the most comprehensive analysis is the Transition 
Report  prepared every year by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
which takes into account reforms in the following categories: large-scale privatization, small-
scale privatization, enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange 
system, competition policy, banking reform, capital market reform, infrastructure reform 
(with sub-categories – roads, railways, electricity and water). 
The figure below shows progress in all these dimensions, as well as the average score. 
 
Figure 2. 
EBRD transition scores for Serbia, by category  
 
 SOURCE: EBRD 
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As the figure shows, Serbia has made certain progress in each category. Major issues 
still remain in the area of infrastructure, regulation, capital market, and competition policy. 
In all, the picture may look good, but if we compare Serbia with the countries of the region, 
the conclusion considerably changes: 
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Figure 3. 
EBRD Transition score, Serbia and countries of the region, 2010 
 SOURCE: EBRD 
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
HUN POL SVK BG CRO ROM SLV MAK AL SRB MN BIH
 
The only two countries somewhat behind Serbia are Montenegro and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
In addition, if we look at the indicators from the World Bank Doing Business Report, 
Serbia fares poorly in comparison with other countries. The table below shows the global 
ranking of Serbia in all categories, as well as its ranking among 13 countries in transition 
(Baltic countries, Visegrad Agreement countries, Western and Eastern Balkans): 
 
Table 1.  
World Bank Doing Business Ranking, Serbia 
Criterion Global ranking 2011 Regional ranking (among 
13 countries) 
Overall 98 12 
Starting a business 83 10 
Dealing with construction 
permits 
176 13 
Registering property 100 10 
Getting credit 15 2-6 
Protecting investors 74 8 
Paying taxes 138 10 
Trading across borders 74 74 
Enforcing contracts 94 11 
Resolving insolvency 86 9 
 
Overall, there is no doubt that the economic situation in Serbia is very unfavorable: in 
2012, economic growth is negative, with negative prospects; macroeconomic situation is 
unfavorable (inflation is rising, foreign debt crisis is approaching, public finances are in 
disorder); the business environment if unattractive for investors. Therefore it is unsurprising 
that employment is still declining, and unemployment is rapidly rising.  
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There is no doubt that the necessary prerequisite for raising employment is the 
improvement of the macroeconomic situation and business regulation, in order to ensure an 
enabling environment for employment growth in the private sector. Adequate 
macroeconomic policies are supposed to mitigate fluctuations in economic activity and keep 
relative prices aligned. The business environment is supposed to provide public goods needed 
for successful operation of the economy: infrastructure, access to finance and business 
regulation. These policies, together with the formation of human capital and the rule of law 
constitute fundamentals on which booming economic activity and employment policies 
rest.41 
 
 
LABOR TAXATION  
 
Current labor taxation 
 
Wage taxation in Serbia is scheduler, with a proportional rate of 12% and the non-
taxable amount that is currently RSD 7,822, or about 14% of the average (gross) wage. There 
are relatively numerous tax exemptions on wages that are not very important in aggregate 
terms (transport allowance, per diems, business trip accommodation, voluntary pension 
insurance premiums up to a specified limit, etc.) 
In addition to tax, mandatory social security contributions are also paid and include 
pension and disability insurance (PDI) contribution, health insurance contribution, and 
unemployment insurance contribution. The basis for calculating contributions is the gross 
wage minus, in this case, the non-taxable portion. Contribution rates are 22% for PDI (paid 
by employer and employee at 11% each), then 12.3% for health insurance (paid by employer 
and employee at 6.5% each) and 1.5% for unemployment insurance (paid by employer and 
employee at 0.75% each). The aggregate contribution rate – paid by both employer and 
employee – is 35.8 % of the (gross) wage and is paid on the total amount of wage up to the 
‘ceiling’ amounting to 5 times the average (gross) wage; the lowest tax base is 35% of the 
average (gross) wage in the previous quarter.  
Finally, individuals whose annual net income exceeds three times the amount of average  
(gross) wage pay an annual personal income surtax at the rate of 10% of taxable income, while the 
net income exceeding six times the average (gross) wage is taxed at the rate of 15%. 
As can be seen, the existing system has the elements of proportionality, 
progressiveness and regressiveness, so it is difficult to assess the overall progressiveness. 
Namely, the rates are generally proportional, while the non-taxable amount introduces an 
element of progressivity and the maximum base for pension and disability insurance 
introduces the element of regressivity. In addition to the above, the law provides for various 
moderate tax breaks for employment of different categories of unemployed persons (below 
the age of 30, above the age of 45 or 50, and for employing persons with disabilities). 
                                                      
41 See Jobs, World Development Report 2013, The World Bank, 2012 
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The fact is that labor taxes and contributions are high. Comparisons with other 
European countries may lead us to conclude that the situations is not all that bad, but if we 
think about the incentives for both the employer and employee, it is clear that the tax rate of 
over 40% on total labor cost provides a serious incentive to both parties to avoid/evade paying 
taxes and contributions.  
There is also a particular problem in that there is no difference between the health 
care contribution amount and service level, so the employees are motivated to minimize these 
payments. The amount of pension is directly linked to the amount of paid contributions, but 
such link may not survive in the long run, so even here there is no big wish among the 
currently employed to pay PDI contributions. 
 
 
Changes in wage taxation 
 
Wage taxation underwent big changes in the past decade. The June 2001 reform cut 
contribution rates, broadened the tax base and made a switch to the gross wage system. The 
average net wage burden is effectively lighter by almost 10 percentage points, but low wages, 
due to the broadening of the tax base, remained virtually at the same tax burden level as in the 
previous period.42  
In the following years, due to the growing deficit in the PDI Fund, there were some 
small increases of the PDI rates. First in May 2003 the individual PDI rate rose from 9.8% for 
employee and employer each to 10.3%, which slightly increased the total wage burden, and 
then to 11% in 2004, but this was offset by the elimination of the tax on wage bill, so the 
overall burden on wages somewhat decreased.  
The next major change in the wage taxation has applied since January 2007, when the 
total tax burden was reduced both by cutting the wage tax rate from 14% to 12%, and by 
introducing the tax exempt amount of the wage. In 2007, it amounted to RSD 5,000 (which 
equaled 23% of the net wage in the previous year) and was accompanied by the decision to 
adjust it at the beginning of each calendar year by the consumer price index in the previous 
year. Moreover, the lowest base for paying contributions was cut from 40% to 35% of the 
(gross) wage, and the threshold for annual personal income surtax was reduced from four to 
three average wages, with the introduction of one more rate – 15% on net income that 
exceeds 6 average (gross) wages.  
                                                      
42 The meal allowance, that actually played the role of a tax allowance, was included in the tax base. Therefore, 
despite significant contribution rate reduction, low wages (e.g. 67% of average) effectively remained the same 
(for details see Arandarenko, M. and K. Stanić (2006), “Labor Costs in Serbia” background paper for the World 
Bank (2006) “Serbia: Labor Market Assessment” 
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Figure 4.  
Fiscal burden for various wage levels (% of total labor cost)  
 
These changes led to a slight reduction of the overall burden on labor cost, and the 
application of the non-taxable amount (with the reduction of the threshold for the annual 
personal income surtax and introduction of two rates) introduced mild progression in the 
wage taxation system, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
Since January 2007, the total fiscal burden on labor has been slightly smaller – about 
39% of the total cost of labor for an average employee or about 64% of the net wage. The non-
taxable amount resulted in a slight progression for the wages between the amount equal to the 
minimum base (which is now 35% of the gross wage) and five average wages. However, there 
is still regression in the fiscal burden above the level of five average wages due to the ‘ceiling’ 
for social security contribution payments.  
The so-called ‘ceiling’ for PDI contributions is not a rare phenomenon, but common 
practice in the pension system funding (except in the countries with a typical Beveridgean 
pension systems such as Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Denmark), and in the developed 
countries it is at a quite lower level.43 However, in the case of health insurance, this is not 
common practice considering that a large number of healthcare systems in OECD countries 
are funded from the budget44. Finally, the largest number of OECD countries has progressive 
personal income tax rates, ‘ironing out’ the alleviation of burden arising from the pension 
insurance ‘ceiling’.  
 
 
  
                                                      
43 For instance, the EU-15 average is about 2 average wages, while in the countries that joined the EU later it is at 
the level similar to ours. For details, see various editions of OECD publication „Pension at a Glance“.  
44 „Health at a Glance“, Figure 7.6.1, OECD, 2009 
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International comparisons 
 
To compare the level of fiscal burden on wages with other countries, it is important 
first to make sure that it is done on the same base. In that respect it is best to use OECD 
methodology – the so-called ‘tax wedge’ – the ratio of all taxes and contributions to total labor 
cost.  
The fiscal burden on wages in OECD countries varies greatly – from very low burden 
for an average individual in Chile, New Zealand and Mexico to very high such as in Belgium 
(55.5%) and Austria, Germany and France with close to 50% burden. These differences may 
firstly be explained by various types of welfare state among OECD countries, as well as 
different roles of the private sector in providing particular services.  
 
Table 2. 
 Wage tax wedge (% of total labor cost), international comparison 
 Individual with wage:
  67% of average 100% of average 167% of average 
Australia 20.6 26.7 32.2
Austria 43.7 48.4 51.6
Belgium 49.7 55.5 60.7
Croatiac) 38.1  40.1 44.4
Chile 7.0 7.0 7.8
Czech Republic 39.5 42.5 44.9
Denmark 36.8 38.4 44.8
Finland 37.2 42.7 48.5
France 46.5 49.4 53.5
Germany 45.6 49.8 51.3
Greecea) 34.4 38.2 43.7
Hungary 45.2 49.4 51.6
Ireland 21.3 26.8 38.7
Israel 13.0 19.8 28.4
Italy 44.5 47.6 53.0
Mexico 13.2 16.2 21.6
Netherlands 33.1 37.8 41.5
Norway 34.2 37.5 43.1
Poland 33.4 34.3 35.0
Portugal 33.1 39.0 45.8
Slovak Republic 36.1 38.9 40.8
Slovenia 38.6 42.6 47.7
Spain 36.6 39.9 42.5
Sweden 40.7 42.8 50.8
United Kingdom 28.5 32.5 37.9
United States 27.2 29.5 34.4
OECD-Average 31.6 35.2 39.6
OECD-EU 21 37.9 41.7 46.3
EU-15 37.7 41.8 47.2
EU-10 38.7 40.9 ..
Serbia  38.6 39.2 39.8
a) Data for 2010, Source OECD, Source EC(2010),  Grdović-Gnip and Tomić 
(2010)  for Croatia  
NOTE: unweighted average; NMS-new member states
SOURCE: OECD (2011),  EC (2011)and EC (2010) 
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Speaking about averages, we can say that Serbia apparently ‘sticks out’ from the 
overall OECD country average (including the countries with a very small burden such as 
Chile, New Zealand and Mexico), and that is on a par with the EU countries in terms of the 
burden. In the case of the average wage, the burden is even lower than in the EU (both in the 
‘old Europe’ and in the countries that joined the EU at a later date, including Croatia), and for 
above average wages, it is even smaller.  
As for the data for the countries in the region that have not joined the EU, with a 
reservation that in the meantime there may have been some changes in the tax system of these  
 
countries, we can note that the burden in Serbia was considerably larger than in Albania, and 
effectively larger than in Republika Srpska and BH Federation45.  
 
Figure 5. 
 Tax wedge, various wage levels, 2007 
 
 SOURCE: Arandarenko and Vukojević (2008) 
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However, when we look at very low wages (33% of average), the situation is somewhat 
different (Figure 3). Although in half of the observed countries, the burden is above 35%, we 
can say that a low paid worker in Serbia is comparatively more burdened than the others.  
 
                                                      
45 In the Federation, the nominal burden is slightly over 40%, but there were fringe benefits that were not taxed  
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Figure 6. 
Tax wedge for an average worker (childless) at the wage level of 33 % of average 
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revenue in 2005 was 40.82% instead of the 42.2% which was the ‘tax wedge’ for an average 
worker in the EU at the time.47  
Therefore, international comparisons indicate that average worker in Serbia does not 
have a larger burden compared to the workers in other European countries and the region 
(except Albania and BH), while the workers with higher earnings have a smaller burden on 
average. However, the workers with very small earnings, as well as families with low total 
earnings are more burdened compared to OECD/ EU countries, primarily due to a 
completely different nature of the tax system in our country, as well as the manner of funding 
health care from contributions. On the other hand, wage taxation in Serbia is usually 
noticeably higher than in the rest of the world, both in many developed OECD countries and 
in developing countries.  
 
 
Possible wage taxation reforms  
 
Reducing labor taxation is definitely a desirable tax policy, because through reducing 
the total labor cost it would encourage using the production factor – labor force – that is 
underused in Serbia and increase the competitiveness of the Serbian economy relative to 
foreign competitors. Advocating reduced wage taxation has been present in Serbia in the past.  
The basic problem with the orientation towards reducing the burden different levies 
place on wages has to do with the budget: it is hard to see how in the presently very tight fiscal 
system in Serbia one could find room for decreasing this revenue. The existing significant 
deficit needs to be reduced, even eliminated in the years to come, so any possible decreases in 
wage taxation would have to be compensated by increasing another tax, which is associated 
with new difficulties.  
Moreover, the present wage taxation system is such that is very hard to reform. The 
thing is that both the wage tax and the social security contributions are own revenues of local 
governments (80% of wage tax is their revenue) and respective social security organizations 
(PDI Fund, Republic Health insurance Fund and National Employment Office).  
Since the elimination or significant reduction of any component of wage taxation will 
directly jeopardize the operation of these institutions (or levels of government), the wage 
taxation reform requires the reforms of the social insurance and local government funding 
systems first. A detailed elaboration of such reforms is definitely beyond the topic of interest 
here, but in this context we can mention some options. 
With regard to the pension system, it is very hard to see how contribution rates could 
go down if the present PAYGO system is retained. Namely, already now, the PDI Fund 
collects barely 50% of revenue through contributions, while the rest is transferred from the 
budget, that is, other general revenue. Introducing the second pension insurance pillar 
(mandatory private pension insurance) would hardly be able to result in lower rates. All in all, 
when it comes to pension insurance, particularly having in mind the dire demographic 
                                                      
47 OECD ‘Taxing Wages’, 2011; “Taxation Trends in the European Union”, European Commission, Taxation 
and Customs Unit, 2011; Arandarenko and Stanić (2006).  
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outlook, the current rates will have to be increased in the long run. The alternative to close 
the existing fund, finance current liabilities from tax revenues and completely replace state 
insurance with private insurance is always an option, but with no real political chance of 
being adopted and which could not bring results in the foreseeable future. 
With regard to healthcare funding, we should point out that, today, virtually the entire 
burden of funding health care is borne by employed persons, whereas virtually all citizens of 
Serbia have the right to health care. From the legal point of view, the government has the 
obligation to fund health care from the budget for uninsured persons, but in practice, there 
are no such transfers. Therefore, the entire state healthcare system is financed by earmarked 
levy on wages (health insurance contribution). Such a solution is not uncommon, but a big 
question is whether it is right for a country like Serbia. 
One of the reform options is abolition of contributions and funding health care from 
the budget, through general government revenue. Another option is to significantly reduce 
the scope of services available with mandatory insurance (which would reduce costs and 
potentially contributions), and there would exist a possibility for voluntary supplementary 
insurance. One of the obvious issues with the present system is that there is no direct link 
between the paid ‘insurance premium’ (contribution) and service quality. When there is no 
link between price and quality, it is only normal to minimize the price. Some call it 
‘solidarity’, some call it ‘leveling’, but whatever you call it, it has considerable disincentive 
effect on the labor market, and incentive effect on shadow economy. 
 
With regard to unemployment insurance, it could probably be abolished as a 
mandatory obligation and to leave it to the employees to continue paying contributions if 
they wish so.  
With regard to wage tax, obvious possible reforms relate to increasing the non-taxable 
amount and increasing the present rate or, even, possibly introducing a progressive tax rate. 
Thus, the ideas mentioned so far are directed towards increasing the progressivity of the wage 
tax. The question of how justified it is to progressively tax income (including wages) is above 
all an ideological one, but the primary question is probably should not even be the 
progressive nature of the tax but its rate. A progressive tax rate (say 5% - 10% - 20%) is 
definitely less of a disincentive than the proportional 40% rate. 
In fact, looking at the macro level, only two realistic ways of reducing wage burden: 
• Reducing costs financed by taxes and contributions on wages (reducing the 
pension bill by cutting individual pensions or by moving the retirement age, 
reducing the scope of healthcare services, reducing the responsibilities of the local 
government level), or 
• Redirecting the tax burden from wages to another tax base (consumption, 
property, profit). 
 
The former is probably better, but a question arises as to how politically realistic it is, 
having in mind the political power of the groups that would bear the cost of such changes. 
The latter is probably politically more realistic, but it is very difficult to predict the effects of 
such changes, particularly having in mind limited capacity of the Serbian Tax Administration. 
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Cutting wage taxes and contributions to be offset by VAT increase is a proposal that 
has been circulating in the public for a while. The problem with it is that, in the first instance, 
it will result in a lower standard of living of the population and increase of poverty (due to 
increased prices of goods), 48 which is not a desirable option at the time of crisis, and, in the 
second instance, in attempts of workers to secure the increase of nominal wages to preserve 
the value of wages in real terms despite the increased VAT rate.  
If relieving the burden levies pose on wages cannot be realistically expected now for 
the above reasons, it should, nevertheless, remain a long term tax policy objective. When the 
Serbian economy exits the crisis and social circumstances improve, and when the total fiscal 
revenues increase, this idea of relieving the wage burden should be revisited as an important 
way of encouraging employment and decreasing unemployment, as well as increasing 
competitiveness.  
 
 
LAW ON EMPLOYMENT 
AND INSURANCE AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
This law governs, apart from administrative bodies, two different matters: insurance 
against unemployment and the system of active employment measures. The law regulates the 
insurance against unemployment in essential terms (the rights and all other material aspects 
are laid down); however, concrete measures of an active employment policy are not stipulated 
by this law, but by another act (National Employment Plan which is adopted by the 
Government of Serbia). 
 
 
Insurance against Unemployment 
 
Insurance against unemployment provides a pecuniary compensation and continued 
pension and health insurance for workers who lose their job. These entitlements are acquired 
by previous payments of mandatory contribution which is equally paid by employer and 
employee (0.75% of gross wage, each) in favor of the extra-budgetary fund maintained by the 
National Employment Service (NES). The currently applicable law was adopted in 2009 and 
has to some extent reduced the right to compensation for unemployment. 
An unemployed who has been dismissed by employer due to the breach of duty and 
discipline and similar reasons of inadequate conduct does not have the right to 
compensation.   
The level of compensation for unemployment depends on the previous wage of the 
unemployed, but with substantial limitations. Namely, the unemployed is entitled to 50% of 
his previous average wage but on condition that such obtained amount cannot be lower than 
80% or higher than 160% of the minimum wage. Such tangible reduction of the amount of 
                                                      
48 For such results see G. Matković and B. Mijatović: The effects of proposed tax changes on poverty and 
vulnerable groups in Serbia  Economic Annals, July-September 2011 
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compensation relative to the previous wage encourages the (newly)unemployed to actively 
seek new employment, or the well-known phenomenon that high compensation discourages 
seeking of employment which is highly present in the European Union, is avoided.   
Duration of the entitlement to compensation for unemployment is not equal for all, 
but depends on the previous insurance against unemployment and ranges between 3 months 
for previous insurance of up to 5 years to 12 months for insurance over 25 years.  
Exceptionally, an unemployed person may receive compensation for up to two years if two or 
less years are left until retirement.  
Compensation recipient has a duty, under the threat of losing the entitlement, to 
participate in the NES programs, to actively seek employment, and not to refuse the one 
offered to him. These are standard measures that need to stimulate the unemployed to try to 
increase efforts in finding employment instead of waiting for employment to find him. If the 
unemployed does not find a job until the expiry of the right to compensation for 
unemployment and if does not have other income, another program is available – the 
program of pecuniary social assistance to poor households – which provides smaller amounts 
but which can be received on a lasting basis.   
There are several issues concerning the insurance against unemployment: 
• the compensation is received by a small number of unemployed (about 70 thousand 
during 2012), which is hardly ten percent of the total number over the recent years; 
the causes thereof are: (1) the large number of long-term unemployed young and not 
so young persons who have never been employed and are thus not entitled to 
compensation, (2) a substantial number of those who have worked but have accepted 
the severance pay and voluntarily left the companies during restructuring and, 
therefore, are not entitled to compensation and (3) a part of the unemployed have 
used their right to compensation, 
• delays in paying the compensation are usually several months long because the 
revenue from the contributions for unemployment is significantly smaller than are the 
needs for paying the compensation, so that the permanently overburdened budget has 
to supplementary fund a considerable portion of the total cost, 
• the NES does not sufficiently monitor the behavior of compensation recipients; 
consequently, NES does not exclude from the programs many of those who are not 
active. 
 
Basically, the concept of insurance against unemployment has been well structured in 
Serbia: as a temporary means of support to the unemployed and as a means encouraging 
active job-seeking. The most important difficulties in the system arise from its 
implementation – from funding difficulties to difficulties in controlling the behavior of 
beneficiaries.  
 
Active Employment Measures 
 
The Law stipulates, in principle, numerous employment measures such as mediation 
in employment, professional orientation and advising on career planning, employment 
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subsidies, support to self-employment and training, public works, etc. But, total expenditures 
for active measures used through the NES are very modest, particularly when compared with 
the seriousness of the unemployment problem in Serbia: in 2010, they amounted to 3.7 billion 
dinars or to only about EUR 35 million. Of this amount, one-half was spent to reimburse the 
wages of the trainees recruited under the First Chance program. One-fourth was spent on 
public works, and for trainings only 8% of the already modest total assets.49  
Indeed, the impact of active employment measures on the reduction of 
unemployment in Serbia has not been visible. The cause for that, no doubt, is the minimal 
amount of assets, but it is at the same time questionable whether a considerably larger 
amount would bring the necessary results. Actually, the experiences around the world show 
that the effects of active employment policies, if any, are generally modest. A broad analysis of 
European experiences, for example, shows that training programs have minimum effects, that 
programs of employment subsidies in the private sector and those supporting job-seekers 
have better effects, while the effects of the programs of direct employment in the public sector 
are modest, even negative. Disadvantageous is the fact that the programs dealing with the 
young show particularly poor results.50 It is fair to say, though, that insufficiently good results 
of numerous programs of active employment policies are not the consequence of the 
weakness of the idea as such (supplementary training, for example) but of the deficiencies in 
the programmers’ implementation. 
An additional problem in Serbia is that active policy measures were often adopted 
within short deadlines, without in-depth studies and preparations, under the pressure of the 
political need that “something has to be undertaken” urgently with regard to unemployment, 
and were usually accompanied by a propaganda campaign. There is also dissatisfaction with 
the work of the NES on the part of a number of employers who were trying to cooperate on 
the training and other programs. Finally, there is no serious analysis, either, of the medium-
term effects of active employment measures which could serve to indicate the direction in 
which to go further.   
 
 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 
 
The question of occupational health and safety is very important for the overall 
business environment. Overly strict regulation may create excessive costs for employers, and 
thus deter them from investment, and, on the other hand, may lead to avoiding it in practice, 
particularly in less sound companies. In this manner a deficient system is created in which 
those that comply with the regulations are handicapped in the market as their production 
costs are higher. Therefore, the state’s standards in this area should be appropriate for the 
general level of development in the country and the capacity and integrity of inspection and 
other competent authorities.  
                                                      
49 See,  Izvešaj o radu Nacionalne službe za zapošljavanja za 2010. godinu (Work Report of National Employment 
Service for 2010), NSZ, 2011, p. 87 
50 J. Kluve - The effectiveness of European active labor market programs, Economic Journal, No, 6, 2010 
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The area of occupational health and safety has gone through very stormy changes in 
the past 20 years. Occupational safety and workers’ health in socialist times were very high on 
the government’s priority list, and there was even a parallel medical system of ‘occupational 
medicine’, and since the economy was dominated by large companies, quite a few of them 
had their own doctors’ offices on factory grounds. With the break-up of the system and big 
economic crisis in the 1990s, the entire system collapsed, and now it is being rebuilt, albeit on 
different foundation, but there is still a burden of the past.  
Occupational safety in Serbia is governed by the Law on Occupational Health and 
Safety, which was enacted in 2005. In addition to the law, several rulebooks were adopted, 
such as the Rulebook on the manner and procedure of the assessment of job and working 
environment related risk, as well as several rulebooks on preventive measures for safe and 
healthy work in the workplace and when using work equipment. 
It must be noted that the law itself does not provide for the employer’s obligation to 
insure its workers against work-related injury, but the current general collective bargaining 
agreement introduces such an obligation, as well as insurance against impairment or loss of 
work capacity. Among other things, Foreign Investor’s Council raised objections to this 
article of the general collective agreement, as the competent ministry claimed that the issue of 
insurance will be dealt with in a separate law. Considering that in Serbia there is general 
disability insurance, and the system of extra service credits (discussed below), it is really 
unclear what is expected from the employer with regard to insurance – which type, what 
amount of premium, and the like. 
As in many other areas, there is very strict legislation, but it is only selectively applied. 
The main illustration of its strictness is the requirement that all employers, regardless of the 
industry and risks faced by employees, are obligated by this law. Thus, the law applies to all 
employers, including those whose workers are exposed to no or minimal risk.  
For instance, the law obligates all employers to adopt the following: 
1. Occupational Health and Safety Act, and 
2. Act on Job and Work Environment Related Risk Assessment  
 
We believe that this arrangement makes no sense and that it generates unnecessary 
costs, particularly for small companies, and for a large number of large companies in the 
service sector, as well as institutions. In addition, the law not only refers to all employers, but 
also risk assessment has to be performed for each job position. We believe that the law should 
specify job positions considered risky, and then have detailed risk assessment performed only 
for such job positions, if they are provided for in the ‘job systematization’ document. The law 
could, thus, define most office and administrative jobs and some jobs in the service industry 
as “job positions with minimum risk”. 
We believe that legal exception (only few industries and only up to 10 employees) is 
extremely restrictive and that the list of industries should be extended and the number of 
employees increased. The law provides for draconian penalties (in many cases the minimum 
fine is RSD 800,000) even for some quite benign things, such as failing to adopt the 
occupational Health and Safety Act.  
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In addition to this law, other relevant legislation in the area of occupational health and 
safety is pension legislation that regulates the system of extra service credits towards pension 
for particularly hard and dangerous jobs, as well as general disability insurance. There are 
four groups of jobs that carry extra service credits, where 12 effective months on the job are 
calculated as 14, 15, 16 or 18 months. For the groups of jobs carrying extra service credits, the 
employer pays additional contributions. Such contributions are proportionately higher than 
the contributions for a standard pension to exactly match the length of service the credits add. 
With regard to the minimum retirement age, it is 55 for those whose 12 months are calculated 
as 14, 15 or 16 months (full application as from 2015) and 50 years of age for those whose 12 
months of effective service are calculated as 18 months of service.51  
 
 
EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES  
 
The Law on Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment of Persons with Disabilities, 
adopted in May 2009, has introduced special incentives for employment of persons with 
disabilities. However, because of the way the incentives are set, the law actually implies a tax 
on employment.  
 
The Law envisages the following options for employers: (1) employment of a number 
of people with disabilities relative to the total number of employees in a company, (2) 
financing of wages of the corresponding number of persons with disabilities employed in a 
company for vocational rehabilitation and employment of disabled persons (CPRDP) or a 
social enterprise, (3) purchase of goods and services from a CPRDP, and (4) payment of a 
fine. 
Ad 1. Each employer in Serbia employing at least 20 employees has a duty to employ a 
certain number of persons with disabilities, depending on the total number of employees: 
• an employer employing from 20 to 49 employees is under an obligation to employ one 
person with disabilities, 
• an employer employing 50 and more employees is under an obligation to employ at 
least two persons with disabilities, plus one such person on each new 50 subsequent 
employees. 
 
It is important to note that a newly incorporated employer is exempt from the 
obligation to employ persons with disabilities for a period of up to 24 months from the date 
of incorporation.  
Various difficulties surround employment of disabled persons. Employment is not 
possible in some industries because of the nature of work as such (building industry, catering, 
industry in general, etc.); moreover, in small places it is often not possible to find a disabled 
                                                      
51 For the analysis and proposals for improvement, see Analiza indeksacije opšteg boda i beneficiranog radnog 
staža (Analysis of General Credits and Extra Service Credit), CLDS, 2011  
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person with required abilities (technical or physical); finally, small-sized companies usually 
do not have supporting jobs that could be appropriate for disabled persons, etc.  
Ad 2. Financing of wages of the corresponding number of disabled persons in a 
CPRDP essentially constitutes an option equaling to a sanction as it incurs only costs and 
brings no benefit to the paying company. 
Ad 3. Purchasing goods and services from a CPRDP is the most attractive option, and 
the most productive from a broader perspective (provides work and not just salary), but its 
scope is limited since the assortment of a CPRDP goods and services is very narrow, and there 
are few companies registered as CPRDP.  
Ad 4. If an employer fails to fulfill the obligation to employ a person with disabilities, 
he will pay penalties equaling to a triple amount of the minimum wage for each person with 
disabilities he has failed to employ.   
 
Imposition of fines is not a good method for encouraging employment, which is 
evidenced by the fact that an increasing number of companies pay fines and do not employ 
disabled persons. It would be much better to encourage employment of disabled persons 
through incentives, rather than through sanctions, since in such a case those companies that 
have possibilities to employ disabled persons without special difficulties would be doing so to 
a much larger extent than so far, proceeding from their interest, while those companies not 
having a possibility to employ disabled persons would be relieved of this obligation. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Personal Income Tax Law has already 
introduced tax incentives for employment of persons with disabilities – wage tax and 
contributions on the weight of the employer do not have to be paid for three years. The 
rationale for this provision may be arguable but, in principle, such a measure makes sense. 
However, this law introduces a sanction if a company does not employ the number of persons 
with disabilities as prescribed by the government, and it is difficult to explain the principle 
underlying the obligation of a company toward such persons, and why companies should be 
sanctioned in the first place. 
Therefore, in principle, such legal arrangements do not make much sense, particularly 
not in a country where the unemployment rate exceeds 25% and where it is very difficult to 
find a job even to perfectly healthy persons. In practice, however, this problem is even more 
difficult because even the companies that are willing to meet the requirement and employ a 
person with disabilities (and thus avoid payment of fines) are very often faced with the 
serious problem of finding persons with disabilities who would be interested in working and 
who have the necessary qualifications and skills, particularly in some smaller places.  
 
 
ANTI- DISCRIMINATION AND ANTI-MOBBING REGULATIONS 
 
Over the past several years two more laws were adopted, which quite substantially 
touch upon the issue of labor relations– the Law on Prevention of Discrimination and the 
Law on Prevention of Mobbing at Workplace. 
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Although both laws are acceptable in principle, some provisions of both laws are 
highly problematic and disputable. For example, the Chapter Employer’s Rights, Obligations 
and Responsibilities of the Law on Prevention of Mobbing at Workplace (Articles 7, 8 and 9) 
does not in fact set out any of the employer’s rights. It rather provides only for the obligations 
and responsibilities, including essentially important obligations such as: „The employer shall 
be liable for damage caused by abusive behavior of a responsible officer or an employee to 
another employee with the same employer, in accordance with law”, as well as the 
administratively cumbersome obligations such as “The employer shall inform an employee in 
writing, prior to his/her employment, about the prohibition of mobbing, obligations and 
responsibilities of the employee and the employer in relation to the prohibition of mobbing, 
in accordance with this law.” We do not know the number of employers who actually do that, 
but it is clear that another obligation has been imposed on employers without any real need 
for it. On the other hand, the above mentioned stipulation that the employer shall be liable 
for damage caused by one employee to another constitutes a very high contingent liability for 
the employer, particularly bearing in mind very limited options of the employer (under the 
general Labor Law) to punish employees.   
A separate problem is posed by Article 31 which places the burden of proof on the 
employer if the court finds that a statement of claim is grounded. It means that the employer 
has to maintain very detailed and precise documentation of all events in order for the purpose 
of defense in a court of law, which is too burdensome an obligation for small companies and 
an unnecessary cost for big companies. A very similar arrangement is also found in the Law 
on Prevention of Discrimination (Article 45), according to which the burden of proving there 
was no discrimination is on the employer.  
 
Specifically, Article 16 of the Law on Prevention of Discrimination stipulates that 
„Discrimination shall be prohibited in the sphere of labor, i.e. violation of equal employment 
opportunities, or of enjoyment on equal terms of all rights in the sphere of labor, such as the 
right to work, free choice of occupation, career progress, professional advancement and 
vocational rehabilitation, equal remuneration for the work of equal value, equitable and 
satisfactory working conditions, rest, education and joining a trade union, as well as the right 
to protection against unemployment.”  This means that the employer practically may not 
freely take decisions related to these aspects. Having in mind that an employee can file a 
lawsuit against the employer, and that the employer bears the burden of proving that no 
discrimination has taken place, this means that the employer has to keep very detailed records 
of almost each decision on human resources, in order to be able to explain such decisions in 
court. Consequently, the company management is no longer accountable only to the owners 
for the human resources policy in the company, but has to be prepared for justifying all its 
human resources decisions in court – for example, that they have promoted the best 
performing employee, or that the most promising employee has been sent to advanced 
training. Another problem is the absence of case law so employers are still mostly “in the 
dark” and are not sure what evidence the court will exactly seek, and what kind of reasoning 
and explanation is compliant or not compliant with the law.  
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Additional issue is the fact that, in all likelihood, workers will often use their rights 
provided for by these two laws only after they have been laid off, and therefore the protection 
against mobbing and prohibition of discrimination have been de facto transformed into 
another restriction on employers to shed labor at the time of crises and try to replace bad 
workers by better ones.   
The experiences, particularly in courts, with the application of these laws are still 
insufficient for assessing the laws, but the whole set of anti-discriminatory laws would 
probably need to be amended at least in one key segment: to reintroduce the presumption of 
innocence of the defendant (the employer, for example) and to shift the burden of proof from 
the defendant to the plaintiff.  
 
 
PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONS  
IN THE SPHERE OF LABOR  
 
Introduction 
 
Labor relationship is filled up with individual and collective rights of employees and 
employers. If these rights are violated, the regulations on the protection of rights from the 
labor relationship are activated. This protection can be individual and collective, based on 
mutual agreement, judicial and before the Solidarity Fund. 
Protection based on mutual agreement is exercised in the labor environment 
(arbitrage) and with the Agency for Peaceful Settlement of Labor Disputes. Judicial protection 
is provided by the first instance court for individual and higher court for collective disputes, 
and if the employer is in bankruptcy – by the commercial court. 
 
 
Operation of Institutions and Proposals  
 
Labor Inspectorate 
The Labor Inspectorate supervises the implementation of labor regulations (The 
Labor Law, the Law on Occupational Safety and Health, the Law on Volunteering, the Law on 
Prevention of Mobbing at Workplace, the Law on Strike, the Law on the Protection of the 
Population from Exposure to Tobacco Smoke), followed by collective agreements, rules on 
operation and other acts. 
The Inspectorate acts preventively, correctively and repressively. Preventively – 
through control inspections which encourage orderly operations, efficiency and promptness. 
Correctively – through orders to eliminate identified violations of the regulations, and in a 
specific case to also postpone the enforcement of a decision by the employer. Repressively – 
through institution of relevant penal procedures. 
There are obvious weaknesses in the work of labor inspections which contribute to the 
chaotic situation and non-respect for the laws and other regulations in the sphere of labor 
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relations. Operation of the Labor Inspectorate has to be improved for this reason by a more 
consistent application of general regulations on inspection surveillance that relate to: 
employment continuity, labor independence, efficiency and updatedness, expertise and 
working ability; curbing of corruption and any form of conflict of interests, and also by 
tightening of responsibility. 
Moreover, labor inspectors need to demonstrate a higher degree of determination in 
some frequent, albeit serious infractions, such as: 
• curbing of unregistered work by relying more on paragraph 2 of Article 32 of the 
Labor Law, 
• institution of infringement proceedings when the conditions from Article 270 of the 
Labor Law are in place therefore, 
• imposing the measure banning work, within the meaning of Article 66 of the Law on 
Occupational Health and Safety, etc.  
 
Agency for Peaceful Settlement of Labor Disputes 
The Agency is a place where disputes are settled involving both individual rights 
(cancellation of service contracts, wages, various allowances, discrimination, mobbing, etc.) 
and collective rights (collective agreements and the like). 
The Agency activity after its establishment was sizeable (in 2006, the number of settled 
labor disputes was 1,670), then started to gradually fade away to finally become very modest 
recently. In 2010, the number of settled disputes was 87 (of which 10 collective), while in 2011 
the number of settled disputes was 164 (of which 8 collective).52 If the trend continues, such 
drop in the work result inevitably raises the question of whether further existence of this 
agency makes sense. Indeed, bringing down the number of mediations to minimum is not 
evidence of a substantially higher respect for laws by employers and employers, but either of 
the weaknesses in the Agency operation or of its insufficient reputation among potential 
clients.  
Further, the Agency for amicable settlement of labor disputes settles individual and 
collective disputes which are also settled by courts. The Agency settles them based on the 
demand filed by mutual consent, and the court – based on the lawsuit. As disputes on 
individual rights can also be settled in the labor environment and in a litigation or in 
extrajudicial procedure, and as disputes concerning collective rights can be settled before the 
arbitration court and court of law, truly justified is to raise the question if such disputes need 
to be settled by the Agency for Amicable Settlement of Labor Disputes, particularly for the 
fact that it settles them without the constitutionally guaranteed  right to appeal and because 
such disputes can be settled by application of the regulations on mediation. Therefore, we are 
of the opinion that the rationale for the further existence of this Agency needs to be 
reconsidered.  
 
  
                                                      
52 Work  Report, Republic Agency for Amicable Settlement of Labor Disputes, April 2012 
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Solidarity Fund 
Protection of rights is taken to the Solidarity Fund when a company is in bankruptcy, 
for workers’ financial claims (wages, sick leave pays, severance payments, etc.). Such claims 
are decided upon by the Governing Body of the Fund; however, in order for this decision-
making to take place, a commercial court needs to first establish in bankruptcy proceedings 
the right of an employee to put such claims. 
Basic difficulty in the Fund operation is of financial nature: over the recent past it used 
to dispose of hardly EUR 3-4 million per year,53 which is insufficient to finance entitlements 
of former employees in the companies in bankruptcy. Thus, according to the statement of the 
Fund’s director, in February of this year the Fund disposed of only one-fifth of assets 
necessary for this year so that it was able to finance the rights of three thousand users only, 
while about 11 thousand demands are on the “waiting list”, and the same additional number 
is expected because several thousands of companies have gone bankrupt.54  
Another, conceptual problem with the Solidarity Fund is the following: employees 
receive assets only after the court’s decision become absolute, and not immediately after the 
dismissal when they need the money most. This arrangement makes sense because the Fund 
cannot deal with establishment of the rights of certain employees prior to the court decision 
but, on the other hand, the question then arises with regard to the reasons for its existence. 
For, the economic court as the court which deals with bankruptcy has a duty to establish 
everybody’s rights, including those of employees and can, therefore, without major difficulty 
render the decision on payment of the legal claims to employees, both of the part pertaining 
from the bankruptcy estate and the part payable against the Republic budget that finances the 
Solidarity Fund. Therefore, we believe that it would be good to transform this fund into a 
budgetary fund without any administration, with all the decisions on payments being taken 
by a competent court, and all the payments being made by the Ministry of Finance on the 
basis of a court ruling. 
  
Courts 
Although the Labor Law (Article 195, paragraph 3) stipulates that lawsuits involving 
dispute filed by employee against employer have to be finally settled within 6 months from 
the date of their institution, they have been pending for years. The reasons for such a 
situation include: a chaotic courts network, large number of cases, insufficient training of 
judges, a small number of judges specialized in labor disputes and small number of trying 
judges, work inefficiency, etc.  
In deciding in employee lawsuit filed against employer, often principle in dubio pro 
laboris (in the case of doubt, decision must be in favor of the worker) is applied when 
necessary to rule in unclear circumstances. The reason for applying this principle is explained 
by the fact that the worker is economically, socially and in any other way weaker and that it is 
natural and adequate to be given preference when preference must be given to someone. 
                                                      
53 Operation Report of the Solidarity Fund, Solidarity Fund, January 2012 
54 “Novato“, 13.2.2012 
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There remains the question whether what matters here is the acceptable partiality or not.55 
There is also, of course, the partiality in favor of employers, but it is then of corruptive origin.   
Labor relationship disputes are under the second-instance control of appellate courts 
which resolve the appealed judgments of first-instance courts (which determine in individual 
disputes) and higher-instance courts (which determine in collective disputes). Higher-
instance court resolves on appealed decisions concerning the conflict of jurisdictions. The 
Supreme Cassation Court decides on judgment revisions. In Belgrade, second-instance courts 
accept appeals in about 20% of cases, and in the rest of Serbia about 15%. Judgment revisions 
are accepted in about 10% of cases. 
There is a problem in Serbia with regard to standardization of judicial practice, as 
most cases in the domain of labor relations are finalized at the level of one of the appellate 
courts (there are four of them in Serbia), so that the difference in practice among them is 
possible. Standardization is ensured only in disputes where revision of the proceedings is 
possible (commencement of employment and termination of employment, and collective 
disputes), because the revision is done by one court – the Supreme Appellate Court. 
The Labor Law includes several deadlines that we believe need to be changed in order 
to speed up litigations. 
 
Proposal: 
1. to shorten the deadline for filing  a lawsuit in employee/employer dispute (Article 
195) from 90 to 30 days, because if these disputes are to be settled urgently (Article 
438 of the Law on Civil Procedure) they also need to be urgently instituted,  
2. the 6-month deadline for final settlement of lawsuits filed by employee against 
employer (Article 195) is unreasonably short, and needs to be extended (to two years, 
for example) or abolished, 
3. to shorten the three-year limitation period for the claims arising from labor 
relationship (Article 196) to two years (or to even one year). 
It would be advisable to consider introduction of separate courts specialized in 
settlement of disputes in the sphere of labor or, at least, specialization of judges for the 
resolution of disputes in this area. (The sphere of labor is broader than labor relations because 
it also covers labor beyond labor relationship). The mentioned specialization would improve 
the quality of trial and its efficiency. 
 
 
 
  
                                                      
55 Partiality of the courts in favor of employees is notorious in Italy and France; see, A. Alesina and F. Giavazzi – 
The Future of Europe, Reform or Decline, MIT Press, 2006, p. 58 
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Chapter 4 
MAIN WEAKNESSES OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
AND PROPOSALS FOR THEIR ELIMINATION   
 
In this chapter we offer an overview of major weaknesses of the Labor Law that we 
believe are causing high unemployment rates, hurting productivity, and are decreasing the 
competitiveness of Serbian companies. We also present recommendations to boost 
employment, improve productivity and increase competitiveness by amending laws and 
regulations. Still, the applicable concept of labor legislation and the essential rights of 
employees are not questioned here. Instead, we have tried to identify those major issues that 
constitute weak points but can be addressed within the existing model of labor relations. 
Overcoming of these deficiencies would result, to a certain extent, in more flexible 
arrangements and, primarily, in the elimination of some evident shortfalls of the existing 
Labor Law, which are not necessarily connected with the choice of a labor relations model. 
Furthermore, not all the deficiencies of the Labor Law have been discussed here, including 
those more relevant, but only those which make functioning of the economy more difficult 
and contribute to high unemployment.56   
 
 
TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT  
 
Apart from the usual full time employment for an indefinite period, as an enduring 
standard type of employment, over the last decades more flexible, the so-called non-standard 
forms have increasingly developed, such as the fixed term employment contract, part-time 
employment contract, job sharing employment contracts, temporary employment contract, 
casual employment contract, telework agreement, on-call employee agreement, and the like. 
The main reason for the increasing popularity of the listed types of employment is certainly 
their better employment adaptability to the work characteristics and processes and interested 
workers, i.e. a higher flexibility of the employment at the time of increasing business 
uncertainties and fast technological and market changes. An additional reason, frequent in 
European countries, is to avoid numerous restrictions of the existing legislation applicable to 
standard employment, or the legislator’s awareness that something needs to be done to make 
the labor legislation more flexible in order to enable new employment.  
 
 
                                                      
56 A long list of almost senseless, nomotechnical errors in the Labor Law can be found in Z. Ivošević – Thirty 
Reasons for Making a New Labor Law, „Izbor sudske prakse“ (A Selection from Case Law), vol. 6/2011 
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Fixed-Term Employment   
 
The Labor Law does envisage the possibility of fixed-term employment but stipulates 
that it may not last for more than 12 months (Article 37, paragraph 1), and specifies that it 
may be established in the case of seasonal works, works on a specific project, increased 
volume of work lasting for a certain time. This arrangement is very rigid and reflects the 
aspiration to direct employers toward more hiring on a standard employment basis as more 
favorable for the employee. However, the mentioned objective is usually not accomplished 
because there are alternative ways for avoiding a standard contract: 
• illegal employment (without any contractual relationship),  
• circumventing the legal provisions, as done in Serbia, through (1) a 30-day break 
between the expiry of the previous and the beginning of a new contract, or (2) 
conclusion of a new fixed term contract formally for other activities, although the 
workers go on performing the original activities, 
• shifting business activities to the gray economy,  
• decrease of economic activity and non-hiring of workers, with unemployment higher 
than in the case of fixed-term work, etc.   
 
All these modes of evading a standard employment contract are harmful both for the 
worker (his social and other rights and protection are reduced) and for the employer and 
society as a whole.  
The solution with maximum 12-month fixed-term work both for one contract and in 
total is unusual from the point of view of comparative law arrangements. Only Spain has 
remained with the same 12 months. On the other hand, the number of countries in Europe 
which do not set any time limit whatsoever for fixed term work is increasing: currently, there 
are 13 such countries (for example, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Turkey, Ukraine). In 
most other European countries establishment of fixed-term employment is allowed regardless 
of the reason, and total duration is limited, ranging from 24 to 60 months (60 month-period 
is applied in Russia, Finland, Hungary and Macedonia; Estonia and Switzerland allow as 
many as 120 months.57  
In analyzing the extension of fixed-term employment, there is an apprehension that 
employers might shift a vast majority of employees in a company from indefinite-period 
employment contracts to fixed-term contracts in order to improve their position as much as 
possible and thus abuse this possibility.58 However, such reasoning is wrong. In most of the 
cases employers are aware that uncertainty of employment, as a consequence of the fixed-
term contract, in many cases is not good for the company, either, as it encourages diligent 
and good workers to seek another job, in another company, which would not be the case with 
indefinite period employment contracts and higher certainty that they entail. Therefore, the 
employer would be facing a risk of losing good workers, the mainstays of the company’s 
                                                      
57 This and similar data which follows has been taken over from the database of Doing Business 2012, The World 
Bank, 2011 
58 See the statement of the Vice President of the SSSS, daily Novosti, 29 September 2012. 
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production, due to excessive utilization of fixed-term contracts. Therefore, in most of the 
cases the employer is interested in keeping indefinite period employment contracts with the 
workers who make up the core of the labor force, and keep only a smaller variable part of 
workers, whose number depends on the trends in business and who have lower qualifications 
and are less trained, on fixed term contracts. In other words, the employer will behave in 
accordance with his best interests and will not maximize the number of fixed-term contracts 
on account of indefinite period employment contracts: the employer will keep all workers 
that he counts with on a long-term basis on indefinite period employment contracts, while 
taking into account the number of workers necessary for the times of crisis and their quality 
and training (in which he has also invested), and will potentially shift to fixed term contracts 
only the part of the labor force that depends on business trends (cycles).  
The basic idea behind relaxation of the restrictions on contracting fixed-term 
employment is not to shift the existing labor force from indefinite period to fixed-term 
contracts, but to increase employment through more flexible forms of employment. Actually, 
it has been long known that employers refrain from additional employment at the time of 
strong business cycles as they know that it will be neither easy nor cheap to shed redundant 
labor when a less favorable time or a crisis comes. The main reason for refraining is the 
inflexible labor legislation which makes layoffs more difficult procedurally and makes them 
expensive because of the obligation to provide severance payments. Therefore, higher fixed-
term employment is one of the responses to this problem.  
 
Proposal:  
1. to modify the existing arrangement in the Labor Law laid down in Article 37, 
paragraph 1, and to enable a longer term for fixed-term work – 24 months or 36 
months and even longer, if duration of a project is longer than 36 months 
(construction of a dam, subway, shooting a TV series, etc.); 
2. to abolish the obligation to state reasons for fixed-term employment; 
3. to limit the maximum number of successive fixed-term employment contracts with 
the same employee to not more than three in a reference period; 
4. if the proposal presented in item 1 is not adopted, then envisage a possibility for newly 
incorporated employers of entering into three-year or four-year fixed-term 
employment contracts.  
 
Such arrangements would increase the efficiency in the economy when facing 
dynamic changes in the business environment where uncertainty is increasingly evident 
(hence employers cannot plan the labor force), with economic crises and difficulties, with 
changing trends in the economy but also in individual firms, with a permanent need for 
reducing the operating costs in order to survive on the increasingly competitive market, etc.   
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Job sharing Employment Contracts 
 
Employment established on the basis of a job sharing employment contract is 
unknown to our labor legislation. This is another demonstration of its unnecessary 
conservatism with respect to contemporary ideas in the domain of labor relations. Job sharing 
is a unique method of employing workers in a pair to fill one vacancy, who work as specific 
partners by splitting the working hours, cooperate in performing the job, are autonomous in 
deciding on distribution of the working hours among them, and are supported by the 
employer with regard to improvement of the cooperation necessary for performing the 
envisaged activities. Division of labor between the two can be proposed by the workers, but 
can also be made upon the employer’s initiative. Needless to say, it is the employer’s duty to 
strike a balance in the distribution of tasks in order to satisfy the needs and ambitions of both 
employees and to achieve efficiency in work.   
Job sharing can be understood as a way for resolving one problem encountered with 
part-time work. Namely, the part-time work is convenient for many individuals in view of 
their family circumstances or leisure time preferences; however, employers face difficulties 
from time to time of how to “fill in” the non-covered working hours when they receive one 
part-time worker because they are not able to easily find a worker of the relevant profile and 
abilities who is willing to also work a part of the working hours. In such a situation, it is 
possible that the “first” worker finds a partner who is capable and willing to work in a pair, or 
to split working hours: it can be, for example, a spouse, or it can also be an unknown person 
found by the “first” worker thanks to his own channels. In this way, two goals can be 
complementarily achieved: the goal of the employees to work reduced working hours and the 
goal of the employer not to feel the negative consequences thereof, i.e. to have one worker on 
a full-time basis.  
This type of non-standard employment contracts, together with some other, has been 
spreading over the developed world over the last few decades, starting from the 1970s.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to add a provision in the Labor Law (Section Part-time Employment) which would 
enable division of full time working hours between two or more workers, through a 
job sharing employment contract, 
2. concrete arrangements would be regulated by an agreement of the interested parties 
(partners and employer), in accordance with the employer’s bylaws.  
 
Adoption of this amendment would be beneficial both for employees and employers 
and would not affect anybody’s interests.   
 
 
Remote Employment Contract   
 
The next flexible type of employment is telework that can be defined, according to the 
European understanding, as „a form of organizing and/or performing work, using 
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information technology, in the context of an employment contract/relationship, where work, 
which could also be performed at the employer’s premises, is carried out away from those 
premises on a regular basis“.59 This work is usually performed at the employee’ home, but it 
can also be carried out in other places – from rented premises to an internet café. Its basic 
characteristic is that the employee is not at the same location with his associates or with 
workers with whom he is performing joint work. Telework has become possible with the 
emergence of the modern communication technologies, primarily the Internet, telephony, 
video technology, etc.    
Relative to usual method of work organization, advantages of telework are numerous 
both for the employer and the employee. The employer can significantly reduce the labor 
costs, particularly those for business premises and employees’ transportation, and can also 
recruit some high qualified experts, who they would not be able to employ in the usual 
manner because of the distance of their place of residence. Telework also offers more 
opportunities to employees to find adequate employment without the need to move to other 
parts of the country or other parts of a big city and without long travels to the work post. 
Telework is particularly convenient for workers who find it hard or impossible to leave their 
house (because of the children or elderly parents), and also for persons with disabilities who 
can perform their tasks without the tiring daily journeys to their work posts. Moreover, this 
work method enables the employees to make better use of their time or to organize and plan 
by themselves the execution of their assignments.  
Telework has expanded rather rapidly in the developed countries over the past 
decades. Thus, the number of workers in the United Kingdom who were working from home 
in 2010, either permanently or on an ad hoc basis, was 3.7 million.60  
Serbia’s labor legislation does not specifically regulate telework as such, although 
mention is made of one type, the most important one, of this form of employment – working 
at home – through the formulation „away of the employer’s premises, or at home”. This 
arrangement can be considered vague and create confusion in practice. Namely, it is 
incomplete because telework can be organized in several different ways of which only one is 
work at the employee’s home. Therefore, possible application of the regulations concerning 
work at home to employees will depend on the concrete type of telework, which requires 
direct regulation of the work at home by the Labor Law provisions in order to avoid any lack 
of clarity in their application. The regulation of certain issues by collective bargaining 
agreements may have certain advantages, as they facilitate the respect for the specificities of 
some forms of this type of employment. 
 
Proposal: 
1. to modify the Labor Law by exclusively using the term work away from the employer’s 
premises and by striking out the terms work „at home“ (Article 42) and „family 
members“ (Article 43), 
                                                      
59 Framework Agreement on Telework concluded by ETUC, UNICE/UEAPME and CEEP, of 16 July 2002, item 
2 of paragraph 1  
60 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-11879241 
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2. to narrow down the number of provisions from Article 42, paragraph 2, that an 
employment contract for this type of employment has to contain to the key ones only, 
such as the type of work and wage, and to leave the rest to the negotiations between 
the employer and the employee, either individually or through collective bargaining.  
 
Individual or collective bargaining concerning the telework parameters represents a 
more convenient method for creation of the norms for employees’ rights than the legal 
regulation of this matter because it is more flexible and enables regulation of the telework in 
the manner that best suits various situations in a given firm, branch or activity. 
 
 
Temporary Employment Contract through Agencies  
 
The Labor Law of the Republic of Serbia does not recognize another form of 
employment whose popularity in European countries is growing:61 temporary work through 
agencies (or labor force hire). It involves activities of private companies (agencies) which, 
with a view to making profits, recruit workers who will be working in another company on a 
temporary basis (because of an increased volume of business, as a substitute for an absent 
worker, etc.), but in such a manner that employment contracts are made by and between the 
agency and the company, and not by the worker being recruited. In other words, the agency 
engages a worker exclusively to be able to temporarily “hire” his work to other companies in 
need of such worker and, consequently, there is no employment contract (or labor relation) 
between the company-beneficiary and the worker. Such engagement of a worker in an agency 
can be both for a fixed term and an indefinite period. In Germany, for example, workers are 
hired in agencies for a fixed term, with all usual benefits (pension, disability and health 
insurance, etc.). 
Business relations between the agency, company and worker are usually established in 
the following way: (1) the agency has a long list of job-seekers, as well as the evaluation of 
their qualifications and work skills, (2) the employer in need of temporary workers 
approaches the agency and contracts the hiring of a certain number and certain composition 
of workers, wages per hour, etc., (3) the agency provides the necessary workers who perform 
the work with the employer, (4) the agency pays to the workers the contracted amounts for 
the work performed, and (5) the employer pays to the agency the contracted amount for the 
worker’s services. In such a manner, the agencies ensure flexibility for both the worker and 
the employer. Some do it with unskilled workers, and some specialized ones with highly 
skilled experts.  
The above type of work engagement can have favorable results for the employer: 
necessary workers can be found quickly, in a manner that is easier than if one is doing that on 
one’s own; regular employment is avoided in the cases of temporarily increased needs for 
workers; there is a possibility to avoid incurring certain costs (health insurance, paid annual 
                                                      
61 See Temporary Agency Work in an Enlarged European Union, European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions, 2006 
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leave, etc.). Employment through these agencies can also be attractive for workers as it is 
simpler than seeking job on one’s own. It may also be a way for permanent employment 
because some employers use the temporary engagement as a trial when they intend to employ 
workers on a permanent basis; the worker knows that the private agency, unlike similar 
government services, will really do its best to find him engagement as it is interested in 
earning its mediation fee.  
European practice is largely diverse, and during the last decade the restrictions that 
generally used to exist were reduced. Generally, the basic idea behind less stringent 
arrangements was the wish to encourage illegal immigrants (the Netherlands) or workers in 
the gray economy to get integrated into the legal system of labor relations, even at the cost of 
relaxing the provisions of the labor legislation.   
Currently applicable provisions of the Serbian Labor Law which deal with temporary 
employment (Article 174) do not regulate this area adequately. Therefore, they need to be 
completely revamped and/or supplemented by the provisions on temporary employment 
through agencies, because the labor force hire from agencies is common practice in Serbia, 
too; hence this area should not be left in the zone of illegality, thus encouraging employers to 
avoid obligations through fictitious agreements with the agencies, and leaving employees 
without any legal protection.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to supplement the Labor Law with a chapter on temporary engagement of workers 
through agencies, which will include the basic arrangements (recognition of this form 
of work engagement, relationship with the general provisions concerning temporary 
and fixed-term employment, basic relations in the employee-agency-service user 
triangle, etc.), 
2. to include the principle of equal treatment of workers employed on a fixed-term and 
on a permanent basis in the beneficiary’s company, while leaving a possibility for a 
different solution through the collective agreement,  
3. to regulate the operation of these agencies in the Employment Law (their existence, 
the reporting principle, possible financial guarantees, and the like) either by making 
appropriate changes in the existing section on employment agencies or by adding a 
new section on temporary employment agencies.  
 
Regulation of temporary employment through agencies would bring to Serbia another 
mechanism for boosting employment which is increasingly present in European countries as 
a flexible and popular solution.   
 
 
Employment of Aliens  
 
The existing Law on the Conditions for Employment of Aliens originally dates back to 
1978, i.e. the era of socialist Yugoslavia and is outdated in many aspects. The essential issue is 
88 
 
reflected in the fact that the area of employment of aliens in Serbia is not regulated in 
accordance with the modern market, economic and legal basis, which creates legal 
uncertainty and unnecessary costs for employers, and also results in non-registration of the 
employment of aliens („informal employment“). 
The main general question is whether, or to which extent, to level out the position of 
foreign and domestic workers, proceeding from the fact that the existing law gives priority to 
domestic workers. For example, whether to keep the existing arrangements: annual quotas for 
employment of aliens, prioritization of the domestic unemployed over unemployed aliens, 
different positions relative to the insurance against unemployment, etc. In addition, the 
applicable law does not cover the work of members of boards of directors and company 
owners, which altogether creates practical difficulties. Principled equalization of the position 
of domestic and foreign workers is a civilization-affirming requirement and should be 
observed with minimum restrictions in the case of particularly sensitive issues.  
Another problem is created by complex and slow procedures for obtaining the 
necessary permits. First, the procedure for obtaining a business visa and residence permit is 
excessively complicated and time consuming. Besides the time necessary for gathering 
numerous documents in order to have the residence permit approved, the waiting period 
until definite issue of the permit is too long. Second, the procedure for obtaining a work 
permit from the National Employment Service after the residence permit has been obtained 
entails the need to face a new procedure which requires, inter alia, the submission of the 
opinion which the National Employment Service has issued itself to these aliens during the 
residence permit procedure.   
 
Proposal: 
1. to enact a new law on employment of aliens, based on the principles that are in line 
with Serbia’s integration into international flows and market economy.  
 
 
WORKING HOURS 
 
Overtime Work  
 
The Labor Law of the Republic of Serbia envisages (Article 53) that an employee at the 
request of an employer shall work overtime, but not longer than 4 hours per day and 8 hours 
per week.   
Legal limitation of the number of overtime hours is certainly a civilization-affirming 
achievement and a natural way for protecting the employee against excessive work effort. In 
real life, however, urgent need often arises for overtime work for business-related reasons, 
which cannot be satisfied in a timely fashion by outsourcing work.  This is why the limit set 
by the law turns to be insufficient from time to time. On the other hand, the legal 
arrangement does not take into account a possible interest on the part of the employee to 
achieve his material and other interests over a specific period of time by investing more effort 
at work. Accordingly, this legal arrangement might be set a bit more flexibly.  
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Comparative European arrangements differ significantly. Overtime work in some 
countries is practically not allowed (for example, the Czech Republic and Latvia, except in 
very exceptional cases), while in others there is no restriction on overtime work (for example, 
the UK if the worker agrees). Overtime work is possible in most countries, and time 
limitations vary. Some countries prescribe the maximum number of hours per day, some 
prescribe them per week, and some for longer periods (month, quarter, semester, year). Thus, 
Belgium has a limit of 65 hours in a quarter when usual overtime work is concerned and 130 
hours in exceptional circumstances, which makes it possible to concentrate the hours in a 
smaller number of days. Many countries combine time restrictions of different durations: for 
example, Norway allows overtime work equal to 10 hours per week, 25 per month and 200 
per year, which can be additionally increased with the consent of the trade unions and even 
more with the consent of the labor inspector; Turkey allows 270, and Poland and Portugal 
150 hours per year. The existing Serbian arrangement with 4 hours per day and 8 hours per 
week is relatively frequent, although only one of these two criteria is usually applied (Croatia, 
Slovenia 8 hours per week). A frequent restriction is also 10 hours per week, particularly in 
the former Yugoslav republics (Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also 
Austria). In the Netherlands, the restriction is 4 hours per day, but also 20 hours per week, 
which means that on all five working days the maximum overtime work is allowed.   
Another unfavorable arrangement is limiting overtime work exclusively to cases of 
unforeseen events (force majeure, a sudden surge in the volume of operations and similar 
unplanned reasons), which means that it is not allowed in situations of planned or seasonal 
volume of works. This arrangement is unnecessarily rigid: although it is intended to protect 
the worker, it prevents at the same time a quite natural orientation toward reliance on the 
existing labor force at times of temporarily increased volume of operations based on mutual 
interests of the employer and the worker. It should also be mentioned that the provision of 
the Labor Law on redistribution of the working hours does not satisfy these needs as it is 
suitable only for seasonal and similar works which also include periods of less intensive 
activities. Therefore, making overtime work conditional upon unexpected events is 
completely unnecessary and does not allow a natural response to a temporarily larger volume 
of operations.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to keep in the Labor Law the permitted number of overtime work of maximum 4 
hours per day, and to replace the weekly limitation of 10 hours with a monthly 
limitation of 60 hours, 
2. to supplement paragraph 1 of Article 53 with the provision that overtime work can 
also be carried out in other circumstances if the employer and employees so agree. 
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Redistribution of Working Hours 
 
The Labor Law provides for (Article 57) a possibility to redistribute working hours for 
the purpose of their better utilization or for the needs of completing a certain task, provided 
that the working hours of the employee cannot be longer, on average, than full working 
hours. The redistribution cycle cannot be longer than six months.  
This six-month cycle is often not sufficient as it is too short for many seasonal and 
similar works (agriculture, tourism, building industry, etc.) which are the only segments 
where redistribution of the working hours is possible considering that they work more 
intensively during the high season and weaker in off-season periods. As in the mentioned and 
other similar activities the high season lasts for about six months, it is significantly more 
natural to do the redistribution within one calendar year. Croatia has such an arrangement.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to change in paragraph 2 of Article 57 six months into one year as a framework for 
redistribution of the working time.   
 
 
Secondment 
 
The Labor Law does not envisage a possibility of short temporary transfer of a worker 
(for example, of up to thirty days) to another appropriate job with the same employer, which 
would not require modification of the employment contract. Such a need for substitution 
occurs frequently when an employee is on annual leave or a short sick leave, and the business 
process requires continuity in that workplace. This solution is significantly more 
advantageous for the company than short-time outsourcing of a worker, because it is simple 
in administrative terms and because an “insider” is already familiar with the company and its 
operations. On the other hand, secondment would not create any special difficulty for the 
worker since it is for a short time period.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to add to the Labor Law a section that would enable secondment of a worker to 
another corresponding job without amending the employment contract,  
2. to set the maximum secondment period at 30 days.  
 
 
Annual Leave 
 
The Labor Law chapter on annual leave has several weaknesses and needs to be re-
examined. First, the Labor Law envisages that the first part of annual leave, when used in 
parts, has to last at least three weeks. This long minimal term can cause difficulties in the 
company’s operation. Therefore, it would have been better for the economy if the legislator 
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had observed the provisions of the ILO Convention No. 132 which envisages an 
uninterrupted two-week term for the first part. This particularly holds for the activities of a 
seasonal nature that are carried out during the more pleasant part of the year when 
companies are left without workers needed at the time of most intensive works.   
The Law is not clear with respect to the remaining portion of the annual leave: does it 
have to be taken in whole or can it be divided into smaller parts. The Law needs to be 
amended so as to specify this matter. A better legal arrangement is to allow division into 
smaller parts, but to leave the definite outcome to the agreement between the employer and 
the employee. Entire annual leave would have to be taken by no later than 30 June of next 
year, as the case has been so far.   
Second, the Labor Law stipulates the obligation for the employer to submit the 
decision on the use of annual leave at least fifteen days before its start. Such a decision is 
reasonable when an employee takes the annual leave upon employer’s request, in order to 
have time to make adequate planning. However, this term is too long for frequent situations 
when, for business reasons, it is necessary to react faster than permitted by the applicable 
provision of the Law. It would be advisable to foresee a possibility of also issuing the decision 
on the use of annual leave based on employer/employee agreement, after the mentioned term.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to rephrase Article 73 of the Labor Law in the manner that annual leave may be used 
in parts, provided that the duration of the first part must be at least two weeks and 
used in the calendar year, and that the entire leave has to be taken until the 30th of 
June of next calendar year, 
2. to supplement paragraph 2 of Article 75 with a provision that the decision on annual 
leave may also be submitted based on employee/employer agreement, after a 15-day 
period.  
 
Voluntary Blood Donation 
 
According to Article 77 of the Labor Law, voluntary blood donors are entitled to two 
days of paid leave of absence for each donation. This manner of stimulating voluntary 
donation has been inherited from the socialist era. Currently, the arrangement according to 
which a private employer, rather than the state, has a duty to stimulate or finance a 
humanitarian activity at his expense has no longer any sense.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to delete item 2 of paragraph 3 in Article 77 of the Labor Law. 
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PERSONAL INCOME  
 
The arrangements in the Labor Law relating to the determination of the wage and 
other types of personal income are excessively, and occasionally erroneously regulated, thus 
affecting the freedom of employer/employee bargaining, preventing the application of more 
modern remuneration methods and creating significant difficulties of administrative nature 
for the companies. Some of such weak points are highlighted below. 
 
 
Same Pay for Same Job   
 
According to the arrangements of the Labor Law, the employer may not raise the base 
wage of an employee relative to other employees working on the same jobs even if such 
employee achieves much better results than the others and even if his contribution to the 
company’s success is larger. The Labor Law achieves this by invoking the “same pay for same 
job”, but equating the value of the individual’s work with the individual’s job. Namely, the 
Labor Law stipulates the obligation for the company to adopt a general enactment defining 
the work posts, their description (contents), the qualification they require, i.e. the job 
classification (Article 24); on the other hand, the legal principle holds pursuant to which all 
employees have to receive the same pay for equal work, and equal works is equated with the 
same work post. In this way, raising the wage of an individual without raising the wage of all 
others performing the same job has been made practically impossible. According to the Labor 
Law (Article 104), “Employees shall be guaranteed the same pay for the same work or the 
work of the same value that they perform with the employer. The work of the same value 
involves the work requiring the same level of professional qualification, the same working 
ability, responsibility, and physical and intellectual work”. Evidently, it is just the matter of 
formal criteria here (relevant for defining workplaces), and not of real, effective work of 
individual employees.   
In other words, upon definition of work posts in the job classification act, and of the 
qualifications required for such work posts, each work post is connected with corresponding 
wage without a possibility of differentiation. In order to somehow manage to do what is 
necessary – to differentiate among wages and stimulate good work – employers are forced to 
invent other jobs, which are included in the job classification, when they wish to raise 
someone’s wage relative to others doing the same job. Otherwise, wage differentiation will be 
contrary to law.   
This arrangement is one of the major shortfalls of the Labor Law because it is not only 
unacceptable because of the linking of the wage to the work post under the threat of nullity of 
an opposite arrangement, but also because of its essential contradiction. Namely, contrary to 
the above quoted paragraph 2 of Article 104, a completely opposite arrangement is found in 
paragraph 4 of Article 107 which prescribes a possibility for the employer to negotiate with an 
employee a base wage higher than the one that the employee would receive based on the 
general enactment. The provisions of these two paragraphs from Articles 104 and 107 are in 
direct collision.   
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The employer must be given the freedom to differentiate among wages in 
employment contracts with employees even when they perform the same work, depending on 
his own evaluation of the work of individuals and the company’s business priorities. Needless 
to say, the legal principle that wage differentiation is not conditional upon unpermitted 
discrimination based on personal characteristics of the worker (gender, religion, political 
affiliation, etc.) must be ensured. This can be achieved by application of anti-discriminatory 
laws, but the very possibility of contracting a higher wage cannot be excluded in the manner 
arising from the current wording of Article 104 of the Labor Law.   
 
Proposal: 
1. to amend the Labor Law by excluding paragraph 3 of Article 104 which defines equal 
work and which unnecessarily links the work of equal value not with the work effects 
but with the work post elements.  
 
By this proposal, the principle of the same pay for the same job would be preserved in 
the Labor Law, but the wage would be delinked from the work post and the measuring of 
actual work performance would be made legal, including the reward for certain individuals 
through higher regular wages.   
 
 
Complex Wage Calculation  
 
A special difficulty in the wage calculation is the obligation to establish a part of the 
wage based on performance exclusively on a monthly level, which is unnecessary for a large 
majority of employees and also for the real situations prevailing in economic activities. Here, 
the Labor Law evidently does not take into account the fact that modern performance 
evaluation methodologies take also other time periods for benchmarking (the calendar year, 
for example), and not only the month, so that the employer’s intention can often not 
materialize.   
Moreover, this arrangement is often also harmful for workers because employers 
avoid excessive administering of this portion of the wage and avoid its calculation. They thus 
reduce the employees’ wage to the basic wage only even when they would otherwise approve a 
reward based on performance. This issue needs to be resolved in a manner which will be in 
line with the reality, and not to link the performance exclusively with the monthly calculation. 
As an incentive system that rewards good work is in the interest of both the employer and the 
employee, the unnecessary red tape has to be avoided so as not to increase the operating costs 
and undermine the natural freedom of employee/employer arrangements.   
 
Proposal: 
1. to revise Articles 106, 121 and 122 of the Labor Law and relieve the employer of the 
obligation to monthly record and calculate the parts of the wage based on the 
performance and the contribution to the employer’s business success. 
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Employee’s Share in the Profit 
 
Similarly to the above, an employee’s share in the profit is envisaged as a possibility by 
the Labor Law, but is exclusively linked with the business year (Article 14). On the other 
hand, employer and employee may be interested in different calendar remuneration through 
profit-sharing, particularly with respect to the rewarding of managers based on the company’s 
performance. Therefore, this linking with the business year is unnecessary and the decision 
on the time dimension is to be left to the employer and unions, or the general enactment 
and/or the employment contract.   
 
Proposal: 
1. to remove from Article 14 of the Labor Law the mentioning of the business year.  
 
 
Compensation of Employee’s Work 
 
In addition to the monetary wage (including the part for particularly good work), as 
the basic mode for remunerating the work of the employed, there are also other forms that do 
not have a usual monetary form and, therefore, do not represent the wage in a narrow sense, 
but are part of the concept of personal earnings. Those are numerous benefits on top of the 
wage – benefits in kind, payment of some employees’ costs by the company and some 
allowances – such as covering housing costs and the right to use the company car by the 
employee, supplementary pension and health insurance, covering of training and education 
costs, costs of recreation and annual leave, meals at work, etc.   
According to the Labor Law, a part of the above compensation forms is formally 
included in the wage and is thus subject to a strict tax treatment, which includes both the 
wage tax and contributions for social insurance. Such definition of elements covered by the 
wage in the Labor Law is unnecessary, as it is not the task of the Law to regulate the tax aspect 
of some forms of remuneration for employees and of the services rendered to them by the 
employer. In other words, the Labor Law does not have to specify the wage elements and, 
accordingly, the method of taxation of certain elements, but to leave their taxation to fiscal 
legislation. In this manner, a more favorable tax treatment of certain benefits would be made 
possible, such as, for example, a housing cost allowance and the costs of using a company car.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to delete paragraph 3 of Article 105 of the Labor Law which specifies unnecessarily 
and incorrectly the content of the total wage. It is incorrect because it also includes in 
the wage the personal earnings which, according to the Labor Law, are not part of the 
wage.   
 
In this arrangement, the taxation of some forms of employee compensation would be 
left to fiscal laws, as appropriate. 
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Wage Compensation during Leave of Absence 
 
According to the Labor Law, wage compensation during leave of absence for various 
reasons (Articles 114-116) must be calculated in relation to the average wage in the preceding 
three months. As the average wage includes, besides the basic wage, the performance bonus, 
overtime work, night work and work in shifts, work on the days of public holidays, hot meal 
allowances, vacation bonuses, annual bonuses, etc., it means that the mentioned 
compensation is not calculated only in relation to the basic wage, but also in relation to all 
other elements. This arrangement is not good because it does not make sense for an employee 
who is not working in a given period to receive a wage whose base would also include the 
performance bonus as if such employee achieved top work results. This problem is 
particularly pronounced in situations where high one-time bonuses (annual rewards, for 
example) were paid in the preceding period, which distorts the picture of the employee’s 
current wage. This also holds true for all other one-off bonuses which also lead to significant 
deviations of the three-month wage average from the standard wage. The legal arrangement 
results in significant differences in the wage payments of otherwise equal workers, depending 
on the time when they receive the payment. It is, therefore, quite a frequent phenomenon in 
practice that an employee takes paid leave of absence after the period in which he had high 
earnings.   
In view of the above, it is much more equitable for the basic wage to be the basis for 
the calculation of benefits, excluding other wage elements, with a possible increase based on 
the years of service.  
Proposal: 
1. to revise Articles 114-116 of the Labor Law in such a manner that the basis for 
determining compensation during absence from work is defined as the basic wage and 
not as the average wage in the preceding three months. 
 
Adoption of the proposed amendment would entail a fairer and more logical 
arrangement for compensation during absence from work. 
 
 
Wage Increase for Night Work and Work in Shifts  
 
In the Labor Law, the formulation of allowances for night work and work in shifts is 
not precise: “for night work and work in shifts, if such work has not been valued at 
determining the basic wage – by at least 26% of the base”, Article 108, paragraph 1, item 2. 
A conclusion which arises from this formulation is that the wage of an employee who works 
in shifts needs to be raised on this basis by at least 26%, and when within such an 
arrangement he works by night – by further 26%. Such doubling for the night work was 
certainly not the intention of the legislator. Accordingly, this provision needs to be 
formulated with more precision so as to avoid dilemmas and conflicts between employers and 
unions, plus involvement of the government agencies.   
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Second, it is questionable whether night work (in shifts) needs to be at all envisaged as 
a basis for allowances topping the wage. Indeed, such allowance is not the internationally 
accepted practice (France, the UK, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Turkey, Cyprus do not have allowances for night work) nor is it envisaged by the 
International Labor Organization conventions. Therefore, the percentage of the wage for the 
allowance based on work in shifts should not be imperatively prescribed by law, but may be 
left to general company regulations.  
The third weak point is the fact that the Labor Law neither defines the work in shifts 
nor is precise in formulating what represents the basis for the calculation of the allowance on 
this basis, which creates dilemmas with respect to what is considered as work in shifts. On the 
grounds of the published opinions of the Ministry of Labor and case law, the majority view is 
that work in shifts involves a continuous rotation of all three shifts on daily and weekly levels 
according to a specific schedule, while the work in two shifts does not represent shift work.  
This needs to be explicitly defined by the Law in order to prevent different interpretations 
and make administration easier.   
 
Proposal: 
1. to rephrase Article 108, paragraph 1, item 2, of the Labor Law in order to make clear 
that night work as part of shift work may be paid only once, 
2. to lower the allowance for night work to 10%, as prescribed by some comparable 
countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, and the Czech Republic). 
 
 
Minimum Wage 
 
Prescribing the minimum wage is a frequently used instrument in the world for 
protecting the lowest paid workers, which helps their wages rise above the level on which they 
would be according to the solution which is strictly market-based. Some authors emphasize 
the realistic possibility that the minimum wage above the market one leads to a decrease in 
employment of these workers due to the drop in the demand for their work. Without entering 
deeper in the discussion with respect to the value of the concept, we will analyze the 
applicable arrangement in the Labor Law of the Republic of Serbia. The basic provision is that 
the minimum wage is determined by the Social-Economic Council  for a six-month period by 
taking into account numerous and different factors (Article 112). 
The objection to this arrangement is that the Social-Economic Council is not the body 
that should decide on the minimum wage for at least two reasons: 
• in countries with parliamentary systems, such as Serbia, it is natural that decision-
making concerning such an important topic of a broader social interest needs to be 
made in the Parliament and not in a body which belongs more to the concept of a 
corporatist than a parliamentary state,  
• the hitherto experience with the work of the Social-Economic Council has not been 
positive, starting from disputable representativeness of the participants to unavoidable 
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imposition of own (and personal) interests to politicization of each and every issue, 
including this one.  
 
A visible demonstration of the Social-Economic Council’s decision-making quality 
and orientation is the ratio between the average and the minimum wage in Serbia. In April 
2012, when the rate of the minimum wage was raised to 115 dinars per hour, the minimum 
wage reached as much as 46% of the average wage in Serbia, practically one half. In other 
words, the wage of the lowest paid workers is now almost one-half of the average wage in 
Serbia which also includes significantly more qualified employees (up to university 
professors) and those in companies in good financial shape (from the financial sector, for 
example). Such a ratio cannot be acceptable and is evidently a consequence of the weak 
representation of true employers’ and employees’ interests, and a good one of the unions and 
the government. Namely, the mentioned ratio is permanently high in Serbia, and its surge in 
April is, no doubt, a consequence of the pre-election Government needs and the consent of 
the trade unions. 
Further, the Labor Law has listed several factors which (should) influence the 
minimum wage movements (the cost of living, the average wage trend in Serbia, subsistence 
and social needs of the employee and his/her family, the unemployment rate, unemployment 
trends, and the overall level of economic development in Serbia). It is impossible to 
operatively take into account such a list of factors and this, therefore, gives rise to extreme 
voluntarism by the Social-Economic Council, or disregard for any objective factor, as is the 
practice.  
A solution to this problem can be sought in two directions: (1) to set the minimum 
wage by the law or (2) to prescribe a precise mechanism for adjustment of the minimum wage 
level by the law, and make the adjustment automatic, similar to pension indexation.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to determine the initial minimum wage level in the Labor Law, 
2. to envisage in the Labor Law the wage level indexation mechanism by taking into 
account the cost of living and average wage movements in Serbia according to the so-
called Swiss formula (one half of the minimum wage depends on the cost of living and 
one half on the average wage). 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY LIABILITY 
 
One of the major weaknesses of the Labor Law is the lack of necessary provisions 
dealing with disciplinary liability, i.e. with sanctioning the employees for the breaches of duty 
and lack of work discipline. The existing provisions – on dismissal for these reasons and on 
temporary suspension without wage compensation for up to three days (Article 170), which is 
a symbolic and, therefore, ineffective sanction – cannot represent an integral model of 
disciplinary punishment.    
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The Labor Law does not contain other provisions concerning disciplinary liability, 
which is interpreted in different ways. One line of thinking believes that the Serbian law 
clearly provides for an employee’s liability for the breach of duty and that, accordingly, the 
employer can autonomously, or together with the unions, regulate the issue of the breach of 
duty and work discipline by his regulations. An opposite interpretation holds that the Labor 
Law does not regulate at all, and that it moreover does not recognize the concepts of 
disciplinary liability, disciplinary measures and disciplinary procedure, nor does it envisage 
their more specific regulation by the employer’s general regulations, so that the employer 
does not have the right to regulate this issue by his regulations anyhow. Such a view has won 
recognition, firstly, in the opinions of the competent ministry, and then in the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia which, when assessing the legality of the 
provisions of companies’ general regulations which govern the issue of disciplinary liability, 
took the view that disciplinary liability, disciplinary procedure, disciplinary bodies, and 
disciplinary measures cannot be regulated by these regulations, as it has been frequently 
practiced by numerous employers (labor rules) and social partners (collective agreements).62  
Such a stand of the Constitutional Court of Serbia means that an employee’s 
disciplinary liability is exclusively limited to dismissal and temporary suspension from work, 
which quite unnecessarily denies the possibility of establishing a violation less serious than 
the one which deserves dismissal and prohibits other penalties (for example, a monetary 
sanction, temporary wage reductions) which would correspond to the weight of the 
infraction.   
The above arrangement neither makes sense from the point of view of ensuring work 
discipline nor from the point of view of comparative legal arrangements. It is quite natural to 
have in place a whole scale of breaches of duty with corresponding sanctions. The existing 
arrangement can, on the other hand, be harmful even for workers as it encourages the 
employer to resort to dismissal also in situations where, if it were possible, they would be 
satisfied with a milder sanction.  
As the subject-matter of disciplinary liability has traditionally been in the scope of 
labor legislation, both in the material legal sense and in the formal legal sense, it is necessary 
to re-examine the idea of the lack of disciplinary liability in the domestic labor legislation. 
The Labor Law will need to either (1) regulate more specifically the issue of disciplinary 
liability or (2) to make it binding on employers to regulate this issue by their general by-law 
(regulation).  
 
Proposal: 
1. to supplement the Labor Law with a section on disciplinary liability, which would 
include the basic arrangements only: types of sanctions (for example, reprimand, 
temporary suspension from work with a reduction of wage, monetary sanctions, 
                                                      
62 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia, IU number 213/2004 of 23 June 2005 („RS 
Official Gazette“, no. 68/05); Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia, IU number 
494/2004 of 14 July 2005 („RS Official Gazette“, no. 68/2005) 
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transfer to another work post, dismissal), basic principles of the procedure, and the 
like.  
 
Regulation of the basic principles of disciplinary liability and procedure in the Labor 
Law would enable fairer sanctioning of breaches of duty, and encourage a higher degree of 
respect for work rules and conduct. 
 
 
DISMISSAL 
 
This section will not discuss the abandonment of the European protective model of 
dismissal and the shift to a liberal concept, because it would imply the termination of the 
applicability of Convention no. 158 of the International Labor Organization and the Revised 
European Social Charter, both ratified by our state. However, among the provisions 
concerning dismissal there are also visible shortcomings in the Labor Law.  
 
 
Complex Procedures  
 
One problem is posed by the stipulated complex procedures in the case of some types 
of dismissal, which deter employers from dismissals even when the legal reason for the 
dismissal evidently exists. One of these reasons is the following: according to the view of the 
Supreme Court,63 an employee may be dismissed on this ground only after the judgment 
becomes final and binding, which most often means only in a several years’ time and which 
automatically implies that the dismissal prior to the finality of a judgment is illegal even if the 
criminal offence evidently exists; here, too, a better solution would be that the employer has 
the right to dismiss the employee based on his own information about the nature of the 
offence, and that (il)legality of the dismissal is then finally assessed according to the final and 
binding judgment.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to amend item 4 of paragraph 1 in Article 179 in such a manner that the action 
underlying a criminal offence rather than the criminal offence is a justified reason for 
lawful dismissal. 
 
This amendment would lead to a more reasonable procedure and enable the employer 
to immediately dismiss the employee in the case of an evident criminal offence, without 
fearing that the dismissal is illegal only because the worker has not yet been convicted by a 
final and binding judgment. 
 
                                                      
63 Legal understanding of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court of Serbia of 30 November 2004 
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Virtual Illegal Dismissal  
 
The Labor Law contains an unusual construction relating to resignation by an 
employee, but with the consequences of an illegal dismissal by the employer.  Namely, 
paragraph 3 of Article 178 sets out that „if an employee shall cancel the employment 
contract“ because of the breach of duty by the employer, „the employee shall have the right to 
all entitlements arising from employment, as in the case of illegal termination of his/her 
employment“. 
Equalizing two different cases, in terms of their consequences, is certainly 
inappropriate. An employee whose employment terminates illegally has the right to be 
returned to work and be compensated for the damage in the amount of lost wages (with 
contributions) during the conduct of the labor dispute. On the other hand, an employee who 
himself terminates the employment contract cannot have the right to these entitlements by 
the nature of things because he did so of his own free will. His decision may not be influenced 
by possible illegality of the employer’s decision, because the employee can challenge it 
through a labor dispute and seek fulfillment of the employer’s obligation. If the employee has 
decided to terminate employment of his own free will, such employee cannot have the same 
rights as an employee whose employment was terminated against his will, by the employer’s 
act.   
 
Proposal:  
1. to delete paragraph 3 of Article 178. 
 
 
Consequences of Illegal Dismissal  
 
The Labor Law stipulates in Article 191 the manners of compensating an employee 
when the court finally establishes that his/her employment was terminated illegally. The first 
mechanism is reinstitution and the second – the employer’s obligation to pay to the employee 
the compensation for lost wages and other earnings, including the unpaid social 
contributions. If either the employee or the employer believes that reinstitution is not possible 
in the given circumstances, the Labor Law envisages additional compensation for the 
employee in an amount of maximum 18 wages (at the employee’s proposal) or 36 wages (at 
the employer’s proposal), depending on the years of service, social status, etc. 
There is no doubt that compensation for the illegal dismissal is fair and makes sense, 
but there remains the question of its limits. The first question is whether it is fair to cumulate 
two rights – the return to the job and full compensation of lost wages. By such accumulation 
of the entitlements, the employee actually realizes net profit without any real loss: (1) the 
employee still has his job, and (2) he has received full gross wages for the time (usually several 
years long) in which he did not work. On the other hand, the employer has to pay lost wages 
usually for several years and to again have the concrete (unnecessary) employee on his 
payroll, which is a very severe, even excessive punishment. Therefore, it would be fairer not to 
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have full accumulation of the compensations, but to allow the employee to have the right of 
option: either to be reinstated (plus moderate financial indemnity) or to receive full 
compensation for lost wages (maybe increased by moderate damages), but without the right 
to return to work.   
Another disputable arrangement is related to the employer’s obligation to pay the lost 
wages for the entire period between the dismissal and the court’s final judgment: it is 
disputable because it is not only the employer who is responsible for the duration of that 
period. Rather, it is the court which is usually responsible for that period due to its slow 
procedure (customarily lasting for several years). Particularly important is the fact that the 
Labor Law obliges the courts to definitively complete the labor disputes within a period of six 
months from the date of their institution. As this legal limit is usually not observed by the 
court, it means that it is not fair for the employer to be obliged to compensate the damage 
which was not caused by him but by the court’s illegal acting. Therefore, limiting the 
employer’s obligation through the maximum number of monthly wages that can be awarded 
would certainly make sense as a form of the employer’s protection against the slow operation 
of the courts, but would also serve as encouragement for courts to more rapidly adjudicate in 
such labor disputes.  
Third, there is an important essential difference concerning the question whether 
dismissal is illegal because of the lack of an objective, legal reason for dismissal (from Article 
179) or because of the omissions of a procedural nature on the part of the employer (provided 
that the objective reason for dismissal existed). These two different causes would need to be 
treated differently: the former more strictly and the latter less strictly.64  
Fourth, there is a significant lack of clarity with respect to the coverage and mode of 
calculation of compensation for unlawful dismissal. Namely, the Labor Law leaves the issue of 
damage compensation to the general rules of contract law, i.e. the provisions of the Law on 
Contracts and Torts. There is a dramatic difference in practice, however, between the disputes 
aimed at compensating the damage caused by lost profit on other grounds, and on the ground 
of unlawful dismissal. Plus, there are large differences in how the courts understand the level 
of the compensation. Some courts even award to employees the compensation according to 
the wage calculation for “comparative” workers, which also includes a part of the wage for the 
performance at work, wage top-ups for the work on the days of public holidays, night work, 
etc., costs of transportation, hot meal allowances, vacation bonuses, etc. This position is 
unacceptable from the aspect of the general rules of the Law on Contracts and Torts 
concerning compensation of damage, as the maximum amount that may be paid to an 
employee according to this law would need to be the base wage plus the years of service. In 
order to avoid dilemmas and create a fair system equal for all, the issue of damage 
compensation caused by illegal dismissal needs to be explicitly regulated in the Labor Law.   
 
  
                                                      
64 Different treatment of the two causes of dismissal illegality is applied by Italy according to the new labor law of 
June 2012 
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Proposal: 
1. to rephrase Article 191 of the Labor Law so that: 
a. a worker illegally dismissed without a valid reason referred to in Article 179 of 
the Labor Law has the right of option: either to be reinstated (plus moderate 
compensation) or full compensation of the damage in the form of lost wages 
(plus, possibly, some moderate compensation), but without the right to return 
to his/her job, 
b. a worker unlawfully dismissed for procedural omissions on the part of the 
employer, but for whose dismissal the objective reasons stipulated in Article 
179 of the Labor Law existed, has the right to compensation in the form of six 
monthly salaries, without the right to be reinstated, 
2. alternative: to amend item 2 of paragraph 1 in Article 191 of the Labor Law which 
regulates compensation of damage caused by illegal dismissal, in the sense of 
incorporating a 12-month limitation for the number of months for which 
compensation of damage for lost wages can be awarded; for the purpose of 
adjustment, to reduce the number of months from paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same 
Article, 
3. to regulate more specifically in the Labor Law the issue of wage coverage and mode of 
calculation in the case of unlawful dismissal.   
 
Acceptance of the proposed arrangements would entail a level of wage compensation 
payable by the employer for illegal dismissal which is more appropriate to his guilt.  
 
 
Severance Pay 
 
Severance pay is an important financial element at termination of employment, both 
at retirement and in the case of layoffs by the employer caused by redundancies. In Serbia, the 
employee’s right to severance pay is not questioned, probably out of habit, as if it were a 
definitively acquired right or a civilization-affirming achievement.  
It is questionable, however, whether the right to severance pay is based on good 
reasons. Firstly, the right to severance pay at retirement is highly disputable as one can see no 
good argument for the employer’s obligation to improve the financial position of the former 
employee after his retirement. If the pensions in Serbia are low or paid with delay, this is 
something that needs to be corrected by the government through its pension policy rather 
than by individual employers. This solution discourages employers from employing older 
workers as they will be under an obligation to pay them severance pay in the near future at 
the point of their retirement.   
The next problem with the severance pay in Serbia is its amount: at retirement, it is 
three monthly wages, and at dismissal of workers made redundant by technologically caused 
decreases in the volume of business it is at least one-third of the monthly wage for each of the 
first ten years of service and one-fourth of monthly wage for each following year. For 
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example, in the case of a worker with twenty years of service, it is 5.5 monthly salaries which 
is for a company facing financial difficulties a very high expense, and will probably act as a 
deterrent from shedding labor and, perhaps, push it to bankruptcy because it is not able to 
make such large severance pays. It is even probable that one of the reasons for legalizing such 
severance pays has been to turn employers away from dismissals. On the other hand, in the 
countries coping with the second wave of the crisis amounts of severance pay are declining, 
which is considered to be an incentive to employment through reduction of potential costs 
related with firing. In 2012, it was a road embarked on by Spain and Portugal.65 
The third problem is the obligation to make severance payments in one bullet, prior to 
the date of dismissal (Article 158, paragraph 1). This „tough“ solution  is defended by the risk 
that some employers might fail to fulfill the legal obligation of making severance payments if 
the payments were allowed after the dismissal and in installments. Although there is some 
truth to such rationale, there is no doubt that it makes severance pays and dismissals highly 
difficult because many employers do not have financial reserves for their payment on the 
statutory terms. A better solution would be to combine a more flexible severance pay regime 
and a more efficient enforced  collection of arrears, plus sanctions. At the same time, 
severance pays in installments would not be disadvantageous for the recipients, either, as they 
anyway spend the severance pay for self-support purposes during unemployment.   
The fourth and the biggest problem concerning the severance pay in the domestic 
labor law is the provision of paragraph 2 of Article 158 of the Labor Law which envisages the 
obligation for employer to pay out severance pay for each year of employee’s total length of 
service, and not for the years of service with the given employer. Such an arrangement has no 
justification and makes no sense, because there is no obvious reason for the current employer 
to make severance payments for the employee’s years of service spent with another employer 
or, even, in his own private business. Nowhere in the world has such arrangement existed.66  
This last of the mentioned arrangements not only makes the firing and severance pay 
very difficult, but also opens up a possibility for an employee to collect severance pay several 
times and in different companies for the same years of service. Such unacceptable outcome is 
the best illustration of the arrangement as it encourages manipulation and rent-seeking 
behavior, while discouraging employers from employing older workers in order to avoid the 
possibility of having to pay high severance payments for full years of service.   
In autumn of 2011, the Government of Serbia proposed, as part of the draft 
amendments to the Labor Law, that this arrangement be replaced by another – and in two 
alternatives: (1) to calculate the period since the previously made severance pay (if any), and 
(2) to calculate only the period with the current employer (and its legal predecessor, if any). 
The latter solution is reasonable and along the lines of our considerations, while the former 
represents an attempt to compromise with the unions, that is, aims, as a minimum, at 
avoiding multiple collections, although it is still possible to base the calculation of severance 
                                                      
65 See, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-13/spain-cuts-severance-pay-on-new-open-ended-job-
contracts.html; http://www.portugaldailyview.com/whats-new/labour-law-severance-pay-to-get-severely-severed 
66 See, R. Holzmann, Y. Pouget, M. Vodopivec, M. Weber - Severance Pay Programs around the World: History, 
Rationale, Status, and Reforms, The World Bank and IZA, May 22, 2011 
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pay on full years of service, if not previously received. However, this compromise was not 
acceptable, either, and was rejected by the unions, together with the overall set, and the 
Government desisted from reforming the law.   
 
Proposal: 
1. to delete item 1 of paragraph 1 in Article 119 of the Labor Law (relating to severance 
pay at retirement),  
2. to amend paragraph 2 of Article 158 of the Labor Law so that the right to severance 
pay at dismissal is determined for the years of service with the employer making the 
severance pay and not for the total length of service of the employee, 
3. to amend paragraph 2 of Article 158 so that severance pay for each year of service may 
not be lower than one-fourth of the employee’s wage, 
4. to amend paragraph 1 of Article 158 so that severance pay may also be paid in 
installments, but not more than six monthly installments. 
 
This amendment would provide for a more equitable arrangement and enable 
economic revival of the company and its future progress. Moreover, reduction of total costs 
of the labor force through, inter alia, a less heavy burden of severance pay encourages new 
employment as employers know that possible severance pays will cost them less.  
 
 
CONDITIONS FOR WORK OF UNIONS IN COMPANIES 
 
A growing practical problem of companies in Serbia is the following: numerous newly 
established unions with small memberships are emerging and they are requesting from 
employers all statutory conditions for their operation – premises, technical support, paid 
leave of absence, protection  against dismissal, etc. (Articles 211-212). The employer has no 
possibility to refuse these requests, because the unions have been established in accordance 
with the law which provides for their rights as listed above. Since the Labor Law does not 
stipulate a minimum number of members as a requirement for the establishment of a union 
even a smaller number is sufficient for establishment. On the other hand, the Labor Law 
obliges the employer to meet all of the mentioned requests for the union work, regardless of 
the number of members. Moreover, according to the Rules on Labor Union Registration, a 
labor union does not have a duty to report the number of its members even at registration. 
Thus, the number of members may never be known, as well as the information on whether 
there are any members at all. 
Such a system does not make any sense. It encourages the establishment of small labor 
unions whose intention is not to fight for the rights of employees but to ensure privileges for a 
handful of “leadership” members. Therefore, it is necessary to set forth legal requirements for 
the size of labor unions the satisfaction of which would entitle a union to have the conditions 
for its operation provided by employer.  
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Additionally, the stipulations of the Labor Law are not clear with regard to union 
leaders who are provided certain rights (paid leave of absence, protection against transfer to 
another position and dismissal). Namely, there is a dilemma in practice as to who of the 
appointed or selected union representatives enjoys protection against dismissal. The 
formulation of paragraph 3 in Article 188, which states that the number of union 
representatives who enjoy protection shall be determined by the general enactment or special 
agreement of the employer with the union, results in frequent interpretations that the number 
may be narrowed down only based on the agreement between the union and the employer 
and, if not, all members of the union bodies enjoy the protection. This is unacceptable 
because it may result in serious manipulation since the number of members of the union 
bodies is completely beyond the employer’s control. It is, therefore, necessary to explicitly 
regulate by the law that in the absence of the agreement-based definition of the number of 
union’s representatives enjoying the protection, only the president of the union is entitled to 
such protection.   
Article 181 is also disputable as it stipulates that when the employees’ representative 
refuses transfer to the corresponding work post referred to in Article 171, the employment 
contract may be terminated by the employer only with the consent of the relevant ministry. In 
such a manner, the union officials are excessively protected, even in the case of a standard 
procedure necessary for organizational and economic reasons. Instead of the ministry, a court 
could judge in a labor dispute whether the transfer was objectively justified or if mobbing of 
the union official occurred.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to rephrase Article 210, paragraph 3 and state that the employer has a duty to provide 
the premises, technical and other conditions only to the union with a membership of 
at least 10% of employees,  
2. to specify in Article 188, paragraph 3 of the Labor Law that in the absence of the 
agreement between the union and the employer on other appointed or selected union 
representatives, only the president of the union shall be entitled to protection against 
dismissal.  
 
 
REPRESENTATIVENESS 
 
For the activity of labor unions and the association of employers of great importance 
is their representativeness as in this way they acquire the right to participate in collective 
bargaining and in reaching the tripartite agreement at a certain level, in collective labor 
disputes, etc.  
Pursuant to the Labor Law (Article 223-232), representativeness is established by the 
tripartite Committee for Establishing Representativeness of the Labor Unions and the Union of 
Employers, which takes decisions only unanimously. The line Minister has a duty to accept 
the Committee’s proposal if all relevant factors have been established. In other words, the 
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mentioned committee establishes the facts and is, therefore, the main institution in the 
procedure, and if its opinion is not positive, it is not possible for the union or the association 
to get the status of representativeness. An additional aggravating circumstance is the 
provision that the Committee must take a decision unanimously in order for it to be valid, 
which means that each member of the Committee can block recognition of a candidate’s 
representativeness.  
The main shortcoming of the system of exercising and re-examining the 
representativeness lies in the tripartite nature of the Committee. It is not realistic to expect 
impartiality of the stakeholders when deciding about the representativeness of future 
competing organizations. Instead, it is natural to expect that they will try to block the 
decisions. Actually, the role and influence of each of the existing representative associations 
would diminish if an additional number of them became representative. And this is precisely 
what happens. On the other hand, the Serbian Government may also have its political 
interests and allies, and participate in such context in the activities relating to establishment 
of representativeness.   
The unrealistic feature of the system has become evident over the past eight years of 
the system’s functioning (since its inception), in which period no other union or employers’ 
association has become representative for the territory of the Republic of Serbia, despite some 
attempts. A recent event reflects well the situation in this area. Last April, the Ministry of 
Labor approved representativeness to the Confederation of Free Unions, but not based on the 
opinion of the relevant Committee, which was not given, but based on the opinion of an 
(unknown) independent commission. There is no doubt that this decision was taken in an 
unlawful manner. The Minister of Labor was justifying the procedure by an alleged blockade 
of the Committee’s work, while representatives of the representative unions and employers’ 
association announced their intention to file a lawsuit against the Minister, claiming that the 
procedure was illegal and politically motivated.67 
The issue of representativeness of the national unions/associations has been present 
since the establishment of the first representative organizations, or since 2005. 
Representativeness of the Autonomous Trade Union is not questioned by anyone, while 
representativeness of the Employers’ Association is under serious suspicion. Consequently, 
the entire system of collective bargaining at the national level is of dubious validity and 
legitimacy.   
The Labor Law provides for the possibility to re-examine the representativeness, but 
based on the procedure according to which such representativeness is approved (including 
the unanimity in the Committee), which means that invalidation of representativeness is 
practically impossible. The previous Labor Law (from 2001) included a better arrangement:  
the dispute concerning representativeness had to be settled by the court as an impartial party. 
  
                                                      
67 See, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2012&mm=06&dd=04&nav_category=12&nav_id=615475  
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Proposal: 
1. to rephrase Articles 223-232 of the Labor Law so that: 
a. the Agency for Businesses Registers (which is already maintaining the registers 
of associations of citizens, foundations, pious endowments, sports clubs and 
similar non-economic organizations) takes over the register of unions from 
the Ministry of Labor), 
b. the Agency for Businesses Registers pursues the procedure for establishing 
representativeness, 
c. a higher-instance court conducts disputes which relate to the matter of 
representativeness. 
 
These proposals rest on the idea of introducing order and ensuring that only 
statutorily defined stakeholders participate in the process of collective bargaining at all levels.  
 
 
DISAGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS  
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS  
 
In the course of negotiations over collective agreements disagreements among the 
participants are possible, as is their unsuccessful conclusion. This possibility is included in the 
Labor Law and is fully compliant with the principle of freedom of collective bargaining and 
collective agreement, as well as the ILO Collective Bargaining Conventions nos. 98 and 154.  
However, the latest Civil Procedure Law (2011) provides for the arrangements that are 
not in accordance with the Labor Law and which affect freedom of collective bargaining. 
Namely, Article 443 of this Law stipulates: „In litigation involving collective bargaining 
agreements, participants in the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement shall exercise 
the right of protection when dispute arises over an individual disputable matter in the 
negotiating process or in the process of amending and supplementing the already concluded 
collective bargaining agreement, if the dispute over the disputable matter has not been settled 
amicably or by arbitration formed by the participants in the collective bargaining agreement 
in accordance with the provisions of a separate law”. In other words, if in spite of an 
unsuccessful collective bargaining procedure one party wishes to enter into a collective 
bargaining agreement, even against the will of other parties in the bargaining process, it may 
institute an arbitration procedure and, if such procedure is not successful, may institute 
proceedings before a court which will meritoriously decide how the nonaligned, disputed 
provisions of a non-concluded collective bargaining agreement should read, and thus ensure 
its existence.   
This arrangement breaches not only the principle of freedom of collective bargaining 
but also the general legal principle that conclusion of an agreement requires concurrence of 
the free will of the participants. Interesting is also the question of “the protection of whose 
rights” and what type of rights the court is to ensure when the parties have not agreed and 
when the agreement is non-existent.   
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 Proposal: 
1. to delete Chapter XXX in the Civil Procedure Law,  
2. alternative: to rephrase the Chapter so that settlement of a dispute in court may be 
instituted exclusively on the basis of a mutually agreed proposal by all participants in 
the collective bargaining.  
 
 
EXTENDED EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
 
We have seen above that it is common practice to extend the validity of a collective 
bargaining agreement concluded at the level of the entire economy, or of individual sectors, 
to include all employers in Serbia, and/or in a given branch, once such agreement has been 
concluded. In this way, the association of employers, on the one hand, protects itself against 
losing the existing membership, which would certainly occur if the collective bargaining 
agreement were applied only to these employers: they would find that it would be beneficial 
for them not to be members of the union as the collective bargaining agreement would not be 
applicable to them in such a case. On the other hand, trade unions believe that the extension 
of the collective bargaining agreement is beneficial for them as they thereby advance the 
position of employees and also their own influence. It is also suitable for the government 
which demonstrates the care for employees in this way.  
The possibility of extending a collective bargaining agreement in Europe largely 
differs from country to country – from the mere existence of the legal possibility of extension, 
to extension requirements, to the frequency of deployment of this mechanism. Out of 30 
member countries of the European Economic Area (EEA),68 21 members have mechanisms 
for the collective bargaining agreements’ extension, and nine do not (including Italy, the UK, 
Sweden and Denmark).69  
It is standard practice among the countries where the extension is possible to set the 
conditions or thresholds that have to be met before a collective bargaining agreement can be 
extended. Indeed, the frequency of the extension depends on the conditions’ strictness.   
Quite a large number of countries are insisting, prior to deciding on extension, that 
the condition of the agreement’s representativeness has to be satisfied or that it is 
representative in order to be extendable. Representativeness of a collective bargaining 
agreement is measured by the number of workers covered by the original agreement, i.e. by 
the percentage of all employees in a branch. Thus, the requirement in Germany, Slovenia and 
Latvia is that 50% of employees are initially covered, in Greece this percentage is 51% and 
55% in the Netherlands. In Finland, the required percentage was also 50% until recently. The 
strictest regime is in the Slovak Republic where the extension of the collective agreement the 
requires employer’s consent.   
                                                      
68 EEA includes all EU member states and Norway, Island and Liechtenstein. 
69 Romania does not have the extension mechanism, either, but is not necessary there as collective bargaining is 
conducted at the branch/industry level so that signed agreement covers all employees.   
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According to accessible data, in most EEA countries the extension of a collective 
bargaining agreement either does not exist as an institute or is rarely or not applied at all. 
Extension of a collective bargaining agreement is frequent only in Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, France and Portugal. In other words, most countries have the legal basis 
for the extension mechanism for higher level collective bargaining agreements, but in many 
countries this possibility is rarely availed of, or not at all, so that application of this 
mechanism is usual in a smaller number of countries.70  
The basic arrangements of the Labor Law concerning the extended effect are the 
following (Article 257):  
• the Minister may decide that the collective agreement or some of its parts be also 
applied to employers who are not members of the employers’ association which 
signed the collective agreement, 
• this decision assumes the existence of “justified interest”:  
o for the purpose of implementing economic and social policies in the Republic 
of Serbia, ensuring equal working conditions which represent the minimum 
rights of employees that arise from work and are based on work; 
o for the purpose of diminishing the differences in wages in a certain industry, 
which have a substantial bearing on the social and economic position of 
employees and entail, as a consequence, unfair competition; provided, 
however, that the collective agreement being extended is binding upon 
employers who employ at least 30% of the employed in a specific branch. 
 
To date, the Minister has neither expressed a wish to provide arguments in the 
decision on the extension of a collective bargaining agreement proving the existence of 
justified interest, as envisaged by the Labor Law, nor does he prove the type of the 
relationship between the extension of a collective bargaining agreement and „economic and 
social policies“, or that the extension leads to „diminishing of the differences in wages ….. 
that have a substantial bearing on the position of the employed“, and even less that CBAs 
which are extended cover more than 30% of employees in the given branch.71 All these legal 
requirements are formal and the Minister is obliged to respect them and report them as met 
in the rationale of his Decision, and particularly the last one which is quantitative and, 
accordingly, easily verifiable.  Without taking into consideration these legal conditions and 
without their transparent disclosure in the relevant document (Decision), the mere act of the 
CBA extension remains disputable from the points of view of legality and legitimacy. 
 
                                                      
70 For overview, see: Extension of collective bargaining agreements in the EU, Background paper, Eurofound, 
2011.  
71 The text of these decisions includes only the provision on extension and nothing else. Thus, one decision fully 
reads as follows “Article 1: Branch Collective Agreement for Building Industry and Building Material Industry of 
Serbia ("RS Official Gazette", no. 1/11) shall also apply to employers performing the activity of building industry 
and building material industry, who have not participated in its conclusion. Article 2: This Decision shall 
become effective eight days following its publication in the "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia". 
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Generally, the system of collective agreements’ extension has significant short-
comings: 
• affects the freedom of collective bargaining because it also extends the agreement 
of two parties – trade union and  employers’ association – to those who have not 
participated in the bargaining, i.e. the employers who are members of other 
associations or are not members of any association and who represent a vast 
majority, 
• it introduces legal uncertainty into business activity because employers do not 
know whether and when the Minister will use his mentioned right and regulate 
numerous crucially important elements of doing business (for example, 
employees’ wages), which directly and materially reflect on the company’s 
financial results, 
• it introduces political motives into collective bargaining, because the relevant 
Minister may have in mind the interests of the government and the governing 
coalition when thinking about the decision on the extension; the politics thus 
interferes with economic life unnecessarily and with negative consequences, and 
begins to directly influence the operation of the private sector,  
• it prompts the representative organizations of employers and employees to 
observe the impact of collective bargaining on them as organizations, and not on 
employees or employers; the Union of Employers has noticed that their members 
are leaving because of the acceptance of the collective agreements that only apply 
the employers from that association, so that they took the view and informed the 
Ministry that they would no longer sign the collective agreements if the expanded 
effect is not promptly prescribed for them;72 only in such a case, they hope, the 
reason will disappear which was prompting the employers to leave their 
association (in order to protect themselves against the effects of the collective 
agreement), 
• it expands the effect onto all companies of a system of collective agreements which 
are not compliant with the principles of the modern market economy (for 
example, wage determination based on the coefficient and minimum labor cost 
rather than on the basis of modern work performance measurement systems, etc.), 
• it expands the effect of the collective agreement which was made with the 
participation of one employers’ association whose representativeness is disputable 
and which cannot be believed to represent the essential part of the economy of 
Serbia, which undermines the legitimacy not only of the collective agreement but 
also that of its extension. 
 
Such politicized system of extended collective agreement’s effect, without the 
participation of employers who represent a dominant part of the economy, has turned into its 
contradiction where one party aspires to pre-election gathering of votes, the second party to 
                                                      
72 Analysis of the application of the General Collective Agreement 2008-2011, Union of Employers, 2011,  
p. 36 
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satisfying its own interests, and the third to the interests of the stratum it represents, while 
interests of the economic recovery and development of the country are not respected very well.  
It is even questionable whether the extension mechanism of collective agreements is 
useful for the trade unions, as it is generally thought, or not. For, if collective agreements are 
normally extended to all employers and employees, one can ask whether it makes sense to be 
a member of a union and pay the membership fee when all employees with all employers have 
the same benefits from the union’s activity, and not only the embers of the union which 
signed the collective agreement.  
 
Proposal: 
1. to introduce into the Labor Law the concept of representative collective agreement 
which have to cover at least 50% of employees of a given sector or territorial unit; 
the second condition is that both parties in the bargaining (the unions together, 
and the employers together) have to ensure at least two-fifths of the said 50%, for 
the purpose of balanced significance of the signatories, 
2. to stipulate that representative collective agreements can exclusively be extended, 
3. to stipulate by the Labor Law, in order to regain confidence in legitimacy of 
utilization of the collective agreement extension mechanism, that each concrete 
decision on extension  shall be signed by the president of the Republic (in 
Belgium, the extension is proclaimed by the royal decree), 
4. alternative: to delete Articles 257-261 of the Labor Law which regulate the matter 
of extended effect. 
 
These amendments would resolve the pressing problem of the existing practice with 
the extension of collective agreements’ effect, and would enable that this institute of collective 
bargaining cease to be the stumbling block and, possibly, to gain more legitimacy than it 
currently has.  
There is another type of extension effect of the collective agreements which is much 
less mentioned in the public and expert discussions: extension at the company level. Namely, 
the Labor Law envisages (in Article 262) that the collective agreement with employer is also 
binding upon the employees who are not members of the trade union which has signed the 
collective agreement. This arrangement brings along several difficulties: (1) it is also binding 
upon those who have signed no agreement, which is contrary to the freedom of bargaining, 
(2) creates a possibility that all employees are bound by the decisions of a minority trade 
union, i.e. the trade union which was the first to sign the collective agreement with the 
employer, (3) may lead to competition between the unions in the company with regard to the 
first signing of the collective agreement, which need not necessarily be in accordance with the 
employees’ best interest.  
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Proposal: 
1. to rephrase Article 262 of the Labor Law in the manner that all employees be bound 
only by the representative collective agreement with the employer, i.e. the collective 
agreement concluded by the majority trade union or the coalition of minority trade 
unions which represents the majority of the company employees,  
2. alternative: to delete Article 262. 
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Chapter 5 
ELEMENTS OF THE LABOR MARKET  
REFORM STRATEGY 
 
The above chapters have discussed the problems on the Serbian labor market, 
weaknesses of policies on the labor market and numerous specific suggestions for improving 
regulation and operation of labor market public policies. This final chapter will discuss 
individual global and operational elements of the new government strategy for boosting 
employment and improving competitiveness, through amendment and promotion of policies 
and better functioning of government institutions.  
Principles. The reform of the labor market policies as proposed in this study is based 
upon several general principles: 
• inclusion in the framework of general economic and social system reforms; as future 
progress of the country principally depends on institutional factors and the economic 
policy quality – on well-arranged business ambiance, i.e. attractiveness for investing 
and doing business – ahead of Serbia is the task to continue and bring to end the 
transition processes initiated long ago and to definitely set up a vibrant economy, 
whereas the labor market and related policies reforms will have to fit into that 
framework;73  
• comprehensive approach, which means a conceptual and temporal correlation of the 
reforms in different areas of the labor market; conceptual orientation would need to 
ensure that activities are harmonized in the same direction, without inter-policy 
conflicts, while temporal harmonization of activities would need to ensure 
synchronization of both the efforts and effects of the reform program; needless to say, 
temporal harmonization does not involve simultaneousness since the program 
implementation will inevitably take a somewhat longer period of time; 
• respect for the principle of equality, each individual is in the same position both before 
the law and among other participants on the market, without rents and privileges; the 
position of a man who works needs to be determined by his merits in economic 
activity, and not by extra-market privileges.  
Labor legislation. The existing labor legislation has changed the direction of the right 
and responsibility equilibrium pendulum in favor of employees, for the purpose of as 
complete protection as possible. In the longer run, the result of such shortcoming is the lower 
employment and less efficient economy, as proved to be the case in Serbia. If Serbia wishes to 
embark upon the path of a real economic recovery, one of the reform directions will also have 
to cover the labor legislation.   
                                                      
73 ‘For a complex approach to the reform program, see Bela knjiga 2011, predlozi za poboljšanje poslovnog 
okruženja u Srbiji (White Book 2011, Proposals for Improving Business Environment in Serbia), FIC, Belgrade, 
2011 
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Serbia needs action of the new government that will create an appropriate legal 
framework for labor, which will encourage and not undermine the employment. For that 
purpose, it is necessary to improve flexibility that will enable efficient adjustment of the needs 
of individual employees and the business needs.   
The proposed reforms of labor legislation contained in this study start from the need 
to establish a true equilibrium between the interests of employees and interests of employers:  
• employee’s interests must be respected through his fundamental rights: to adequate 
remuneration for work, to legal working hours (except in special circumstances), to 
paid annual leave and other necessary absences from work, to free bargaining with 
employer concerning the working conditions, to protection against discrimination 
and exploitation, to support in the case of termination of employment; 
• employer’s interest must also be observed and he must be allowed to manage and 
conduct the operations and adapt the company to external challenges in the best way 
he can, without unnecessary restrictions, starting from the fact that the mission of a 
company existence is to create newly added value, and not the social policy (which 
needs to be mostly cared of by the government). 
 
In addition to employee’s and employer’s interests, there is one more party whose 
interest would need to be taken into account in this type of thinking: that party is the 
unemployed. As he is not employed, he is not protected by law, and is not protected by the 
trade unions (in spite of their permanent proclamations concerning the fight against 
unemployment, they are representing the interests of the employed, usually older age 
workers). The point is the following: behind each dishonest or non-productive worker whose 
dismissal is impossible or prohibitively expensive there is one young man, honest and willing 
to invest his maximum efforts at work, only if offered a chance. Protection against dismissal, 
for example, is often the protection of undeserved privileges of insiders, those who have 
employment, against life risks, on account of all others: both the employers and the 
unemployed (usually young, frequently women, those without protection). 
The proclaimed goal of Serbia is to integrate with the European Union. Therefore, 
natural is the interest in getting familiar with, and in using the experience, of the member 
states. Although the labor market regulation falls under the competence of the member states, 
a joint global model has nevertheless been established, contrary to the American liberal 
model, but with considerable differences in the concrete solutions. During the last 15 years or 
so, in Europe has been underway the process of liberalization of labor market institutions. 
The process is progressing slowly but, as it seems, unequivocally. The existing crisis has only 
spurred the reform movement. Chapter 2 speaks about this in greater detail. In the past 
decade, Serbia accepted the European model or, more specifically, its more restrictive version. 
It is the time now also for Serbia, if it is still intended to follow EU examples, to start 
following the more advanced member states in their reforms oriented to more flexible forms 
of regulation.  
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The reform objectives would need to be: 
1. flexible labor legislation, without unnecessary paternalism which limits the possibility 
of employee/employer bargaining based on free will and awareness of one’s own 
interests, 
2. free and well-regulated collective bargaining of legitimate representatives, without 
imposing the will of minority participants on majority participants, 
3. simplification of the procedures, shortening of deadlines, acceleration of trials so that 
employee’s uncertainty is lesser and that employer can react efficiently and faster. 
No waiting. Employment and unemployment in Serbia are extremely dramatic. Less 
and less people are working, more and more are unemployed (as much as one-fourth of the 
labor force), more and more of those inactive... The economic crisis in Serbia which has 
spilled over from the world at the close of 2008 is certainly one cause for such a situation, but 
not the only one. Others can be found in the weaknesses of the general economic regulation, 
particularly the labor relationship regulations, and in the institutions that are implementing 
them.  
There is a two-way link between the economic activity and the labor force market. In 
one way, as has been noted, the level of economic activity determines the necessary number of 
workers, i.e. the current situation on the labor force market. On the other hand, the labor 
force market also influences on the level of economic activity. Depending on the situation on 
the labor force market – availability of the necessary profile of workers, predominant labor 
force price (including the level of imposts payable on wages), good regulating arrangements 
in the labor and related legislation, quality of operation of government and other institutions, 
character of collective bargaining, etc. – will also depend on the attractiveness of the 
ambiance for economic activity. If the trends in the mentioned areas are negative, and in 
Serbia they are, the labor market will then hinder the economic activity and represent an 
impediment to economic growth. 
Such two-way feature of the economic activity and labor force market impact means 
that Serbia needs not wait for the economic crisis to pass and for employment to possibly 
begin to rise exclusively on the basis of increased economic activity and investment in Serbia. 
Instead, the regulatory ambiance needs to be improved, in particular the labor legislation, in 
order to contribute in that way to the attractiveness for doing business in Serbia, to help 
overcome the economic crisis, spur the economic growth and increase employment. 
Desirable steps in the reform of labor and related legislation. Reform of policies 
relevant to labor and employment should not be a current task performed only by the line 
ministry, and only on occasions, when technical and political conditions have been created; 
instead, it should be a strategic project which implies a long-lasting sustained activity and 
proper planning of necessary steps. In that respect, basic elements of an action plan could be 
the following: 
1. setting up an Employment Board at the level of the Republic of Serbia which would 
take strategic decisions on reform policies and actions and which would supervise 
their implementation; the Board would comprise representatives of the government, 
interested associations, leading experts and the like, and the Chairperson of the 
Board should be the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister. 
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2. establishing a Tripartite Committee of the Serbian Government, consisting of 
representatives of the government and relevant trade unions and employers’ 
associations, whose task would be to harmonize operative elements of reform 
policies, 
3. establishing an inter-departmental body of the Serbian government, which would 
implement the conclusions of the Employment Board and coordinate operational 
and technical work carried out in line ministries, 
4. the Employment Board adopts a framework strategy of reform policies, 
5. elaboration of a communications strategy for reform of labor and related legislation, 
6. establishment of working groups for the drafting of legal texts, 
7. the discussion of the drafts in the Tripartite Committee and the Employment Board, 
8. communication activity, informing the public of the basic proposals, 
9. a public debate about draft laws, 
10. drafting of the final bill by the Employment Board and the Government and its 
submission to the National Assembly. 
11. reform and/or promotion of work by public institutions (courts, National 
Employment Service, the Mediation Agency, the Solidarity Fund, etc.) 
12. monitoring of the entire process by the Employment Board and timely responses to 
deviations from planned actions.  
Successful reform requires strong commitment on the part of the country’s political 
leadership, based on understandings of the true long-term interests of the nation and of the 
economy, even in those cases where there is no full consensus in the political sphere. It is 
usually better to build policies on good expected results than on bad political compromises.  
Potential comparative advantages of Serbia. The relatively low price of the labor 
force compared with west European countries represents an important opportunity for Serbia 
in the future. On the basis of competitive wages, and with the fulfillment of other usual 
conditions, Serbia can attract both domestic and foreign investors and make possible 
productive investments for them, to mutual benefit.  
The labor force price is Serbia is unnecessarily increased by the dinar exchange rate 
policy and fiscal duties. The policy of the strong dinar that has been pursued incessantly in 
Serbia is increasing employees’ wages expressed in the euro, which represents the increase of 
the production costs of the export oriented sector and discourages the inflow of foreign 
investments in Serbia.  
Also, the high total imposts payable on wages make the labor force less competitive 
when compared with other developing countries than it would otherwise be. Although the 
comparison of imposts payable on wages in Serbia with those in European Union has shown 
a similar level of burden, it does not mean that the Serbian system of wage taxation is mild 
vis-à-vis the taxpayers. To the contrary, since European taxation of employees is among the 
most austere in the world, a direct conclusion can be drawn that the Serbian, due to belonging 
to the same group, is highly austere if compared with other developing countries which can 
be Serbia’s competitors in several economic sectors whose products are included in 
international trade.   
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Besides the labor cost of employees, in gross wage terms, on the demand for labor 
force and its employment also impact its standard (or average) working ability which is, in 
turn, determined by its expertise and skills on one side, and its physical and mental health, on 
the other.  
Serbia’s education system is giving poor results and is very much lagging behind in 
adapting to changed needs of economic life. This also holds true for the high education, but 
particularly for the secondary level of education. Indeed, secondary vocational education is 
changing the curricula and profiles very slowly fully because of the large number of teachers 
who have become redundant. A good example is that children are still educated for vocations 
that are almost not in demand nor will be in demand in the future (numerous metallurgical, 
chemical and similar schools), while within service-related activities are emerging the needs 
for workers of certain profiles that cannot be satisfied. Therefore, after two decades of 
unnecessary waiting, a serious reform of the secondary level of education becomes a high 
priority.  
The health protection system, in general and in the workplace, would need to aspire 
for European standards, which is the official orientation. However, in practice appear the 
unavoidable trade-offs, i.e. the impossibility to reach European goals with Serbian financial 
resources. This explains the frequent discrepancy between the normative and the real, or non-
observance of the standards in practice. Thus, the protection of occupational safety and health 
is often insufficient, even in the case of elementary things, which is particularly present in 
companies with smaller number of employees and in companies facing financial difficulties.   
The system of protection of occupational safety and health needs to be developed 
further according to new health risks threatening the workers in Serbia, and also more 
completely implemented in practice, including through more active work of inspection 
authorities.  
Implementation and institutions. Apart from legislative, there are also serious 
weaknesses in the implementation of the existing regulations, which additionally deteriorate 
the labor relations and employment in Serbia. Thus, the courts are very slow in trying labor 
and other disputes, manifesting also certain partiality, and thus contribute to prolongation of 
the conflicts and introduce uncertainty in mutual relations of the protagonists. Inspection 
authorities are insufficiently active and can also be partial, depending on circumstances. 
Recently established institutions (mediations, the Solidarity Fund, etc.) have not met the 
expectations, which raises doubts regarding the reason for their existence. Even the Ministry 
of Labor used to make moves of suspicious legality, particularly in the field of collective 
bargaining, dragging into labor relations the pure politics over all limits.   
Clearly, such operation of government and other similar institutions does not 
contribute to pure labor relations and good operation of the economy in Serbia. Accordingly, 
it is not surprising that businessmen are dissatisfied with such a situation prevailing in this 
sphere: to illustrate, 74% of them see as negative the time necessary for carrying out all the 
procedures concerning labor law,74 which is a very high percentage taking into account that 
these procedures do not involve any negative financial implications. 
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There is no doubt that improvement of the frequently poor operation of the state 
administration would need to be a priority task of the new Serbian government. A part of the 
task needs also to be a due attention to be paid to operation of the institutions linked with the 
labor market so as to contribute to improvement of labor relations, more efficient operation 
and larger employment in Serbia.  
